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ABSTRACT
The Spanish-American War changed the course of 
American history. In a few months the United States 
acquired a colonial empire and adopted a policy of 
overseas involvement that greatly altered future world 
events. The political victory of a few military reformers 
and politicians, who endorsed Social Darwinism, over those 
who upheld the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson, destroyed 
the international isolation of the American republic. No 
matter what successive political administrations claimed, 
they inherited substantial overseas commitments.
The group that engineered this profound change in 
American foreign and defence policy were led by Elihu 
Root, John Hay, Leonard Wood, Alfred Thayer Mahan and 
Theodore Roosevelt. These men were convinced that American 
economic prosperity and political independence depended 
upon exerting influence overseas. The creation of English- 
speaking democracies world-wide, which endorsed free 
trade, would guarantee American prosperity and peace. 
Josiah Strong's evangelism, which claimed advanced nations 
had a duty to help the less fortunate, provided American 
imperialists with moral legitimacy. American expansion 
required both allies and an efficient military. During the 
late nineteenth century top-ranking British officials 
decided that Britain could not maintain its industrial and
naval preeminence. An informal alliance between the United 
States and Great Britain became increasingly attractive to 
key decision-makers in both countries. This decision led 
to poorer relations with Germany and Japan because these 
states resented Anglo-American imperialism and its 
industrial power.
The American army highlighted these changes. The 
Spanish-American War had displayed deficiencies of 
command, training, and equipment that proved unacceptable 
to politicians wishing to influence the world. Army reform 
provoked political debate. Supporters of local control, 
volunteerism, and the ideologies of Jefferson and Jackson 
opposed military reform. Led by William Jennings Bryan, 
they challenged the view that national efficiency required 
a professional civil service, army, and navy responsible 
to federal authority. Ideas from Germany, Britain, France, 
and Switzerland were used to construct the new army. 
American business organisation, partly responsible for 
unparalleled economic growth, influenced the rhetoric of 
reform and new command structure of the army. The reforms 
included a General Staff structure, War College, and 
closer national guard-regular army cooperation; creating 
the basis for today's American army.
CHAPTER ONE 
TOWARDS A NEW CENTURY
In 1883 the novelist Henry James left America for 
Europe. He left a country of thirty-nine states and fifty 
million people living in a largely rural environment. 
Chester A. Arthur was president. He presided over a 
country with rural values, with government that was 
primarily local, controlled by amateurs. The political 
economist William Graham Sumner had published a book 
entitled, What the Social Classes Owe to Each Other, which 
upheld class distinctions, upper-class superiority, and 
rural stability. On August 30, 1904 James returned to 
America on the S.S. Kaiser Wilhelm II. His native land had 
greatly changed. The population was now seventy-six 
million and over percent of people lived in towns of 2,500 
people or more. Theodore Roosevelt was president. He led a 
country transformed. The rural Republic was now an 
industrial and colonial world power. James quickly 
discovered a preeminence of business ideas and values in 
America which deeply depressed him. A year later, 
thoroughly sickened by the dominance of commercialism in 
his own land, he returned to Europe.1
James could not adapt to the momentous social and 
economic change in America. Railroads had destroyed the 
old frontier and allowed substantial urbanisation. Big
2business advocated professionalism and efficiency as 
essential to develop new markets at home and abroad.
These ideas challenged the old Jacksonian and Jeffersonian 
notions of local political control, relative international 
isolation, agrarian economy, and individual amateurism. 
Alexander Hamilton's concept of a strong centralised 
state, expanded federal agencies, and a professionally 
advised executive dominated American politics. Economic 
necessity and moral obligation had created an American 
Empire. The essence of government was strong central 
authority advised by professionals. Supporters of this 
philosophy were frequently referred to as "Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans." Concerned at the increasing complexity of 
society, they argued that government must place authority 
in the hands of a body which had the confidence of the 
majority: professionals who could ensure efficiency in an 
age of increasing complexity. Such government was 
essential to ensure continued economic growth and 
political independence in a competitive international 
world. American success in a such a world depended not 
only on efficient government but also on a strong 
military. The debate over military reform reflected these 
national political and economic changes. Military 
efficiency required a new command system and a 
professional officer corps. The struggle over army reform 
highlighted the political divide within America between
3Neo-Hamiltonian Federalists and Jacksonian-Jeffersonian 
localists.
Between 1870 and 1900, the United States enjoyed both 
remarkable economic expansion and considerable Federal 
government growth. National income increased from $7 
billion in 1870 to $17 billion by 1900. Foreign 
investment, only $684 million in 1897, reached $2 billion 
by the early twentieth century. Economic development 
created new economic trusts and corporations with an 
annual 300 corporate mergers between 1895-1914 creating 
American Tobacco, U.S. Steel, DuPont, and other corporate 
empires.2 The Federal Government underwent profound 
change. In 1871 the civilian pay-roll of Federal employees 
numbered only 53,000; yet by 1901 there were 256,000 
employees. The federal budget, set at $292 million in 
1871, increased to $1 billion by 1891. Thomas Jenckes 
advocated civil service reform in the 1860's based on the 
principle of merit. He attacked provincial patronage and 
helped promote the professionalism in government 
established in 1883 with the Pendleton Civil Service Act. 
In 1895, the Dockery-Cockrell Congressional Commission 
undertook one of several comprehensive reviews of 
government administration. The apparent successes of 
commerce and industry led to interviews with business 
managers on the latest management techniques.3
4Unlike industry and the Federal Government, the 
American army was in decline in the late nineteenth 
century. The effective army created during the Civil War 
was rapidly disbanded at its end. By July, 1868 the army's 
strength was set at 54,302 officers and men, an enormous 
reduction from Civil War enrollment.4 Peacetime limited 
the army's role to pacifying fewer than 100,000 hostile 
Indians in the West and to upholding Reconstruction in the 
South.5 Further reductions in army enrollment took place 
on March 3, 1869 and July 15, 1870, when Congress reduced 
the army to 30,000 officers and men and the number of 
regiments from forty-five to twenty-five.6 By March, 1898 
the army numbered fewer than 25,000 men in a country with 
a population of over 73 million people. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, with the exception of the Civil War, 
the United States had a lower ratio of military personnel 
to population than Japan or any European power.7
At the same time as the army grew smaller, business, 
particularly railroads were developing new management 
techniques that would soon have an impact on the army. The 
completion of the great East-West rail lines created the 
largest companies of the mid-nineteenth century. The 
Illinois Central, Baltimore and Ohio, Michigan Central, 
and other railroads, undermined provincial economics and 
politics in America. As David C. McCallum, General 
Superintendent of the Erie Railroad pointed out in 1855:
5A Superintendent of a road fifty miles in length can 
give his personal attention in the direction of 
details; each person is personally known to him, and 
all questions in relation to its business are at once
presented and acted upon.8 
This economic system preserved the local control so 
important to Jefferson and Jackson. The emergence of 
larger railroads, however, overturned local control and 
produced regional, divisional, and finally national 
management. In the 18 60s and 1870s managers in the 
Pennsylvania Railroad pioneered a new departmental system 
reporting to a divisional and headquarters structure. The 
new central office consisted of departmental heads who 
worked with the president to coordinate, assess, and plan 
the goals of each department in relation to the company's 
interests.
Throughout the 1880s and particularly during the 
depression of the 1890s the consolidation and amalgamation 
of American business was promoted by ideas for national 
management. Business expanded, and by 1900 agricultural 
income was estimated at only $3 billion out of a total 
production income of over $14 billion.9 Between 1888 and 
1892 Gustavus and Edwin Swift created a national 
distribution, marketing, and processing company for beef 
products. In 1895, James B. Duke created American Tobacco 
for purchasing, manufacturing, and marketing tobacco 
world-wide. By 1900 similar organisational advances were 
made by U.S. Steel, U.S. Rubber, National Biscuit, and 
DuPont. No longer local in character, these new companies
6gave America the largest industrial capacity in the 
world.10 The economy was increasingly based upon business 
technology, business management, and science. Philosopher 
John Dewey, supported by Henry James, criticised 
nineteenth-century individualism. Americans were 
encouraged to support government bureaucracy and business 
based upon administrative efficiency and scientific 
management.11
Jacksonian and Jeffersonian supporters were not the 
only Americans alarmed by the emergence of big business 
and urbanisation. In 1883, John Hay, later secretary of 
state, published a novel entitled The Bread Winners. He 
attacked the rural egalitarian society upheld by 
Jeffersonians and created heroes who accepted their social 
position in life. He portrayed industrialists as 
Philistines.12 Elihu Root, later secretary of war, Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge, and author Henry Adams shared this 
ambivalence to the impact of business on society; they saw 
in Britain an ideal alliance between corporate wealth and 
social position which maintained stability.
Business expansion encouraged urbanisation. Between 
1880 and 1900 the number of Americans living in towns more 
than doubled. Urbanisation threatened rural American 
values and alarmed even active supporters of industrial 
expansion. Hamlin Garland and later Henry Nash Smith 
continued to chronicle the homestead and rugged
7individualism. William Graham Sumner, Theodore Roosevelt, 
and Leonard Wood all endorsed the "strenuous life concept" 
of intense physical activity as an antidote to industrial 
and urban weakness.13
Despite the reduction in the size of the American 
army, its officer corps maintained its continuity. Between 
1871 and 1898 the corps varied little more than 100 from a 
figure of 2,100 officers;14 the highest number of 
resignations was just twenty-eight in 1889.15 This 
continuity within the officer corps was reinforced by the 
continuity of ethnic origin and education within this 
relatively small body of men. The majority of senior 
officers were Protestant and came from North-eastern 
states. Such ethnic, regional, and religious cohesion 
within the officer corps was reinforced by a common 
educational experience: between 1898 and 1940, over sixty- 
eight percent of top military men graduated from West 
Point while many of the remainder had some college 
education.16 The social profiles of army officers were 
similar to those of the new business leaders. The demands 
of army life, however, removed most officers from the 
influence of corporate ideals of efficiency, organisation, 
and specialisation emerging in business and the civil 
service. Most officers lived on the frontier far from 
cities, industry, and the new commercial ideas of the 
North-east. Colonel Stephen C. Mills summed up the life of
8most when he wrote:
You were wet, and cold, and hungry; or dry, and 
hot, and thirsty, according to your geographical 
location. You chased elusive Indians over routes of 
alkali, rock and sage, they usually got away from you 
and all you got in return were the jeers of the 
fellows who didn't happen to be out that trip.... You 
were always behind on your paper work, and when you 
got the chance to make papers, it was usually done 
with the paucity of detail only equalled by Mark 
Twain's boyhood diary. A months hard scouting was 
dismissed by the entry "Distance marched during 
month, 360 miles.".... These were the good old days 
when one drill a day, five days in a week, comprised 
military training. Target practice was practically 
unknown. I think the allowance of ammunition was 
twenty rounds a year, and by custom of the service
it went in hunting.17 
During the Indian wars some seventy-five military posts 
were operational in prairie and mountain states alone, 
often located in rugged and inhospitable terrain.18 
Despite the reduction in the number of posts by the 1890s 
only sixteen of eighty posts were occupied by a regiment 
or more in 1894.19 Small military commands occupied the 
largely undeveloped West far from North-eastern corporate 
expansion and its new ideas. The lack of recreational, or 
educational facilities encouraged boredom not military 
reform.
The declining size of the army and promotion based 
upon seniority created few promotion opportunities which 
in turn discouraged interest in new ideas. By the 1890s 
many officers were often too old for the promotions they 
held, (see Table 1).
9TABLE 1
THE AVERAGE AGE OF BOTH STAFF AMD LINE OFFICERS WHEN THEY 
RECEIVED PROMOTION TO A SPECIFIC GRADE.
RANK AGE RANK AGE
Lieutenant at 31.1 Lieut. Colonel at 60.9
Captain at 43.5 Colonel at 62.25
Major at 57.1 General at 58.25
Source: Captain, later Brigd. General Wm. Crozier’s report 
on the 1901 Peking Relief Expedition to China. The North 
American Review. (Boston, Feb., 1901).
Major General Johnson Hagood described the army as an 
aging, well-trained fire department with no fires, and the 
firemen sitting around playing chequers. Promotion among 
army officers had practically stopped. Generals of the 
Civil War, demoted to captain and major, remained 
common.20 According to General Nelson A. Miles, in 1889 
110 officers in 1889 had not received a promotion for two 
decades, while even in 1895, 279 officers were still Civil 
War veterans.21 In 1890, the senior lieutenant of 
artillery had twenty-eight years of service, with twenty- 
three years as a lieutenant, while the senior infantry 
subaltern had yet to be promoted after nineteen years of 
experience at the same grade.22 Slow promotion discouraged 
interest in military innovations. An officer gained no 
advantage by studying new military methods, since all 
officers were promoted solely on the basis of seniority. 
Recognising the problems caused by long-delayed promotion, 
Congress passed a law in June, 1882 requiring mandatory 
retirement at sixty-four years of age, or after forty
10
years of service. This failed to alleviate the problem,
with most officers between forty-one and fifty-one years
of age, and only fifty-two officers sixty-one years old or
over by 1885.23 The problem remained throughout the 1890s
and early 1900s. Disenchanted and time-worn, most officers
cared little for civil service, business, or military
reform. The scattered army provided little opportunity to
practice handling larger numbers of troops at divisional,
brigade, or even regimental levels. Confronted with slow
promotion and tedious assignments to small Western
outposts, many line officers sought staff bureau
assignments, which, when made were permanent, usually
involved promotion by one grade and allowed an officer to
work regular office hours in one of the larger American
cities. Senator Redfield Proctor graphically outlined the
scramble to get a staff position while debating a bill to
increase the size of the army in 1900:
Permit me to state the common method, when there is a 
vacancy, or is to be one in the Quartermaster's 
Department. The scramble for the place commences 
months before it actually occurs. There are about six 
hundred first lieutenants in the line ... sometimes 
three hundred I am informed are applicants for the 
place .... The applicants file briefs giving their 
records, with letters from military officers, 
personal and political friends. These briefs are 
often printed pamphlets of many pages. The wives, 
mothers, and sisters of the applicants in personal 
interviews appeal to the President and the Secretary. 
The scramble to get out of the fighting branch of the 
army is at least unseemly. Of course but little 
consideration is given to most applicants, Senator A 
or Representative B has a relative or a constituent 
with powerful influence behind him and he demands it.
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Such a system of political patronage, combined with poor 
prospects for promotion and the dispersed state of the 
army, led Senator Proctor to conclude that: "No system 
could be better calculated to kill ambition.1,24 The lack 
of opportunity, however, was not the only problem which
confronted army officers in the late nineteenth century.
The end of Reconstruction in 1877 and the decline in 
Indian hostilities gave the army only a ceremonial and 
police role in a society safe from European imperial 
encroachments. A cultured Eastern woman underlined the 
apparent irrelevance of the army when, surprised by the 
appearance of an army colonel, she exclaimed: "What a 
colonel of the army ? Why I supposed the army was all 
disbanded at the close of the War!"25 Industrial unrest 
including the strikes of 1877 and the Pullman Strike of 
May 1894, which involved more than 16,000 troops, briefly
gave the army a new role in society. This role, however,
hardly justified the armies existence to Congressional 
critics keen to cut expenditure. William T. Sherman, 
commanding general of the army from 1869 to 1883, 
unconvincingly concluded that the army's peacetime role 
was to prepare for war.26 In the late nineteenth century a 
new justification for maintaining a standing army emerged, 
based upon international economic competition and the 
intellectual ideas of Social Darwinism.
12
In 1870, Britain dominated the industrial world. This 
position of preeminence was rapidly undermined by Germany, 
America, France and Japan. America exceeded British steel 
production in 1890, and by 1905 America produced four 
times and Germany twice the steel produced in Britain. 
American coal production exceeded that of Britain in 
1900.27 The industrial dominance of Britain was replaced 
by commercial competition among several powers (see Table 
2) .
TABLE 2
WORLD PERCENTAGE OF INDUSTRIAL AMD
FOREIGN TRADE 1870 -1910.
YEAR 1870 1885 1900 1910
COUNTRY
Great Britain 31.8 26.6 19.5 14.7
United States 23 . 3 28.6 30.1 35.5
Germany 13.2 13.9 16. 6 15.9
France 10. 3 8.6 7.1 6.4
Russia 3.7 3.4 5.0 5.0
League of Nations Report, Industrialization and Foreign 
Trade, cited in Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p.26.
The emergence of new economic powers caused an undignified 
scramble for world-wide colonial Empire as Britain, 
Germany, France, and Belgium attempted to secure sole 
access to raw materials and new markets at the expense of 
competitors. The creation of formal empire alarmed 
American businessmen convinced that prosperity depended on 
free trade and expanding markets. The interrelationship 
between continued economic growth and overseas trade
13
interested politicians. Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay,
Theodore Roosevelt, Whitelaw Reid and other prominent
North-eastern Republicans, reasoned that American wealth
and continued economic growth required an assertive
American foreign policy.
International relations between Great Britain and the
United States in the mid-nineteenth century were poor. The
location of the Alaskan-Canadian boundary, fishing rights,
and claims for damages inflicted by British-built
Confederate ships in the Civil War contributed to
strained relations. Initally British economic superiority
produced little inclination to settle such matters, but
the disintegration of British economic superiority led to
a friendlier attitude towards America among members of the
British establishment. In the 1880s prominent Members of
Parliement Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilk widened
their definition of upright Anglo-Saxon powers to include
America.28 British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice
emphasised increasingly cordial Anglo-American relations
when he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge in July 1890,
expressing delight at the U.S. decision to annex Hawaii:
I can't tell you with what a pleasure I see that 
Hawaii is at length to be annexed. The pleasure is 
selfish and has nothing to do with the real or 
permanent advantages to America which I believe 
will result from the step. I think there can be no 
doubt that there is an intention, (and a natural 
one), to depose English civilization, (I mean 
yours as much as mine) from the Pacific .... I 
need not say how excited we all are at the very
14
welcome proof that you have given that people who 
talk English can still fight . ...29
The effects of industrialisation which threatened to
undermine American social status by creating a new wider
middle class alarmed John Hay, Henry Adams, and Henry
Cabot Lodge. Increasingly they sought to emulate British
aristocrats, who had successfully preserved class
distinction despite industrialisation and emerging middle
class democracy. These Neo-Hamiltonian or Federalist
Republicans enjoyed cordial links with British
imperialists such as Rudyard Kipling, James Bryce, General
Sir Andrew Clark, and Arthur Balfour. A typical week for
Hay in Britain often included dinner with Lady Metcalf on
Monday, dinner with the Gladstones and John Morley on
Tuesday, Wednesday dinner at the Foreign Office with Sir
John Pauleston, Thursday dinner with Sir Cecil Spring-
Rice, and a weekend at the Joseph Chamberlains with Mrs
Robert Peel and Sir Henry Drummond.30 These extensive
social contacts with British society imbued Hay, Whitelaw
Reid and other Republican supporters, with ideas of empire
and Social Darwinism.
In America, British author Herbert Spencer, outlined
a human hierachy dominated by Anglo-Saxon Protestants, to
accompany the publication of Charles Darwin's, Origin of
the Species. He argued that advanced and progressive
society was based upon technology and science. Since
Britain and America were the most technologically
15
advanced, their societies were obviously superior to all 
others. Spencer's work sold over 350,000 copies in America 
and popularised Social Darwinism. William Graham Sumner, 
an influential Yale Professor, became a leading disciple 
of Social Darwinism in America.31 In the 1890s, Hay was 
appointed ambassador to Great Britain. He regularly 
forwarded to Washington D.C. material describing the 
advantages of imperial rule. In July 1898 he forwarded a 
pamphlet by General Clarke on the experiences of the 
pioneering British Imperialist Sir Stamford Raffles in the 
Malay peninsula. Hay drew attention to the expansion of 
trade in the region, to new civil administration, and to 
civil works implemented by British imperialists.32 
Hamiltonian Republicans readily accepted the argument that 
colonial rule benefited both the natives and the colonial 
power.
In America important religious leaders and 
influential economists also began to conclude American 
involvement overseas would be beneficial. Josiah Strong, a 
Protestant minister and reformer, published Our Country, 
which challenged the church to concern itself with social 
problems. In 1893 he published The New Era, which aroused 
spiritual idealism among American Protestants and 
encouraged support for social reform and paternalism 
abroad by describing disease, illiteracy, and poverty in 
foreign lands as an unacceptable evil. In economics the
16
ideas of Brooks Adams and other Neo-Hamiltonians attracted
considerable attention during the American economic slump
of the 1890s. Startled businessmen believed that the
American home market was saturated and that expansion
overseas was required for economic recovery. Lodge and
other Neo-Hamiltonian Imperialists supported the
evangelical and economic call for a policy of "wise
aggressiveness," which had allowed Britain to secure raw
materials and new markets.33 As Roosevelt wrote to an
agreeing Lodge:
The useful member of the brotherhood of nations is 
that nation which is most thoroughly saturated 
with the national idea, and which realizes most 
fully its rights as a nation and its duties to its 
own citizens .... As yet no nation can hold its 
place in the world or can do any work really worth 
doing unless it stands ready to guard its rights
with an armed hand.34 
Increasingly the Neo-Hamiltonians envisaged an army that 
was not merely useful but essential in a competitive 
world.
Traditional U.S. foreign policy based upon the tenets 
of avoiding alliances, maintaining freedom of the seas, 
and upholding an open door policy on trade (all endorsed 
by Britain, the premier naval power in the world) did 
little to encourage the demand for a strong military. 
However, military and foreign policy was refashioned by 
the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed European encroachment 
upon the Americas; American territorial expansion into
17
Hawaii, Midway, Johnson Island, and Samoa by the 1890s, 
and the development of formal European colonial empires.
In the 1880s the navy began a limited building program. A 
naval war college was established, and William C. Endicott 
chaired a board which considered coastal defence. In the 
army, Adjutant General Richard C. Drum ordered Major 
William J. Volkmar to organise a Division of Military 
Information, which established a military attache service. 
Congress authorised money for the appointment of officers 
overseas in 1888 and in 1889, military attaches were 
assigned to Berlin, London, Paris, St Petersburg, and 
Vienna. By the early 1890s most European capitals had an 
American military attache. These officers forwarded large 
numbers of pamphlets, articles, and other material on 
military systems. Many officers later influential in 
modifying the American army served as attaches including; 
Major William Ludlow, Captain Tasker H. Bliss, Captain 
John J. Pershing, and Captain Peyton C. March.35 
Technological breakthroughs in steam power, electricity, 
and the telegraph, coupled with American imperial 
expansion, reduced the effectiveness of America's barriers 
for isolationism: the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These 
changes further convinced Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans of 
the need for military reform. Most Americans, however, 
rejected the Federalist view of the world and endorsed the 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideals of strong state
18
politics, provincial economic control, and national 
defence based upon a locally organised, amateur National 
Guard.36
A four-year economic depression beginning in 1893 
undermined the position of the incumbent President, Grover 
Cleveland. The following year the Republican Party gained 
117 seats in the House of Representatives, which created a 
Republican majority lasting until 1910.37 In 1896 at the 
Republican Party Convention in St. Louis, William McKinley 
was selected to run for president. Born in Ohio in 1843, 
he was a Civil War veteran, a lawyer, a former Republican 
congressman, and a former governor of Ohio. McKinley 
supported big business and the gold standard. He was 
cautious about further expansion overseas. Nominated with 
the help of Senator Mark Hanna, McKinley was not from the 
Neo-Hamiltonian wing of the Republican Party.38
McKinley was opposed by Democrat William Jennings 
Bryan. Bryan was of English and Irish descent and was the 
second of six children born on a 500-acre farm in Salem, 
Illinois. He grew up in the rural Midwest, where he led a 
tough farming life. He was profoundly influenced by the 
moral evangelism in the speeches and writings of Wendell 
Phillips.39 Phillips assailed the "money power" in America 
as a menace to republican government and freedom. Like his 
father and like Phillips, Bryan endorsed Jeffersonian and 
Jacksonian opposition to policies supporting corporate
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power, a unified banking system, centralised government, 
and a larger professional military. A gifted orator, he 
was elected to Congress in 1891. He led the Democratic 
Party and Populists against big business and Neo- 
Hamiltonians.40 The depression helped McKinley to victory 
in the Presidential election; he polled over 7,000,000 
votes and carried twenty-three states, against 6,500,000 
votes and twenty-two states for Bryan. Electoral chicanery 
deprived Bryan of precious votes in West Virginia, Ohio, 
and Kentucky which might have altered the election 
result.41 The close election, despite a depression, both 
underscored the appeal of democratic ideals among the 
electorate, and emphasised the relative weakness of 
business and Social Darwinian theories, which promoted 
overseas expansion and strong central government.
McKinley attached little importance to the army and 
appointed Russell A. Alger as secretary of war. Alger, 
born in 1836, was the son of a pioneer couple both of whom 
died when he was 11 years old. He raised two younger 
children, put himself through the local academy, and 
passed the Ohio Bar in 1857. In 1859 he moved to Grand 
Rapids, Michigan and married into a prominent local 
family. He served throughout the Civil War in the 
volunteer cavalry and saw action at Gettysburg, the 
Wilderness, and in the Shenandoah Valley. After the Civil 
War he became a timber millionaire with interests in
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Canada, California, and Michigan. He was ambitious but 
politically naive.42
Alger encountered an army frustrated and divided. 
These problems were exacerbated by a command system which 
promoted bitterness between staff and line officers. The 
administrative system also created resentment between the 
top ranking soldier in the army, the commanding general, 
and the secretary of war and staff officers. Army 
management departed from planned organisation through the 
Revolutionary and Jacksonian Periods and had been 
finalised by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, and the 
U.S. Senate in March 1821. The structure upheld the 
president's role as commander-in-chief but did not clarify 
the limits of command assigned to the commanding general 
of the army. The commanding general was allotted control 
over military discipline and military operations with all 
orders relating to these issues transmitted through his 
office. The secretary of war retained financial control 
over the army, under the president, and was directly in 
charge of the staff bureaus, (see Appendix l).43 Such a 
system appalled Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, who endorsed 
the idea of a strong central government, served by 
professionals, with clear lines of communication to the 
executive.
Staff bureaus were composed of officers with 
permanent appointments, responsible directly to the
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secretary of war. These officers paid scant attention to 
requests from officers in the field or orders issued by 
the commanding general of the army. Such a confused 
system, with no clear delineation of control led to 
constant friction between the commanding general and 
secretary of war. Prussian military success increased the 
frustration felt by the few officers interested in 
reforming the ineffective American system. Prussia had 
created a highly successful army, while the American army 
suffered dismal promotion prospects, divided command, and 
congressional enmity.
Defeated at Jena in 1806 by Napoleonic France,
Prussia soon set about rebuilding its military reputation. 
Gerhard Scharnhorst, Karl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von 
Moltke, Albrecht von Roon and others produced a military 
system that was, in terms of organisation, the most 
advanced in the world.44 These reformers established a war 
college for advanced education and a general staff to 
command the army. By 1821 Prussia possessed all the basic 
elements of a modern command structure.45 Unfortunately, 
political upheaval in Europe in the 1820s, which caused 
fear of revolution, led the King of Prussia to rely on his 
army officers for political support. This decision by the 
king undermined civilian control of the army. The powers 
of the elected war minister were reduced and the 
organisational structure envisaged by Scharnhorst, 
Clausewitz, and other army reformers was overturned.
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In America the frustration and competition between 
the secretary of war and commanding general over who 
controlled the army led Winfield Scott to write to the 
secretary of war in 1849: "It is in my opinion, 
indispensable that the movements of all staff officers 
immediately connected with the troops, as well as the 
number required at particular stations should be regulated 
by my orders."46 This friction continued throughout the 
early years of the Civil War, with poor command relations 
between General George B. McClellan and Secretaries of War 
Edwin Staunton and Simon Cameron, symptomatic of the poor 
command structure of the army. President Lincoln 
eventually solved this problem by promoting his most 
successful general, Ulysess S. Grant, to general-in-chief 
and giving him complete control of the army. In 1865, 
however, the Civil War ended, and control of the army 
reverted to the secretary of war. Grant found his 
authority undercut as staff bureaus re-asserted their 
independence from the commanding general, and re­
established their allegiance to the secretary of war.
The politics of President Andrew Johnson's 
administration, and Grant's own presidential plans 
prevented any concerted attempt to stop this erosion of 
power. In 1868 Grant was elected president and General 
William T. Sherman became the new commanding general of
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the army. Grant attempted to solve command problems in the 
army by ordering the secretary of war and staff bureaus to 
transmit orders through the offices of the commanding 
general.47 Grant and Sherman’s reforms were attacked by 
important members of the Republican Party, including 
Secretary of War John A. Rawlins. Opposition to placing 
considerable military power in the hands of a military man 
could not be overcome. Grant revoked the proposed reforms, 
and the role of the commanding general returned to that of 
military figurehead. The divided army command structure 
remained.48 Sherman continued to advocate reform despite 
this set-back, and bitter exchanges with Secretary of War 
William Worth Belknap ultimately induced Sherman to move 
his headquarters out of Washington to St. Louis.
Traditionally, American soldiers had regarded the 
French army as a model worthy of emulation. Sylvanus 
Thayer and Dennis Hart Mahan used French military ideas 
when they reformed West Point, while the strategic and 
tactical concepts of Jomini were used in American military 
manuals.49 The quick military victories by Prussia over 
Denmark, Austria, and France in successive wars alerted 
those few officers interested in reform to the potential 
of the new German military structure. General Philip H. 
Sheridan who replaced Sherman on November 1, 1883, 
observed the rapid Prussian victory over France while on a 
seven-month trip to Europe. The mobilisation plans of
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Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke impressed 
Sheridan, who concluded that the American army required a 
war planning agency. Sheridan missed the bitter struggle 
between Chancellor Bismarck and von Moltke over political 
objectives in the Franco-Prussian War, which highlighted 
the increasing power of the German General Staff.
Impressed with Prussian military success, most nineteenth- 
century American military reformers failed to realise that 
the political freedom given to the Prussian army was 
unacceptable in the American democratic political 
tradition. Sheridan was accompanied by Colonel William B. 
Hazen, a former Civil War major general, who investigated 
the Franco-German military education systems. In his 
report published in 1872, he praised the German system 
while criticising the American army for its arrogant staff 
departments and confused command structure. Returning to 
America, both officers gave enthusiastic reports to 
General Sherman, with Sheridan declaring that the Germans 
had built a "perfect military system."50 Sherman spent 
several months observing European armies and continued to 
promote military reform. In June 1870 he appointed 
Lieutenant-Colonel Emory Upton commandant of cadets at 
West Point.
Upton, from Batvia, New York, was the tenth child of 
a zealous Methodist family that embraced temperance and 
abolitionism. He entered West Point in 1856, studied
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science and mathematics, and developed a professional 
contempt for civilian soldiers. A successful cadet, he had 
his choice of appointments and joined the 5th U.S. 
Artillery on May 14, 1861.51 Upton served with all three 
arms during the Civil War, was wounded twice, and was 
promoted rapidly from 1st lieutenant in 1861 to brigadier 
general United States army and major general of volunteers 
by 1865. His views on an army necessary for the republic 
were profoundly influenced by his participation in some of 
the most ferocious fighting of the war at Antietam, 
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and the Bloody Angle at 
Spotsylvania Court House. He had seen militiamen run at 
Bull Run, had seen volunteers refuse to fight because 
their contracts had been violated, and had seen state 
governors who manipulate promotions, including his own, 
for personal political gain.52 Upton was reduced in rank 
to lieutenant-colonel with the rapid demobilisation at the 
end of the war. After the war he served in the West. In 
1870 his wife died, and he turned his full attention to 
military reform.53 By 1875 he had established himself as a 
prominent military theorist. Sherman convinced Secretary 
of War Belknap to give Upton and two other officers - 
cavalryman Brigadier General "Sandy" Forsyth and 
artilleryman Major Joseph P. Sanger - permission to tour 
the world to analyise military systems.
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The three officers sailed from San Francisco in late 
1875, returning to New York in 1876, having visited Japan, 
China, India, The Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Western 
European States.54 On his return Upton recommended that a 
war school be established at Fort Leavenworth and began 
work on his report entitled, The Armies of Asia and 
Europe. published in 1878.
Upton's ideas quickly became popular in reformist 
circles in the army. He proposed a new three-battalion 
structure for regiments, staff appointments for fixed 
terms, promotion based on merit, a system of advanced 
military education including a war college, and a general 
staff system created by the amalgamation of the Adjutant 
General's Office and Inspector General's Department.55 
Upton did not outline the powers of the commanding general 
or those of the secretary of war in his new system. His 
praise for the Prussian system implied the commanding 
general would be chief of the general staff with 
considerable independence from civilian control. In 
Prussia von Moltke operated increasingly without civilian 
control, despite the presence of the able Chancellor 
Bismarck. The inability of Upton and other nineteenth- 
century reformers to define the relationship of the 
secretary of war to the commanding general within the army 
command structure and their failure to recognise that the 
freedom given to the Prussian army would be unacceptable 
in America limited their contribution to later reforms.
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In 1865 the only national institutions for military 
education were the military and naval academies at West 
Point and Annapolis. Under the command of the chief of 
engineers, West Point was largely a technical school. In 
1866, however, it was given independent status and a 
broader curriculum was implemented. General Sherman 
encouraged educational reform while commanding general. In 
1868 an artillery school was established at Fort Monroe to 
give the first post-graduate training for West Point 
officers. In 1881 similar advanced schools for the other 
two branches of the army were established with the School 
of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort 
Leavenworth.56 This school attempted to provide some form 
of post-commission training for isolated field officers 
accustomed to commanding small garrisons. Though only 
partially successful, the school became influential 
through two of its instructors; Captain Arthur Wagner and 
Captain Eben Swift.
Wagner was an influential reform-minded officer. Born 
in Chicago on March 16, 1853, he graduated from West Point 
in 1875. He spent his early years in the army fighting 
Indians in the Dakota Territory. In 1881 he became 
professor of military science at Louisiana State 
University, later moving to the Florida Seminary in 
Gainesville to hold a similar post. In the late 1880s he 
was appointed lecturer in military art at Fort Leavenworth
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and was soon promoted to head of department. In 1888 he 
visited Europe, on leave of absence, to study the 
organisation and methods of the German army. He visited 
the war college in Berlin and war schools at Potsdam and 
Metz. Wagner toured European battlefields and studied the 
Austro-Prussian conflict in the light of the Civil War; 
the published result was the highly acclaimed Campaign for 
Koniqgratz. In 1893 he published The Service of Security 
and Information, which became the textbook at the three 
service schools, and in 1895 he published Organisation and 
Tactics. which was authorised as the standard text for all 
officer examinations.57 In 1893 Eben Swift joined Wagner 
on the faculty at Fort Leavenworth. Unlike Wagner, he was 
concerned with the methods of teaching military 
instruction, and both men complemented each other.58
In 1878 the military reform proposals advocated by 
Upton were introduced to the House of Representatives. 
Sherman, Hazen, and Upton prevailed upon House minority 
leader James A. Garfield and Senate Military Affairs 
Chairman Ambrose E. Burnside to support reform. A product 
of German military thinking the bill was defeated in 
Congress, by those opposed to political freedom for the 
army.59 Sherman, Sheridan, Upton and Hazen were influenced 
both by the military success of Grant when freed from 
political control and the easy victories achieved by 
Prussia in Europe. These men wanted the general-in-chief
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to have absolute authority over the army. The belief that 
Grant and von Moltke succeeded due to freedom from 
political constraints challenged the deeply held Anglo- 
American distrust of autonomous standing armies at a time 
when the need for an army was not apparent. Not 
surprisingly, proposals for reform under these conditions 
invariably failed.60
The emerging concept of professionalism affected the 
army with the creation of new expert associations. In 
1885, the U.S. Cavalry Association was established, 
followed by an Infantry Association in 1892 and an 
Artillery Association in 1893. All three associations 
produced their own journals.61
On August 14, 1888 Lieutenant General John McAllister 
Schofield replaced Philip Sheridan as commanding general 
of the army. Schofield, like Sherman and Sheridan, 
promoted military reform, but, unlike the previous 
commanding generals, he understood the limitations of his 
office. Born in New York in 1831, he graduated from the 
military academy in 1853 and was appointed assistant 
professor of natural philosophy at West Point in 1856. In 
1861 he was appointed a major of volunteers and served on 
the staff of General Lyon. In November 1861 he rose to 
brigadier general of volunteers. A divisional commander in 
the western theatre during the Civil War, he later 
commanded the Army of the Ohio under General Sherman. On
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November 30, 1864 he was promoted to brigadier general in 
the regular army. After the war he served as secretary of 
war in Andrew Johnson's administration, held various 
departmental commands, and commanded West Point between 
1876 and 1881. In 1866 and 1881 he toured Europe to 
evaluate various military systems. During his tenure at 
West Point and throughout his military life, Schofield 
took an interest in military reform and in young, reform- 
minded officers.
Tasker H. Bliss, William H. Carter, and William M. 
Wherry all served under Schofield.62 Bliss in particular 
served extensively as his aide and secretary. In 1879 
Colonel Wherry, while serving on Schofield's staff, 
published an article entitled "The Command of the Army," 
which explained the problems of a divided military command 
and advocated a new centralised command structure.63 
Unlike previous commanding generals, Schofield in 
particular stressed that any military reform that 
threatened civilian political control would always be 
unacceptable in America. Schofield proposed a centralised 
command structure which retained the political control so 
badly undermined in Germany. On February 23, 1889 he 
outlined his ideas in a memo to President Grover 
Cleveland:
In time of peace it is neither necessary, nor
proper, that the commanding generals be clothed
with the supreme authority of the Commander-in-
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Chief, nor that the staff be exempted from the 
responsibility to their staff superiors. But the 
commanding generals are, no less in peace than in 
war, the representatives of the Commander-in- 
Chief, and delegated in part by him to his 
subordinates .... All this does not involve any 
possible distinction between the President's 
authority and that of the Secretary of War. So far 
as concerns or is known to the Army, of the line, 
staff, and generals, alike. He is responsible 
alike for the military and fiscal affairs of his 
department. He is an impartial judge between those 
of his subordinates, who are charged with 
different often conflicting interests .... The 
function of the staff in this regard, is to watch, 
to inspect, to inquire, to investigate and to 
report to their chief, all the things that require 
correction; but not to decide nor command except 
their own subordinates .... it would be 
destructive to the efficiency of any military system 
... to permit a staff officer to overrule the 
decision of his superior in rank. If there were a 
"Chief of Staff," superior in rank to all, that 
difficulty would be overcome by his action in 
cases of contest.
Schofield continued his discussion by describing the 
limited functions of the commanding general while the 
secretary of war was so over-worked that he required an 
assistant. The commanding general was virtually isolated. 
Schofield revealed he only saw orders issued in his name
if they were submitted to him. Frequently he only knew of
orders when they appeared in the morning papers. The 
General concluded:
....The solution to all these difficulties seems to 
lie in the simple recognition of the principle 
that the General Commanding the Army is subordinate, 
in all things to the Secretary of War, no less than 
the President, and that he and his subordinate 
commanders of divisions and departments are the 
assistants of the Secretary and President in the 
military administration, no less than in the command. 
In accordance with this principle, the General-in- 
Chief would be in effect, though not in name, the
Chief of Staff of the Army.6^
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Schofield deplored the lack of further education and 
planning in the army. As commanding general, he acted as a 
de facto chief of staff, sparing the War Department the 
bitter squabbling which had plagued it throughout the 
century.65 Schofield also encouraged younger officers 
interested in reform, including Tasker Bliss.
Bliss was not a typical army officer. His father was 
an eminent language professor at Lewisburg College, the 
forerunner to Bucknell University, while his mother was 
the daughter of the dean of Vassar College. He spoke six 
languages, including French, German, and Spanish, and 
enjoyed translating Latin during his time off. One of 
thirteen children, he tried to enter the navy after two 
years at Bucknell. He failed to gain a place, and entered 
West Point in 1871. Graduating near the top of his class 
in 1875, he had the choice of any arm of the army. 
Initially he elected to join the cavalry, but a classmate 
named Sturgis persuaded him to select the artillery. The 
following summer, Sturgis died while serving with General 
George A. Custer's 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn. 
Bliss was one of a small group of reform-minded officers 
at West Point, all of whom graduated in either 1875 or 
1876. The group included William H. Carter, William 
Crozier, Arthur L. Wagner, J. Franklin Bell and William 
Wotherspoon. These officers were influenced by the reform
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proposals of Upton, Hazen, Sherman and Schofield.66 Bliss 
served for one year with his regiment, then was posted to 
the Military Academy, as assistant professor of modern 
languages. Schofield was school commandant. In the early 
1880s he was posted to the Artillery School, where he 
graduated at the top of his class and was appointed 
adjutant at the school. In 1885 he worked on the Endicott 
Board for coastal defence, and then was assigned to the 
new Naval War College.67
On October 6, 1884 William E. Chandler, secretary of 
the navy, approved the creation of the Naval War College 
under the command of Commodore Stephen B. Luce. Luce 
became convinced of the value of staff work while 
commanding the monitor Pontiac, which supported Sherman's 
army crossing the Savannah River in early 1865. The 
briefing by Sherman before the attack convinced Luce that 
staff work and planning were invaluable. Captain Alfred 
Thayer Mahan became the college's first historian, and 
Lieutenant Bliss the first lecturer in military science.68 
In 1885 Bliss visited Europe to study teaching methods in 
military science. He visited France, Great Britain and 
Germany, but like Upton was most impressed with the war 
college in Berlin. On his return from Europe Bliss was 
appointed aide-de-camp and then private secretary to 
General Schofield. Bliss was distinct from most army 
officers, who were ageing Civil War veterans, and like
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most reformers he was regarded as an outsider by the 
officer corps.69
On October 5, 1895 Major General Nelson A. Miles 
replaced Schofield as commanding general. Born in 
Westminster, Massachusetts in 1839, he volunteered for 
Civil War service in 1861. Appointed first as captain he 
rose in rank to major general by 1865 and received the 
Congressional Medal of Honour for bravery in action at 
Chancellorsville. After the war he remained in the army, 
and became a colonel in the infantry in July 1866. Miles 
spent the next fifteen years in the West, acquiring a 
reputation as an Indian fighter. In 1880 he was promoted 
to brigadier general and ten years later became once more 
Major General Miles. Unlike Bliss and other army 
reformers, Miles was a decorated Civil War veteran and 
Indian fighter and was not viewed as an "academic" who 
merely wrote books about others' exploits.70 An 
exceptionally fine regimental commander, Miles had no 
respect for civilians, was brave, ambitious, vain, and 
blunt. He never attended West Point or any service school 
and had no interest in the military ideas of Germany or 
France which he regarded as irrelevant to the unique 
American experience. Intensely proud of his promotion to 
commanding general - a post held by George Washington, 
Ulysess S. Grant, William T. Sherman and others - he had 
no intention of supporting any military reform which
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placed the commanding general under the secretary of 
war.71 Relations between the commanding general and the 
secretary of war and staff bureaus returned to acrimonious 
bickering and divisiveness.
Unlike Miles, many army officers had no faith in the 
state militias or hastily organised volunteers as 
effective fighting forces. Schofield, Hazen, and Upton 
remembered the combat failures of such forces in the Civil 
War. Younger officers such as Carter, Bliss, and Wagner, 
graduates of West Point, increasingly regarded the army as 
a "profession" and opposed "volunteerism." The National 
Guard, however, remained fundamental to Democrats faithful 
to the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson. The Guard 
represented provincial volunteerism as opposed to central 
control and professionalism. It also provided state 
political officials, who often appointed senior officers, 
with powers of patronage. In 1879 the National Guard 
Association was created; throughout the 1880s and 1890s it 
portrayed the militia as a popular West Point, able to 
counter professional regulars who might usurp the 
government. The argument proved popular and found sympathy 
in Congress, which doubled Federal appropriations for the
Guard while questioning the very need for a standing
72army. '*
Regular army officers v/ere appalled at the support 
given to the Guard, which they regarded as an
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unprofessional and inefficient organisation. Colonel J. P.
Sanger, who had accompanied Upton on his world tour,
summed up the condition of the militia when he wrote:
.... In none of the states are there schools for 
officers and non-commissioned officers .... In 
forty-two states, the company officers are elected 
by the men; in Connecticut, "on the recommendation 
of the company," in West Virginia, Montana, and 
Wisconsin, the second lieutenants are elected by the 
men; in New Hampshire, company officers are nominated 
by field officers; in Washington, upon petition of 
the majority. In thirty-five states, company officers 
were examined for appointment; in ten, they are not
Sanger continued: "cognizant of the practice of electing 
militia officers ... then it is not worth while to expect 
good discipline, or instruction, in the National Guard."
He further criticised the lack of drill, target practice, 
and standardised equipment, concluding that the volunteer 
system was a "broken reed."73 Despite these failings the 
National Guard, and the concept of a volunteer army in 
times of national emergency, retained the powerful 
ideological and political backing of the Democratic Party 
and state politicians.
By 1898 most officers still failed to recognise the 
significance of the technological, professional and 
managerial revolutions at home or the importance of the 
new commercial competition abroad. The creation of 
professional associations, new service schools and a 
Military Information Division with military attaches 
around the world, had little effect on aging Civil War
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veterans in far-flung Western outposts. Younger officers, 
imbued with new ideas of professionalism had no authority 
to reform the army. The efforts of Sherman, Sheridan, 
Schofield, and Upton had failed; as the Spring of 1898 
arrived, with the possibility of war, the army remained 
weak and divided.
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CHAPTER TWO 
"NO END OF A LESSON;88 AMERICA AND THE 
SPANISH - AMERICAN WAR
On April 25, 1898 the United States declared war on 
Spain. By the end of August, America had defeated Spain 
and acquired Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and Manila 
in the Philippines. Despite the previous expansion of 
American commercial interests into Hawaii and some 
enthusiasm for acquiring Samoa, these overseas 
acquisitions marked a radical departure from the American 
past. The United States was transformed from a continental 
state, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, into a 
country with new responsibilities far overseas.
President McKinley only reluctantly agreed to war.
The civil war in Cuba, which provoked an inept Spanish 
reaction, compelled the President to demand that Spain 
vacate the island.1 Unsuccessful rebellions against 
Spanish rule had occurred in 1868, 1878, and again on 
February 24, 1895. The underlying cause remained the same: 
poverty created by Spanish corruption and mismanagement. 
Throughout the late 1890s Cuban rebels like Thomas Estrada 
visited America to raise money and support for the 
insurgents. These men claimed the war as their American 
revolution and struggle for freedom.2 Spain responded by 
mobilising several hundred thousand troops, who failed to 
defeat Cuban forces, and suffered 100,000 casualties.
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Dysentery, typhoid, and malaria incapacitated 50,000 men, 
while 50,000 more were battlefield casualties.3 In January 
1896, General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, was appointed as 
the new Spanish commander.
The policies implemented by Weyler prevented McKinley 
from following the policy of strict neutrality adopted by 
his predecessor Grover Cleveland.4 General Weyler ordered 
the construction of elaborate lines of barbed wire and 
guard houses across Cuba to prevent rebel movement. His 
most controversial policy, however, was "Reconcentration," 
which involved the forced removal of rural populations 
into armed camps. Weyler ordered anyone found outside the 
camps to be considered hostile and shot. Weyler's troops 
systematically destroyed Cuban agriculture and village 
life. The overcrowded camps housing the displaced 
population lacked food and water. Extensively reported in 
America, Weyler's exploits earned him the titles, "Human 
Hyena" and "The Butcher," in the national and local 
press.5 Thousands died in General Weyler's camps; his 
policy created famine, yet failed to break the rebels or 
produce peace. In sparsely populated, mountainous eastern 
Cuba, guerrilla forces moved freely in substantial 
numbers. Only around Havana did Spanish troops exert any 
control. Weyler's strategy scattered his forces throughout 
Cuba, destroyed local agriculture, and made his forces 
dependent upon supplies from Spain and alienated American 
public opinion.6
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In America, despite the deterioration in U.S.- 
Spanish relations, the army failed to plan for any 
conflict. The army remained at its lowest numerical level 
since before the Civil War and Secretary of War Russell 
Alger and Commanding General Nelson Miles paralysed army 
command with their struggle over its control. In 1897 
Alger, thoroughly sick of Miles, ordered him to observe 
the Greco-Turkish War and attend Queen Victoria's Jubilee
• • 7just to get him out of Washington. ' In contrast, the Naval 
War College planned for war with Spain in 1895, encouraged 
by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. By 
1898 the navy, unlike the army, had detailed plans for 
operations against Spain in the Pacific, Atlantic and 
Caribbean.8 Under increasing domestic pressure to respond 
to events in Cuba, McKinley demanded that Spain enter into 
negotiations with the guerrillas and create a time-table 
for Cuban independence.
Germany was irritated by this new American interest 
in the Caribbean. Already at odds with the Anglo-Americans 
over control of Samoa in the Pacific, Kaiser Wilhelm II 
threatened:
It is high time that we other monarchies ... agree 
jointly to offer help to the Queen, [of Spain],
.... in case the American-British Society for 
International Theft and Warmongering looks as if it 
seriously intends to snatch Cuba from Spain.^
In November, 1897 British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice,
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warned Theodore Roosevelt of the German wish to expand 
commercially in the Caribbean and the unenthusiastic 
response in Berlin to any suggested American involvement 
in Cuba.10 In the spring of 1898, civil war broke out in 
Samoa, between the Anglo-American and German backed 
natives, which underlined an increasing Anglo-American 
understanding. The tripartite agreement over the islands, 
established in the Berlin Act of 1889, was broken. A new 
agreement was proposed: Germany gained Samoa, America 
received the islands of Pago Pago, and the British took 
Tonga and the Solomon Islands.11
In mid-January 1898, supporters of Spanish colonial 
rule and General Weyler rioted in Havana, wrecking Cuban 
newspapers and businesses that supported the American 
reform process. The incident angered McKinley and 
Congress, with the result that the battleship U.S.S. Maine 
was dispatched to Havana on January 25, 1898 to prevent 
further lawlessness. On February 9, the New York Journal 
published a personal letter intercepted by Cuban rebels 
from the Spanish premiere, Dupuy de Lome, to a friend in 
Cuba. The letter criticised American interference in Cuba, 
and described McKinley as "weak and a bidder for the 
admiration of the crowd, besides being a would be 
politician who tries to leave the door open behind himself 
while keeping on good terms with the jingoes."12 Many 
Americans, furious at this insult to the President,
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demanded an immediate apology. The late and half-hearted 
nature of the Spanish response only caused more resentment 
towards Spain. The U.S.S. Maine arrived in Havana and 
anchored inside the harbour. On the night of February 16, 
1898, the Maine blew up; 262 officers and men were killed. 
American public opinion was shocked, while American 
newspapers speculated the U.S.S. Maine had been 
deliberately sunk.13 Congress, infuriated by the "McKinley 
letter" and the destruction of the Maine, listened angrily 
to Senator Redfield Proctor denounce Spanish tyranny on 
his return from a visit to Cuba. In a moving speech, 
Proctor described the conditions in Cuba and the shame 
inflicted on American people for permitting such 
atrocities so close to home.14
Congress unanimously increased defence expenditure by 
$50 million and called on McKinley to take stronger action 
against Spain.15 Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who endorsed 
a Darwinian model - of inevitable world competition and 
conflict over limited resources - joined those imbued with 
Josiah Strong's missionary zeal in sweeping aside 
McKinley's caution. Even William Jennings Bryan approved 
the Congressional defence appropriation on the basis of 
protecting American honour and Cuban welfare.16 Bryan 
claimed that America was helping a friend in need, but he 
warned Republicans, who favoured overseas expansion, that 
history would only vindicate America if it upheld the
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principles of freedom and self- determination. It would be 
hypocritical and greedy if a war justified on the basis of 
humanity became a war of conquest. In a clear warning to 
Neo-Hamiltonian supporters such as Hay and Lodge, he 
attacked those who dreamed of empire around the globe and 
claimed enduring happiness was based upon a homogeneous 
people with free and democratic government.17
On April 22, 1898, the United States implemented a 
naval blockade on Cuba and two days later formally 
declared war on Spain. The demand for war swept aside any 
protest. In the House of Representatives Speaker Thomas B. 
Reed, who opposed war, summed up the feelings among 
congressmen, when asked by Vice-President Hobart why he 
had not dissuaded his colleagues. He responded, "Dissuade 
them! .... He might as well ask me to stand out in a 
Kansas waste and dissuade a cyclone." Such was the desire 
for war.18 The United States army of 24,000 regulars 
confronted a Spanish army in Cuba of 150,000 men supported 
by 80,000 Cuban loyalists. The Spanish forces, however, 
were demoralised by three years of guerrilla warfare and 
tropical disease. In these years 13,000 troops died from 
yellow fever, and by 1898 one quarter of all troops were 
hospitalised with dysentery, typhoid, and yellow fever. 
Despite these problems, Spanish forces in Cuba heavily 
outnumbered American land forces.19
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The navy, unlike the army, had planned for war. On 
April 30, 1898, Commodore Dewey, commander of the American 
Asiatic Squadron, entered Manila Bay and sank the entire 
Spanish pacific fleet. Theodore Roosevelt, the assistant 
secretary of the navy, encouraged this prompt action. 
Sympathetic to Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, he supported the 
view that American victory in the Philippines would 
encourage U.S.-Asiatic trade. American control of the 
archipelago would provide new markets, raw materials, and 
a base to exploit the increasing weakness of China 
regarded as an important future market. In the late 1890s 
large areas of China had been seized by foreign powers: 
Japan acquired Formosa; Russia seized the Liaotung 
Peninsula and Port Arthur; France took Kwangchow Bay; 
Germany occupied Kiaochow; and Great Britain seized Wei- 
hai-wei.20 America, through Roosevelt's action, now 
claimed the Philippines. The rapid action in the 
Philippines circumvented the Teller Amendment, designed by 
Bryan and other anti-imperialists to prevent America 
claiming sovereignty overseas. Added to an army 
appropriation bill, the Teller Amendment applied only to 
Cuba, not to the Philippines, which now could be legally 
seized by American forces.
Initially, the army expected the war to be a naval 
contest, with only small invasions to aid rebel forces in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. However, even this 
limited role exposed the complacency and inefficiency of
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the post-Civil War army. Despite the naval victory by 
Dewey, many Americans in coastal cities feared Spanish 
naval shelling of their homes. Congressmen demanding 
protection for their constituents discovered that the 
recommendations of the Endicott Board, and young reform- 
minded officers like Bliss had been largely ignored. 
According to one artillery officer, only 151 heavy guns 
and mortars were mounted and ready for action, out of the
2,000 recommended by Endicott, Bliss and others. General 
Miles, an early critic of the war, proclaimed Washington 
D.C. defenceless, while the Ordnance Department informed 
Congress that each coastal gun had only twenty rounds of 
ammunition.21 Congress responded quickly to public 
pressure from coastal communities and approved an 
ambitious coastal defence scheme.
The proposal by McKinley for a larger standing army, 
received less support in Congress. The National Guard, 
state politicians, and congressional Democrats combined to 
defeat plans for a larger professional army. The 
traditions of volunteerism, provincial political control 
and local identity remained strong. Representative George 
B. McClellan and General Miles both introduced plans to 
expand the professional army. McKinley's administration, 
however, supported legislation proposed by House Military 
Affairs Committee Chairman, John A.T. Hull.
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Hull, a Republican from Iowa, was a powerful member 
of the House of Representatives who chaired the military 
affairs committee for ten years.22 The "Hull Bill" 
proposed an army of 27,000 men, arranged to expand quickly 
to a force of 104,000 regulars, organised in three- 
battalion regiments as recommended by Emory Upton. The 
bill ignored controversial organisational reforms and was 
supported by all segments of the professional army 
including Secretary of War Alger, Commanding General 
Miles, and Adjutant General Henry Corbin. Despite this 
rare unanimity in the professional army, Hull's 
legislation was defeated in the House by 155 votes to 
61.23 The National Guard, state politicians, and most of 
Congress, continued to support the locally controlled 
volunteer against the federal professional. The principle 
of a volunteer army was reaffirmed and in the words of 
Representative Hull:
The opinions of Grant, Sherman, Schofield and Miles 
did not have the slightest weight when put in the 
balance against an officer in the state militia. The 
great generals had no votes, the militia officers had 
votes back of him with which to enforce his
demands.24
The failure of the bill reflected the antipathy of 
many Americans to a standing army. Indeed the minority 
report by the House Military Affairs Committee, which 
represented the views of Democratic members, bluntly 
asserted:
Such an army is not necessary to be maintained in 
the country now, neither because of our relations
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to the islands [Cuba and Puerto Rico] nor because 
of any necessity which has arisen in the country 
itself.
The report reminded Americans that "the” dangers and evils
of a standing army are many and well recognised" and that
"the one proposed in the Hull Bill would in time of peace
be a menace to the liberty of the citizen." The hostility
to a professional army even produced claims that it would
"desecrate the ballot box." The report by four Democrats
concluded by recommending a standing army of under 30,000 
25men.
On April 22, 1898 a compromise bill was signed into 
law. The President was authorised to raise an army of
120,000 men. In a major concession to the National Guard 
half of the newly created force would be local militia.26 
The legislation endorsed none of the changes suggested by 
nineteenth-century army reformers, and Congress limited 
the duration of the proposed increase by requiring all 
volunteers to be released in 1899. Ideas of provincial 
independence had defeated the attempt to create a 
professional army controlled by a central authority. 
National Guard units continued to elect junior officers 
while state governors asserted their patronage by 
appointing middle-ranking and senior militia officers. 
Many Civil War veterans, including Schofield, pressed 
McKinley not to repeat Abraham Lincoln's mistake of 
mobilising too few men early in the war. National Guard
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officers warned the President that they would not act 
unless all units were mobilised in any state called for 
volunteers. On April 23, McKinley yielded to this advice 
and, ignoring the terms of the Hull Bill, called for
60,000 regulars and 125,000 volunteers.27
Many army officers became increasingly hostile to the 
assertive and politically powerful National Guard, a body 
they regarded as unprofessional and ineffective. Comments 
made by Captain R.K. Evans reflected the antagonism in the 
regular army towards the militia. In a prize-winning 
essay, he described the Battle of Bladensburg in the 
Revolutionary War, when a small British force of regulars 
routed a large American volunteer force in good defensive 
positions. He brusquely concluded: "this incident shows 
that no reliance can be placed on raw levies, hastily 
assembled, without time to acquire discipline or learn 
their duties as soldiers."28 The conflict with Spain fully 
justified such concerns.
In the army, relations between Miles and Alger 
continued to deteriorate. Miles was appalled at the rapid 
increase in the size of the army and continued to voice 
opposition to the war. Alger was increasingly confident in 
the army's ability to succeed and so enthusiastically 
endorsed proposed invasion plans. In the tradition of von 
Moltke in Germany and of Grant in the Civil War, Miles 
asserted his right to unrestricted army command free from
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political control, a demand dismissed by McKinley. His
abrasive manner and ambition for high political office
increasingly isolated him in the War Department. As early
as 1895, the then secretary of war Daniel Lamont was
obliged to remind Miles of his position in the
administration:
To the many newspaper correspondents who have 
called on me today to inquire concerning a reported 
interview with you which appears in the Tribune of 
today and a statement printed in the Mail and Express 
each evening I have been obliged to decline to make 
any expression and I write to suggest you follow the 
same course.
I think I explained to you that no order can 
be made until I hear further from the President and 
it has not been his habit to announce his purpose to
the press in advance of action itself....^9 
The ambitions of the commanding general and his 
opposition to the war left him isolated and frustrated 
within the administration. In April 1898 he issued sound 
military advice on the problems of invading Cuba: the 
dangers of disease, the task of maintaining naval 
supremacy around Cuba, and the difficulties in supplying 
the army overseas.30 McKinley was greatly disappointed in 
Miles. Under domestic political pressure to act decisively 
and aware of the possibility of European intervention, he 
wanted a plan of action, not reasons for inaction. The 
administration ignored Miles and his advice. Neither 
"Major" McKinley nor Alger knew enough about the army to 
direct it without advice. Increasingly, they relied on 
Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, who controlled the
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bureau which issued army orders. The Adjutant General 
became a de facto chief of staff.
Corbin was born in Ohio in 1842. He volunteered for
combat in the Civil War and fought with the Army of the 
Cumberland in Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. By 1866 he 
was a colonel of volunteers and regular army captain. 
Appointed a company commander he spent the next ten years
on garrison duty in the South-West. In 1880 he was
promoted to major in the adjutant general's office in 
Washington D.C.31 In Washington he soon became friends 
with the influential Ohio lobby and profited from its 
political connections, which included President Rutherford 
B. Hayes, future President James A. Garfield, and 
McKinley. All three men liked Corbin, relied upon his 
advice, and took an active interest in his military 
career.32 In February 1898 after serving eighteen years in 
the adjutant general's office he was appointed adjutant 
general. A domineering figure, six feet two in height, 
solidly built, with a full moustache, he was an impeccable 
professional, who detested the amateur soldier and 
political opportunist. He faced an arduous task in 
mobilising the army for war.
In the words of Alger: "After 33 years of peace, 
during the greater part of which the army did not exceed
26,000 men, it suddenly became necessary to arm, feed, and 
equip more than a quarter of a million men."33 The demands
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of war quickly overwhelmed the War Department and its 
bureaus, and exposed the lack of Army intelligence, or 
staff system. The army had no pre-planned campaign of 
military action, and little intelligence on the Spanish 
army.
Major General Arthur MacArthur, a divisional
commander in Major General Wesley Merritt's force to
invade the Philippines, described the woeful intelligence:
It was my privilege to join Eighth Corps at San 
Francisco in June 1898, and on the 27th of that 
month I started for Manila in command of the third 
detachment of the Corps, consisting of five ships 
and approximately 5,000 men. Aside from the high 
spirits and feelings of self-confidence which 
actuated all concerned, the distinctive 
characteristic of the command was the absolute 
ignorance of the Philippine Archipelago, in respect 
of geography, climate, people and the general aspects 
of nature.
There was little or no literature aboard from 
which instructive information could be obtained. One 
writer to whom we had access advised all travellers 
to carry coffins, as few returned alive from Manila. 
Another and more optimistic writer cited an Eastern 
epigram to the effect that for romance and adventure 
the entire Eastern world relied upon Manila. These 
two facts constituted about all we could learn by
investigation .... 34
In addition to this lack of basic information, other 
problems in Washington seriously impeded efficient 
planning for war. The War Department was besieged by 
office seekers and reporters, who quickly relayed every 
detail of American war plans to the outside world.35 In 
order to expedite interviews with office seekers, Corbin 
withdrew all chairs from his office, save his own, and
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kept all those seeking patronage standing in front of his 
desk. The Adjutant General frequently called meetings at 
three in the morning to avoid the crowded War Department 
hall-ways the crush of reporters those wishing to promote 
themselves and interfering congressmen. William Jennings 
Bryan was among those who offered his services and 
McKinley reluctantly approved his commission. He was 
appointed colonel of a regiment of Nebraska volunteer 
infantry. Corbin made sure that the leading Democratic 
politician was given no opportunity to become a war hero, 
and his regiment was assigned to a mosquito-filled camp on 
the St. John's River in Florida.36
The mobilisation of the National Guard was a 
calamity. Almost half the guardsmen refused to leave home 
for an extended length of time and were replaced with 
hastily assembled volunteers. Most state troops were 
equipped with Springfield rifles, a single-shot, breech­
loader, using charcoal powder, which created a large cloud 
of dust when fired, revealing one's position to the enemy. 
These Springfield rifles were poorly maintained, old, and 
often exploded in the user's face when fired. Less than 
half of National Guard officers had attended an 
instructional course, and even fewer had passed a formal 
command examination.37 Training for the enlisted men 
consisted of weekly company drills, supplemented by 
regimental drills during the week, or ten days of summer
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camp. Little time was devoted to target practice since 
ammunition was in short supply. This inadequate training, 
however, was more than the replacement volunteers 
received.
While the National Guard struggled with mobilisation, 
Alger and Miles continued to argue. Alger openly resented 
Miles and dismissed his abilities asserting that, "many of 
the General's proposals were obviously impracticable, and 
not infrequently impossible."38 The lack of planning and 
proper command procedures promoted inter-service rivalry 
between Admiral William T. Sampson and General William R. 
Shafter, the commanders for an invasion of Cuba.39 
Shafter, a friend of both McKinley and Alger, was 
appointed to command the army attacking Cuba after Miles 
refused to go. A grossly fat, short-legged man, he 
displayed all the faults of a late nineteenth-century 
career officer. An aging Civil War veteran, promoted 
through the seniority system, he had spent the years since 
the Civil War in sedentary garrison posts. Shafter was 
neither physically nor mentally equipped to command the 
expedition to Cuba. In describing his physical condition, 
the chief commissary officer stated: "he couldn't walk two 
miles in an hour, just beastly obese."40 The lack of 
further educational facilities in the military had 
prevented Shafter from acquiring the necessary theoretical 
knowledge to command an army. The dispersed state of the
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army since the Civil War prevented any practical training 
with units larger than a regiment. Shafter, like many of 
his senior colleagues, was the product of a neglected 
system.
The army was further handicapped by the choice of
Tampa Bay, Florida as the main embarkation port for the
invasion of Cuba. Although closer to Cuba than any other
U.S. port, Tampa had several fundamental flaws. Unlike New
York, Charleston, Mobile, or New Orleans, Tampa was not a
deep water port and relied on a single mile-long pier to
service ocean-going shipping. Florida was largely an
undeveloped land of swamp and pine forests, filled with
snakes, insects, and disease throughout much of the state.
Significantly, Tampa was served by only one rail link.
Galveston, Savannah, Mobile, Wilmington N.C., and
Charleston all had more than four rail links. New Orleans
had eighteen rail links, which provided extensive access
to the northeast and midwest.41 The choice of Tampa was
made by Alger, after conversations with both General Miles
and Morton F. Plant. Plant owned the main railroad from
South Carolina to Florida and the only railroad which
served Tampa. Corbin, who recommended the use of New York,
was overruled, and wrote sadly of the decision:
Mr. Plant, of the railroad system bearing his name 
persuaded the Secretary of War that Tampa was the 
place and his railroad was competent to handle the 
army and all its supplies. It proved that neither 
was true .... The moving of a large army only
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meant plenty of traffic to him. His ability to do 
it he did not doubt, only he did not realize what 
he was undertaking. That was not all. Secretary 
Alger had all the confidence in his judgement and 
ability, and that was a misplaced confidence, one 
that I never shared with him .... He believed in Mr. 
Plant, no one could move him from his confidence in 
his judgement.I shall always think that all in all 
Tampa was the very worst place one could have
assembled this force.42
General Miles added to administration problems by a 
series of ill-timed press leaks and the use of his office 
to augment his income. In April, 1898 Dr. W.H. Daly, a 
member of General Miles's staff and close personal friend, 
wrote to several companies in Pennsylvania that Miles was 
in financial difficulties. Six companies each advanced 
$5000 to the General, and, in return, he recommended them 
for War Department contracts.4- Miles received money from 
Mr. Plant in Florida, in return for which the General made 
seven requests to Secretary Alger to establish a camp for
10,000 soldiers near Miami, Florida, a camp supplied by 
the Plant railroad. Alger relied on the recommendation 
from Miles and no survey of the camp was carried out. It 
was later discovered that the camp was situated on a coral 
reef, only two feet above sea-level and was surrounded.by 
thick forest with no clearings for drill. In July 1898 the 
camp was closed.44
The full extent of corruption in the office of the 
commanding general was outlined a year later by a report 
compiled by Colonel Wra. H. Carter who estimated probable 
corruption in purchases worth over $1 million. He wrote:
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Incredible as it may seem these official reports 
show among other things, that General Miles 
recommended the purchase of one type of gun, which 
had been tried by the Board of which he was 
President, had exploded with disastrous results and 
that not with standing this fact, he officially 
informed the Secretary ... that the trial 
demonstrated high explosives could be thrown by them 
with perfect safety.
Carter criticised the attempt by Miles to replace the
standard issue Krag-Jorgensen rifle with a Winchester
rifle of inferior quality and concluded:
The reports of the Chiefs of Ordnance upon General 
Mile's various positions will make it clear, why, 
at a very early stage in the war, it became 
absolutely necessary to question General Miles in
matters he should have known all about.45 
Despite these problems, army camps were established 
across America, and an invasion force began to assemble at 
Tampa. On April 29 General Shafter arrived in Tampa with 
the first 6,000 troops and after a further evaluation of 
the probable dangers, McKinley authorised a force of
40,000 troops, to be sent to Tampa in early May.46
The arguement for an active life demanded physical 
activity to counter weakness in martial spirit caused by 
urbanisation. Roosevelt, eager to follow this idea, 
resigned as assistant secretary of the navy to become a 
lieutenar.t-colonel in the first volunteer cavalry. Deeply 
involved in strategic naval planning Roosevelt was 
appalled at the confusion he experienced while in the 
army. Neither the army nor the navy had the shipping to 
conduct an invasion. The Quartermaster's Department
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struggled just to assemble thirty-eight chartered vessels
at Tampa, a motley fleet of steam lighters, a collier,
barges, a tug and two hastily converted hospital ships:
the "John Englis" and the "Olivette." The whole fleet
could carry only 16,000 men and a limited amount of
equipment, well below the force of 40,000 authorised by
the President.47 The immediate problems of training and
supply increased with embarkation, which underlined both
the lack of staff planning and inadequate resources
available to the army. Roosevelt was disgusted and wrote
to his friend, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, describing the
shambles in Tampa:
There are hundreds of freight cars containing 
stores of all kinds which nobody knows anything 
about, and the line is so jammed that it is 
impossible to move as fast as the muletrains go 
alongside .... On the wharf not one shadow of 
preparation had been made to receive any regiment, 
no transportation had been assigned in advance, and 
there was actually no office for either the
Commissary or Quartermaster ....48
By May 8, 1898, over 1,000 freight cars were stranded 
between Charleston and Tampa, while on the pier only two 
or three freight cars could be unloaded each day. The army 
and Mr. Plant had not agreed on any specific loading 
schedule, and there were frequently no invoices for the 
railroad wagons. Nobody had any idea what was on each 
train or what had priority. The hot and humid weather 
added to everybody's discomfort. When troops discovered 
that less than half the force could be carried on waiting
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ships, they illegally seized ships to ensure their 
participation in the invasion. These men were crowded 
aboard ill-designed transports for eight days in hot, 
humid weather, before they eventually set sail.49
The preparations for the invasion of the Philippines, 
under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt, were 
much more successful. He organised an effective 
expeditionary force despite having to sail 7,000 miles 
from California to a land defended by 20,000 Spanish 
soldiers. Unlike Shafter, Merritt had experience 
commanding divisional forces in the Civil War, was 
physically fitter than Shafter, and enjoyed the benefits 
of San Francisco's deep-water harbour and rail links. 
Despite this successful organisation of forces the attempt 
to invade and hold the Philippines proved disastrous. The 
islands occupied 114,000 square miles and were larger than 
all U.S. states and territories except Alaska, Texas, 
California, Montana, and New Mexico. There were over 7,000 
islands in the archipelago with over 1,000 were inhabited, 
(see Figure 1). Encountering nearly seven million people 
and seven main language groups, Merritt's force of 10,000 
men would prove wholly inadequate.50 On May 3, 1898, Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republican John Hay, U.S. ambassador to Great 
Britain, strongly recommended McKinley approve the 
annexation of Hawaii. Such a move would prevent Germany 
from linking Hawaii with either Samoa or the Philippines
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in any future negotiations. The American ambassador 
indicated tacit British support for such a measure, 
through his contacts with the Foreign Office.51 On June 
15, 1898 Hawaii was formally annexed by Meritt's force en 
route to Manila. Hawaii would provide a secure forward 
base for the invasion of the Philippines.52
On June 22, 1898, American forces landed at Daiquri, 
a small village harbour in Cuba, and quickly seized the 
neighbouring harbour of Siboney. Both villages were merely 
breaks in the steep shoreline cliffs and offered neither 
piers nor wharfs to the invaders. Fortunately, the landing 
encountered no Spanish resistance, as the American forces 
had no landing craft: troops swam and waded half a mile 
through heavy surf to get ashore. Even more fortunately 
the Spanish commander, General Arsenio Linares, insisted 
on scattering his troops throughout Cuba, a policy which 
gave the American forces local superiority despite their 
overall numerical inferiority.53 The supply bureaus, 
confronted with the shambles in Tampa, a shortage of 
shipping, and the non-existent harbour facilities in Cuba, 
struggled to provide even basic necessities to the army in 
the field. These supply problems were compounded by the 
Cuban rainy season, which started just days after the 
invasion and which turned dirt roads into thick mud 
virtually stopping all supplies to front line troops. 
Roosevelt bitterly described these staff and supply
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failures, while besieging Santiago in July, 1898:
The mismanagement has been beyond belief .... We are 
half starved; and our men are sickening daily. The 
lack of transportation, food, and artillery has 
brought us to the very edge of disaster; but 
above all the lack of any leadership, of any
system or executive capacity.54
Three weeks into the campaign, men still had no 
shelter tents and were soaked by the daily rains.55 In 
Washington D.C., Miles and Alger continued to bicker, 
diverting attention from the chronic problems in Cuba. The 
Commanding General insisted that the steel shields he had 
devised, which weighed over a 1000 pounds and moved on 
long steel axles, should be shipped to Cuba. Over 200 of 
the shields had been manufactured, and several were 
shipped to Cuba, taking valuable space on troop 
transports. They proved to be utterly useless on mud- 
filled Cuban trails.56
The army had twelve staff bureaus, all accountable to 
the secretary of war, who invariably had no knowledge of 
army organisation. The bureaus normally handled the 
administration of an army of 25,000 men, not the 250,000 
mobilised for war with Spain. Army supply was controlled 
by three bureaus with no overall coordination. The largest 
staff bureau was the Quartermaster's Department, 
responsible for clothing, tentage, wagons, horses and 
transportation for troops. The Commissary Department 
provided food for the troops, while the Subsistence
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Department delivered accessories such as candles, oil and 
salt. The Signal Bureau managed army communications, and 
the Medical Bureau oversaw all aspects of health, 
including the supply of medicines. The Pay Department paid 
the troops. The Engineer Corps controlled civil and 
military construction projects. The Judge-Advocate's 
Office was the legal office for the army and secretary of 
war. The Inspector General's Office conducted examinations 
into all aspects of army operations. Lastly, the Adjutant 
General's Office, commanded by Corbin, issued all army 
orders and held many army records. Alger and Miles proved 
incapable of exercising authority over this complex 
system. Corbin, was left the impossible task of 
coordinating army staff functions, performing as a one-man 
general staff. The result was independent action by staff 
bureaus, which created considerable chaos. Captain Edmund 
Rice, a member of Shafter's Staff, summed up the confusion 
in a telegram to the War Department: "Expected 275 reserve 
troops for Shafter in Cuba. Commissary Department mistakes 
led to 23,000 lbs. of potatoes instead."57
The Inspector General's Office provided little 
information on staff failures. Inspector General Joseph C. 
Breckinridge, the senior officer, disliked Corbin and 
supported Miles. He left his bureau with no orders when he 
took a field command in Cuba.58 His actions deprived 
McKinley's administration of crucial information on the 
poor state of army training, supply and shelter.
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Despite these problems, by early July, American 
forces had laid siege to Santiago. Admiral Cervera, 
commander of the Spanish Caribbean Fleet, was forced to 
sail and was convincingly defeated by the U.S. navy. This 
second decisive victory over Spanish naval power doomed 
Spanish forces in Cuba and Puerto Rico, who were dependent 
upon supplies from Spain. General Miles, having been 
largely ignored in Washington, accepted the chance to 
command the invasion of Puerto Rico. Miles organised an 
effective invasion force that left from Charleston and New 
York and met with little Spanish resistance. On July 17, 
1898 the large Spanish garrison in Santiago surrendered to 
American forces, while in the Pacific General Merritt 
seized the island of Guam, as his forces headed towards 
Manila in the Philippines.59
By mid-August all Spanish forces had surrendered in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and Manila. American battlefield 
casualties were relatively light: 294 servicemen killed 
and 121 wounded. A further seventy-three died in various 
accidents, including forty-eight who drowned struggling 
ashore through the surf in Cuba.60 More servicemen drowned 
than were killed by Spanish fire during the landings in 
Cuba. These unnecessary deaths due to the lack of proper 
shipping were, however, secondary to the 2565 deaths 
caused by disease. Death through illness was five times 
more common than battlefield fatalities.61
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Brigadier General George Miller Sternberg commanded
the Medical Bureau. A kind, German Lutheran he had
attended Columbia Medical School and joined the regular
army medical department in 1861. He served extensively as
a field surgeon, became a pioneer in public health, and
conducted research into the causes of yellow fever. His
work was admired by Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister. He
founded the Army Medical School to improve training of
surgeons established new schools for the Hospital Corps
and introduced biological laboratories to hospitals.62
Yet, despite Sternberg, army health care collapsed during
the war. There was no General Staff to direct the
allocation of resources to the greatest need, while
medical supply faced the same chaotic system as other
stores. Roosevelt outlined the problem to Lodge:
Even now with Santiago taken and our ships in the 
bay and with a month in which to have gotten ample 
transportation, food, and medical supplies our 
condition is horrible in every respect. I have 
over one hundred men down with fever in my own 
camp out of my regiment of four hundred, two 
hundred having previously died or having been sent 
to rear hospitals. The mismanagement of the hospital 
service in the rear has been such that my men will 
not leave the regiment if they can possibly help it; 
yet here we have nothing for them but hardtack, bacon 
and generally coffee without sugar. I cannot get even 
oatmeal without paying for it myself .... The 
engineers and artillery have done poorly and the 
hospital division even worse. But the prime 
difficulty has been the lack of transportation,
including the means to land from ships.63 
Shafter wrote to the War Department, describing the 
condition of thousands of troops who needed medicine,
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while all the field hospitals could provide for eleven 
days was a supply of quinine.64 Thankfully, victory was 
close at hand.
In Washington, the disgruntled Miles believed a 
conspiracy had denied him the credit for victory and thus 
began collecting details of army failures. Shafter warned 
Corbin that Miles and his friends, Inspector General 
Breckinridge and Colonel Waugher, were gathering 
information to discredit the army's performance in Cuba.65 
Army surgeon W.H. Daly, a member of Miles's staff, began 
collecting information on the unpopular and frequently 
inedible, tinned beef ration.66
In the Philippines, while Spanish forces vacated the 
islands, the alliance between Filipino nationalists and 
the U.S. army remained intact. On August 12, 1898 America 
and Spain signed a peace protocol in Paris. The American 
negotiating team consisted of two Neo-Hamiltonian 
imperialists, Senator William Frye and the diplomat 
Whitelaw Reid; two limited imperialists, Senator Cushman 
Davis and former Secretary of State William Day; and anti­
imperialist Democratic Senator George Gray. McKinley, at 
best a reluctant expansionist, hoped this negotiating team 
could ensure tangible territorial gains to offset any 
criticism of war management. The American representatives 
were instructed to press for recognition of U.S. claims to 
Guam, Puerto Rico, a coaling station in Cuba, and
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occupation of strategic points in the Philippines. In the 
early Autumn of 1898 the commander of U.S. forces in the 
Philippines, General Merritt, arrived in Paris to convince 
the American negotiating team to demand the annexation of 
all the Philippines. The conference remained deadlocked on 
this new demand until December 10, 1898, when Spain agreed 
to accept $20 million for the islands.67
Anti-imperialists were concerned by the American 
decision to seize the Philippines. William Jennings Bryan 
left his volunteer regiment, still bivouacked in Florida, 
to visit McKinley in Washington. He challenged the 
President to disband all volunteer regiments and attacked 
expansionism saying: "They volunteered to break the yoke 
of Spain in Cuba, and for nothing else. They did not 
volunteer to ... subjugate other peoples or establish 
United States sovereignty elsewhere."68
However, the ideas of William Graham Sumner, Herbert 
Spencer, and Herbert Croly had grown in popularity in 
America. Many people were now willing to endorse limited 
imperialist goals. A Literary Digest poll of 192 editors 
discovered that half favoured annexation of the 
Philippines and that a further third supported U.S. 
coaling rights in the islands.69 Within the Republican 
Party, president McKinley and future president William 
Howard Taft emphasised the new willingness to accept some 
form of imperialism. Unlike true imperialists, these
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limited imperialists, believed that a limited period of
Western guidance would benefit other countries by allowing
them to achieve multi-party democracy and free market
capitalism. Such figures relied on the teachings of Josiah
Strong and stressed the moral duty to help those who were
less fortunate. True imperialists, such as Hay, Lodge, and
future army chief Leonard Wood, endorsed the racial
stereotyping of Social Darwinism, and believed certain
peoples would always be incapable of self-government.
These views reflected the conclusions of Dewey, Sumner,
and Croly, who believed that technology and business
expansion were the basis of all progress.70 Many important
people, however, including Andrew Carnegie, Mark Twain,
and William Jennings Bryan all remained opposed to any
overseas expansion.
Britain urged Ambassador Hay to insist that McKinley
retain the Philippines or give Britain first option in any
future sale.71 Popular British author Rudyard Kipling also
encouraged American expansion and wrote to Roosevelt, the
Republican nominee for governor of New York:
I can't tell you how pleased I was to get your 
letter or how sorry to see that you are nominated 
for Governor this fall. Why not leave that sort of 
skittles to Bryan and Co. and go in for being a 
colonial administrator. God knows your country 
will need'em pretty bad in a few years .... Now go 
in and put all the weight of your influence into 
hanging on permanently to the whole of the 
Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pick-axe 
into the foundations of a rotten house and she is 
morally bound to build the house over again from the
foundations ,...72
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To examine all the issues related to the war McKinley 
established the Dodge Commission under Civil War veteran 
and railroad executive Grenville M. Dodge. The commission 
convened on September 24, 1898 and consisted of twelve 
Civil War veterans, many of whom were also successful 
businessmen. The commission conducted five months of 
hearings, which for a while, were followed closely by the 
press. The testimony of General Miles, which attacked the 
canned beef ration, caused the greatest public interest.73 
Miles cited evidence surreptitiously gathered by his 
friends, surgeon Major Daly and Lieut. Colonel M.P. Maus, 
at Camp Thomas, that the tinned beef ration was treated 
with boric acid, making it unhealthy for human 
consumption.74 The allegations led to a separate inquiry 
into the beef ration, publicity in the newspapers for 
Miles, and the eventual court-martial of Commissary 
General Patrick Eagen. Eagen, a hot-tempered Irish 
immigrant, was enraged at the accusations levelled against 
his department. He was charged with conduct unbecoming of 
an officer before the Dodge Commission when he threatened 
to pour the contents of the camp latrine down Miles's 
throat. Corbin quietly recommended clemency for the 
Commissary General to McKinley, and Eagen was retired on 
full pay.75 The claims made by Miles, later found to be 
untrue, were typical of the strategems used by the 
Commanding General to promote himself as a presidential
74
candidate.76 Miles emphasised other issues in later years 
to embarrass the incumbent administration and to promote 
his own political goals, which only complicated relations 
in the army high command.
In February, 1899 the Dodge Commission published its 
findings. It concluded that the failures in the staff 
system were caused by an inept management structure, which 
failed to provide contingency planning for future 
conflict. The Inspector General's Office was criticised 
for ignoring orders from the Secretary of War. Committee 
members were particularly concerned by one event on May 
17, .1898, when in response to public pressure over the 
condition of army camps, Alger authorised an inspection. 
The order was ignored when Miles claimed the right to 
command inspections and countermanded the order by the 
Secretary. The resulting squabble over jurisdiction of 
command prevented the poor condition of many army camps 
from being reported.77 Many Americans were most annoyed by 
the poor medical treatment given to wounded soldiers. The 
commission recommended the Medical Bureau be enlarged to 
deal with an army four times its regular peacetime 
strength.78 Army supply bureaus were criticised for being 
unprepared and for failing to stockpile enough food, 
wagons, or money for soldier's pay.79 The divided command 
structure of the army was noted by the committee, and the 
comments of General Schofield were published in the
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report. The former Commanding General testified effective 
army command depended on his willingness to act as chief 
of staff to the secretary of war and president.80
Many staff officers believed that the application of 
business values to the army would produce greater 
efficiency and this idea proved popular with a committee 
dominated by businessmen. The army signals chief,
Brigadier General Adolphus Greely, recommended the 
amalgamation of the Inspector General's Department and 
Adjutant General's Office to promote efficiency and a 
centralised command. Greely further suggested the 
unification of all supply bureaus under business 
management principles.81 This suggestion which combined 
the Quartermaster's Department, Subsistence Department, 
Commissary Department and Pay Bureau was not surprisingly 
opposed by the members of those staff departments, but 
they also expressed their views in business terms. 
Commissary General Eagen cited a current industrial debate 
which highlighted the problems of placing too many 
functions in one department.82
The eight-volume report of the Dodge Commission 
produced little immediate impact when published. Elihu 
Root, however, was a close friend of commission chairman 
Grenville Dodge. He later read the report, during his 
first year as secretary of war and used its conclusions
. t .  .  O ' ?
when formulating his ideas on military reform.OJ
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The victory over Spain increased the army's military 
commitments. In Cuba and Puerto Rico the army was 
responsible for establishing civil administration 
including sanitation, education, and commerce. In the 
Philippines, the alliance between Filipino nationalists 
and the American army ended, when the Paris conference 
approved the American purchase of the islands. Fifty 
thousand Filipino nationalists began hostilities against 
the occupying American forces. The war quickly developed 
into a nasty guerrilla war that lasted over three years 
and caused more casualties than the Spanish-American 
War.84 The Hull Bill, passed in 1898, established a larger 
army based on volunteers who Were entitled to go home when 
peace was concluded with Spain. The new demands of civil 
administration in Cuba and Puerto Rico, emerging conflict 
in the Philippines, and manning of newly built coastal 
batteries all required a larger permanent army.
A bitter debate began in Congress on the need for 
creating such an army. The argument focused on those who 
favoured the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian principles of a 
locally controlled, volunteer force and those who proposed 
a professional force under central command, as championed 
by Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. Bryan in a speech to an 
enthusiastic crowd in Nebraska, took up the Democratic 
challenge:
Our People defended Cuba against foreign arms, now
they must defend themselves and their country
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against foreign ideas - the colonial idea of 
European nations. Heretofore greed has perverted the 
government and used its instrumental interference for 
private gain; but now the very fundamental principle 
of our government is being assaulted. The Imperialist 
idea was antagonistic to ideas and ideals cherished 
since the writing of the Declaration of Independence. 
We must refrain from entering a colonial policy or 
abandon the doctrine that governments receive their 
just powers from the consent of the governed. A house 
divided against itself cannot stand, this nation 
cannot endure half-republic and half-colony -
half-free and half-vassal.85 
Lodge, Hay, Roosevelt and other Neo-Hamiltonian disciples 
utterly rejected these ideas. Influenced by Spencer's 
Social Darwinism, and Brooks Adams's economics, they 
demanded an efficient military to protect American 
overseas expansion. Colonial expansion was essential for 
continued economic growth and American prosperity.
Congress started prolonged hearings on the need for a 
larger army. These congressional hearings, and the wider 
political debate, focussed on the centralisation of 
political power. The argument highlighted the influence of 
business and the concepts of "professionalism" and 
"efficiency," in military reform. Quartermaster General 
M.I. Luddington testified that he opposed the unification 
of staff bureaus since, "this was an age of specialities," 
while Dr. Thomas N. Jamieson argued that a new Army Bureau 
of Pharmacy was required to recognise pharmaceutical 
expertise.86 Commissary General Eagen underlined the 
influence of business analogies when, commenting on the 
amalgamation of supply bureaus, he stated: "Any
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businessman if he stops to consider what ... the 
departments do will reach the same conclusion I have - 
that each has enough to do."87
Adjutant General Corbin attacked amateur idealism and 
stressed the importance of professional training in the 
modern army.88 Schofield again called for a general-in- 
chief appointed by the president to control staff bureaus 
and the army line. Such an officer, would act as chief 
adviser to the secretary of war and the president and 
would be politically accountable.89 General Miles claiming 
Corbin and Alger planned to "Imperialise" the army, 
continued to defend the office of commanding general by 
citing the common belief that the military success of von 
Moltke, Grant, and others was due to their military 
autonomy from political constraints. Miles argued that a 
civilian secretary of war who held the post for an average 
of two years was incapable of grasping the intricacies of 
military management. The solution was to place all 
military administration under the commanding general.90
McKinley despaired of getting any sweeping army 
reform accepted and eventually approved a measure calling 
for a larger army and ignoring the other problems. On 
March 2, 1899 an act entitled "Increasing the Efficiency 
of the Army" was passed by a partisan vote in Congress.
The act authorised an army of 65,000 men and allowed the 
President to raise a further 3 5,000 volunteers, who would
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remain in service until July, 1901. A few minor reforms 
were accepted as amendments to the act. An examination was 
established for new second lieutenants, and the number of 
major generals in the regular army was increased to three. 
The most significant reform was an extension of 
presidential power: the appointment of volunteer officers 
by the president, not the states.91
Increasingly concerned about public criticism of war 
management, McKinley was, however, reluctant to force 
either Miles or Alger to resign. He feared that any 
prominent resignation would implicate his administration 
in the military failures. Both men were also extremely 
influential. Miles had many friends in Congress, was 
related to the powerful Cameron family in Pennsylvania, 
and was a senior member in the important Civil War 
veterans association, The Grand Army of the Republic. 
Alger, the former governor of Michigan and business 
millionaire, enjoyed the friendship of many business 
leaders including Cornelius Vanderbilt.
In June 1899 however, Alger's senatorial ambitions 
became known. He allied himself with Michigan governor 
Hazen Pingree, a man openly critical of McKinley's policy 
in the Philippines. Unimpressed with Alger's war 
management, McKinley decided to ask for his resignation.
On Sunday July 8, 1899 Vice President Garret A. Hobart 
visited Alger and delivered the President's decision. The
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following day Alger resigned.92 He was at best only a
passable administrator unable to handle the ambitious
General Miles. Over-confident of the army's abilities, and
unwilling to listen to professional advice, he was at
least partly responsible for the military shambles in the
war with Spain.
The army was now vastly different from when he took
office. The regular army had increased three fold; senior
officers John M. Wilson and Elwell S. Otis were proconsuls
in Cuba and the Philippines; and the army was engaged in a
large-scale guerrilla war in the Philippines. America had
acquired an empire that included Puerto Rico, Hawaii,
Guam, and Pago Pago. In the army many fundamental flaws
remained: the divided command structure, ineffective
military education, promotion by strict seniority, poor
inter-service cooperation, and a badly trained National
Guard. In the words of Rudyard Kipling, however, some at
least had learned a lesson:
Let us admit it fairly, as a business people 
should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end 
of good.
It was our fault, and our very great fault - and now 
we must turn it to use.
We have forty million reasons for failure, but not 
a single excuse.
So the more we work and the less we talk the 
better the results we shall get.
We have had an Imperial lesson. It may make us an 
Empire yet!93
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CHAPTER THREE 
EARLY ARMY REFORM AND THE 
ELECTION OF 1900
Debate on army reform was encouraged, both by the 
weaknesses that appeared in the American army in the 
Spanish-American War and by the new colonial 
responsibilities created by that war. Traditional American 
political philosophy promoted trust in a volunteer army 
with local political control and rejected the idea of 
military preparedness. Military reform, which proposed a 
strong central executive and large standing army, 
challenged these assumptions. Neo-Hamiltonian politicians 
endorsed this challenge, encouraged by their belief that 
increasing global competition for limited resources was 
inevitable. Abroad, the on-going guerrilla war in the 
Philippines and the Boxer Rebellion in China kept army 
reform at the centre of political debate. At home the 
enduring admiration for business and its organisational 
achievements ensured that corporate ideals would continue 
to influence the debate on military reform.
The new secretary of war, Elihu Root, faced a 
considerable challenge. Born in 1845, he had grown up in a 
world far removed from military service or its values. His 
grandfather, father, and brother were all teachers. Root 
taught briefly at two girls' schools after graduating from 
Hamilton College.1 Root's only previous encounter with the
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military came during the Civil War, when the army rejected 
him due to frail health. After raising some money from 
teaching, Root studied law and received a B.L. and M.A. 
from New York University Law School in 1867.2 By the late 
1890s Root had established himself both as a prominent New 
York lawyer and as a staunch Republican. His clients 
included New York City, the Sugar Trust, Consolidated Gas, 
six railroads and William M. Tweed, the important 
political boss of New York City. In 1879 he was defeated 
as the GOP candidate for judge on the court of common 
pleas, but in 1886 he was elected leader in his assembly 
district. A year later President Arthur appointed him U.S. 
district attorney for the Southern District of New York 
City. In this capacity he met Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Theodore Roosevelt. He was a member of the Bar Association 
and was President of both the Republican Club and the 
Union League Club in New York. In early 1899 he 
successfully defended Roosevelt in a tax fraud case.3 
McKinley then offered Root the U.S. ambassadorship to 
Spain, which he refused, having no knowledge of Spanish.4
Some months later, the president decided to replace 
Alger as secretary of war. The new secretary was to be an 
experienced administrator and lawyer, able to deal with 
the legal problems involved in creating colonial 
government. The list of qualified candidates was soon 
reduced to three names.5 McKinley canvassed Adjutant
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General Corbin, the new secretary of state John Hay, 
governor Roosevelt, and Root's friend, secretary of the 
interior Cornelius Bliss for their opinions. Corbin,
Bliss, and Hay endorsed Root. Roosevelt supported the 
candidacy of General Francis V. Greene and privately 
wished himself to be considered.6 Despite the reservations 
of Roosevelt, McKinley offered the job to Root. Root at 
first refused saying: "Thank the President for me, but say 
it is quite absurd I know nothing about war, I know 
nothing about the army."' The caller insisted Root 
reconsider because McKinley required a lawyer to handle 
colonial administration, not a military expert. The 
President called Root and appealed to his sense of duty 
and honour, ideals of great importance to a nineteenth- 
century professional gentleman, and convinced Root to 
accept.8 The choice of Root emphasised the low priority 
McKinley attached to military reform, and his 
unwillingness to accept the Neo-Hamiltonian vision of the 
world, which demanded an efficient military. Roosevelt, 
Lodge, and others were surprised by McKinley's choice and 
believed the appointment was designed to prevent military 
reform.9
Summoned by the President, Root arrived in Washington 
on the Congressional Limited from New York at 10.30 pm, 
Monday July 24, 1899. He went straight to the White House 
where McKinley and Corbin met him for the first time.10 As
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he entered McKinley's office, Corbin saw a small trim man, 
with dark eyes, a wide forehead and small iron-grey 
moustache. He was wearing a light summer suit and a jaunty 
straw hat. McKinley greeted him as secretary of war.11 A 
week later, on August 1, 1899 he was officially sworn in 
and spent that night in the Arlington Hotel with General 
Corbin.12 Root was immediately confronted with problems 
both in colonial administration, and military 
organisation. The general public had a lively interest in 
military reform, encouraged by newspaper reports of 
military mistakes, the return of volunteer officers to 
politics at home, and the conclusions of the Dodge 
Commission. Root, accompanied by Corbin, set about 
familiarising himself with the War Department and its 
staff.
The War Department was in the executive building 
beside the White House. It was a large multi-storey, 
Victorian, grey stone building, which occupied a whole 
block. Corbin and the Secretary had connecting offices, 
while those of the commanding general and his staff were 
at the other end of the building. Initially Root tried to 
elicit the cooperation of General Miles, and the bureau 
chiefs, but only Corbin proved helpful.13 Corbin and Root 
quickly became friends, and the connecting door between 
their two offices was soon swinging constantly. Both men 
joined the active life fad, promoted by Roosevelt, Sumner,
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and others, and they rode together each week-day evening 
and Sunday.14 Corbin introduced Root to Assistant Adjutant 
General Lieut. Colonel William H. Carter, who soon became 
Root's chief military adviser and friend.
Carter was a slight dapper man, with brown hair and a 
full moustache. He had a great interest in American 
military reform. Born in December 1850 in Brooklyn, he 
entered West Point in the early 1870's. The noted reformer 
Emory Upton was the school commandant. In the college he 
studied the ideas of Sherman, Schofield, Upton, and Hazen. 
His classmates included Arthur Wagner, Tasker Bliss, and 
Thomas H. Barry, officers later influential in army 
reform. After graduation Carter remained at West Point as 
a teacher in the department of tactics and joined Bliss 
who was assigned to teach languages. The new commandant 
was General Schofield. Throughout the 1880s Carter served 
with the 6th cavalry fighting Indians in Arizona, the 
Dakotas, and Wyoming. On Aug. 30, 1881 he won the 
Congressional Medal of Honour for retrieving the bodies of 
Captain E.C. Hentig and Private Bird while under heavy 
fire from Apache Indians. In the 1890s Carter was 
appointed an instructor at The Infantry and Cavalry School 
Fort Leavenworth, where Wagner and Swift were also 
teaching. In 1897 he was appointed major and assistant 
adjutant general on the recommendations of noted military 
reformer Brigadier General Theodore Schwan and Brigadier
93
General George Crook.15 Schwan, Wagner, and Carter drew up 
the legislation for the Act of March 2, 1899 which 
increased the regular army to 65,000 men, and mobilised
35,000 volunteers for two years. Carter was to become a 
valuable adviser to a secretary of war ignorant of army 
matters.16
Root's immediate problem was colonial administration. 
Major General John R. Brook, Brigadier General Leonard 
Wood, and Brigadier General William Ludlow were the 
leaders of colonial government in Cuba. Major General 
Elwell S. Otis was acting governor in the Philippines. In 
Cuba and Puerto Rico the army handled domestic government, 
overseas trade, and security. The Teller Amendment 
provided for Cuban independence, while Puerto Rico was to 
become an American colony. Cuban independence reguired the 
creation of tariff agreements on U.S.- Cuban trade and a 
legal agreement for a U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. While 
these issues involved Root, help from Charles Magoon, a 
legal expert appointed to the law offices in the Bureau of 
Insular Affairs, allowed Root time to study some of the 
problems of military administration.17
The efficiency of the army once more took on sudden 
urgency with the escalation of the conflict in the 
Philippines. On December 10, 1898 Spain had agreed to sell 
the islands to America. This was followed eleven days 
later by McKinley's speech calling for "benevolent
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American assimilation” of the islands.”18 Throughout 
January 1899, the Filipino leaders Emilio Aguinaldo, Pedro 
Paterno, and Apolinario Mabini protested against the 
American decision.19 Many Americans were appalled by this 
overt attempt to acquire empire, but the champions of 
anti-imperialism refused to act. William Jennings Bryan, 
the leading Democrat, allowed his obsession with reforming 
the Gold Standard, to distract him and his party from 
attacking this widely unpopular move to American 
imperialism. He wanted foreign policy matters settled 
quickly, so he could concentrate on domestic economics and 
the increasing power of business.20 Anti-imperialists such 
as Andrew Carnegie and Mark Twain tried repeatedly to get 
Bryan to speak out against the Senate treaty which 
approved the annexation of the Philippines, but he ignored 
their requests, and the treaty passed the Senate on 
February 6, 1899 fifty-seven votes to twenty-seven: only 
one vote more than the necessary two-thirds majority.21
Two days before this vote, Major General Otis 
authorised an assault on the Filipino army outside Manila. 
Otis, who had replaced Merritt in August 1898 as commander 
of U.S. forces in the Philippines, regarded Filipinos as 
"rag-tag” inferiors and was determined to crush them 
before any political directive could stop him. A pompous, 
fussy, career soldier, he resented political interference 
from Washington. Archbishop Chapelle, the papal legate in
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the Philippines, described him "as of about the right 
mental calibre to command a one-company post in 
Arizona."22 Throughout the spring of 1899, U.S. forces 
skirmished with the Filipino army. Even in January 1899, 
Private William Christner wrote home: "We killed a few to 
learn them a lesson and you bet they learned it."23
In May 1899, Brigadier General Henry W. Lawton 
arrived with more troops to conduct an offensive in the 
Philippines. Lawton was a brave, eccentric individual. A 
Civil War veteran, and holder of the Congressional Medal 
of Honour, he had also captured the Indian leader Geronimo 
in 1886. In Cuba, he had served as a brigade commander and 
led the important attack on El Caney. Rewarded for his 
leadership in the Spanish-American War, he was made 
Governor of Santiago, only to be sent home in disgrace 
after a six-day drinking spree. He arrived in Manila 
wearing a British pith helmet and a bright yellow scarf, 
which he wore on all subsequent campaigns.24
When Root took office Otis, Lawton, and Major General 
Arthur MacArthur had apparently routed the Filipino army; 
killing over 3,000 Filipino soldiers at a cost of only 
sixty American lives.25 Aguinaldo, the main Filipino 
leader, however, instructed his forces to disperse and 
begin guerrilla warfare against the American forces. In 
Washington D.C., Root supported the acquisition of the 
islands and was confident of quick success. Throughout the
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autumn he read widely on British colonial policy as he 
considered how best to govern the new colonies. Root, like 
Hay, Lodge, and Wood, regarded British imperial ideas as 
successful and worth copying.26 Secretary Root encouraged 
Otis to give selected journalists greater access to 
military information, especially those from Hearst's 
papers, as they supported annexation of the Philippines.27
Root and his expansionist colleagues enjoyed good 
relations with British officials and were increasingly 
suspicious of Germany. On September 2, 1899 Roosevelt 
introduced Root to the British military attache Colonel 
Arthur Lee, who accompanied Roosevelt during his time in 
Cuba. Lee and Roosevelt were good friends and remained so 
throughout their future careers. Root dined frequently 
with Lee and the British Ambassador Lord Pauncefote.28 The 
secretary of war read and appreciated Kipling, and, in a 
memo to the secretary of state, indicated his support for 
British intervention in Egypt.29 In contrast, he and other 
senior Republicans were alarmed by any rumoured German 
expansion in the Caribbean or Pacific. This unease over 
German intentions was encouraged both by British and by 
German actions. In 1898 Count Hatzfeldt the German 
ambassador in London, approached the then American 
ambassador John Hay and demanded German coaling stations 
in the Pacific in return for German recognition of the 
American annexation of Hawaii. This action encouraged
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Hay's suspicion of German intentions, already cultivated
by the British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice.30 In late
1899, a memo on the Philippines authorised by the
president, discussed the problems caused by guerrilla
warfare and possible German intervention. The report
circulated among senior members of the cabinet and
concluded that control of the islands was being contested
by Spain, Filipino nationalists, Germany, and the United
States. Summing up the international situation it stated:
.... The situation is further complicated by the 
semi-hostile attitude of Germany, which has 
maintained an unnecessarily large naval force in 
front of Manila for the last five months, the 
officers of which have on many occasions shown 
their disposition to embarrass and thwart the 
United States ..... It is not probable that Britain 
will permit the Philippines to go to any of her 
rivals except ourselves. She has her own reasons, 
looking to the future, for allowing us to keep 
without objection, what our own arms and resources 
have won. (Hence the U.S., in the face of guerrilla
opposition, has to hold the islands itself).31 
The delicate diplomatic situation was underlined by the 
actions of Captain Chichester R.N. He placed his three 
ships between Manila and a German squadron commanded by 
Vice Admiral von Diederichs, which seemed determined to 
seize an island for Germany.32
The international situation encouraged Lodge, Hay, 
Root, and other Neo-Hamiltonians to press for further 
colonial expansion and military reform. American victory 
over Spain had made isolationism irrelevant. For 
expansionist Republicans the issue was: would America play
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its new international role well, or badly? Neo-Hamiltonian 
supporters argued that industrial growth and overseas 
expansion were evidence of American ingenuity and 
superiority.
Root was a notable corporate lawyer and participant
in the remarkable success of American business. During his
early life, the value of internal American commerce
increased from $2 billion, in 1850, to $18 billion by
1900; exports rose from $17 million to $435 million;
railroad mileage, just 9,000 miles in 1850, reached
194,000 miles in 1900; and coal production increased from
three million tons to 240 million tons over the same
period.33 Root defended corporate amalgamation and
believed in it explicitly. In an address by Mr. F.B.
Thurber he underlined the following passage:
Not less foolish is our attitude towards the 
organization of industry known as "trusts." With the 
advent of the powers which now control the world, 
steam, electricity and machinery, came the 
organization of industry, because these great forces 
could only be economically handled in large units and 
so "corporations" .... These to promote economy and 
efficiency have been consolidated into larger 
organizations known as "Trusts." It has been popular 
to oppose and denounce these organizations, but it 
is safe to say that corporations and "trusts" have 
been an important element in the rapid development of 
our country, and to them we must look for the
continuance of progress.34
These ideas were an anathema to followers of Bryan 
and challenged Jeffersonian-Jacksonian ideals of an 
agrarian democracy. Root, Hay, Roosevelt, and others
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regarded business boards served by professional advice as 
the appropriate blueprint for efficient government. In 
foreign policy and defence this system was essential to 
defend both the United States and its overseas interests 
against European and Japanese competition. Senator Lodge, 
in a speech before Congress, pledged his support for a 
policy of creating American economic superiority to 
preserve political independence. He warned of the 
competition America faced in implementing such a policy: 
"But does anyone suppose they like it? They are gasping 
for breath in all parts of Europe .... we occupy a great 
position economically. We are marching to a still greater 
one ... but, dazzled by its splendour, do not forget its 
perils."35
Commercial expansion encouraged the development of
professionalism, the ideal of efficiency, and overseas
expansion. Middle-ranking officers interested in military
reform were inspired by the apparent success of business
organisation and sought to achieve the same efficiency in
the army. Lieut. Colonel Carter outlined the analogy
between successful business and hoped-for army reforms
when he wrote:
In our early history, when railroads were 
constructed with a view to uniting adjacent towns, 
they needed honest management and technical skill; 
but when they were merged into great systems 
controlling thousands of miles of track, and 
dependent upon the freights from distant territory 
... it was no longer enough that they should
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posses skilled engineers and accountants, but it 
became necessary that they be controlled by 
directors - groups of men whose principal work was 
to observe rival lines, to consider state and 
local laws and to prepare the system to derive all 
possible advantage from future growth of 
contiguous territory. The duties of these vast 
corporations are very nearly akin to those of the 
proposed General Staff of the Army .... The business 
of the War Department, which in proportion exceeds 
that of many of the largest trusts or corporations of 
the world combined, is managed upon an entirely 
different plan from that pursued in any private
concern.36
Within the army there were many people who opposed 
military reform. The National Guard, based on volunteerism 
and provincial command, and middle-ranking regular army 
officers, who had waited years for promotion by strict 
rules of seniority, opposed most reforms. In service 
journals militia officers stoutly defended the locally 
recruited volunteer and warned darkly against the military 
professionalism of "Hessian and other continental 
monarchies" and the army of the, "hired assassin stamp," 
which would destroy American liberty.37 Few National Guard 
officers supported the opinions of Iowa National Guard 
Colonel, J.G. Gilchrist, who described the Guard as having 
weak staff organisation, poor commanding officers, meagre 
training, and piteous equipment.38
The controversy over military reform and the new 
colonial problems of America gave the new secretary of war 
much to do. Root gained a further problem when he fell out 
with General Miles. In mid-August 1899 operations against 
guerrillas in the Philippines required the construction
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and manning of many posts.39 To provide officers for these 
new commands, Root wrote to retired General Francis 
Greene, Governor Roosevelt, Corbin, and Miles asking them 
to recommend able officers for the new positions 
available.40 Miles recommended promotion by strict 
seniority. The following day the whole story of officer 
selection appeared in national papers. Root believed Miles 
leaked the story to the press. He never trusted Miles 
again and attempted to isolate him from the army.41
The failure of the army to secure a quick victory in 
the Philippines worried Root and the administration. The 
American commanders of the campaign, Otis and MacArthur, 
consistently denied they needed more troops, despite 
inquiries from Root and the War Department. MacArthur, 
frustrated by the lack of success against poorly equipped 
natives, turned to technology for a solution. Armoured 
trains, naval artillery, Gatling guns, and a fire engine, 
adapted to spray petroleum on villages, were all 
introduced with little effect.42 The war became 
increasingly vicious, and one private wrote home 
describing retribution inflicted on one area after an 
American soldier was killed and disembowelled:
"Immediately orders were received from General Wheaton 
[Maj. Gen. Lloyd Wheaton] to burn and kill every native in 
sight; which was done to the finish. About 1,000 men, 
women, and children were reported killed."43 Each side
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ruthlessly retaliated to each new atrocity. American 
troops were buried alive in ant-hills, decapitated, and 
castrated, while Filipino nationalists lost their lives, 
homes, and livestock in ever increasing numbers.
In America, Senator Carl Schurz, appalled at the 
continued violence, established an Anti-Imperial League. 
Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, Illinois Governor John 
Altgeld, William Jennings Bryan, and Andrew Carnegie all 
became prominent members. In response to one reported set 
of casualty figures, Carnegie wrote caustically to 
Republican Whitelaw Reid: "... it is a matter of 
congratulations, however, that you seem to have about 
finished your work civilising the Filipinos. It is thought 
that about 8,000 of them have been completely civilised 
and sent to heaven. I hope you like it."44 McKinley and 
his administration were increasingly worried both by the 
failure to end the war and the increased public support 
for anti-imperialism. The President, disillusioned with 
Otis, decided to send more troops to the Philippines. By 
the end of October 1899 U.S. forces occupied only 117 
square miles on the main island of Luzon. Hundreds of 
islands, encompassing 115,000 square miles of land 
remained unconquered.45
Throughout October Root worked long hours to complete 
his first report as secretary of war. Published in 
November, it recommended systematic military planning for
103
any eventuality, promotion by merit, posting of line 
officers to all staff bureaus except the Medical 
Department for five year periods, inter-service 
cooperation, and creation of a war college to educate 
bright officers.46 The war college would be governed by a 
board of senior officers appointed for fixed terms by the 
president. Military information division records, and 
reports by military attaches, would be placed at the 
disposal of the college. The college would supervise the 
other army service colleges, coordinate all army 
education, and educate the brightest service school 
graduates. Root urged Congress to set aside $20,000 to 
fund work on the new college.47
Predictably Democratic congressmen, national 
guardsmen, state politicians, and middle-ranking officers, 
opposed Root's program. The Secretary, however, remained 
determined to centralise army command and place the state 
militias firmly under federal control.
Root realised any interference with the National 
Guard would be unpopular, and he astutely left plans to 
federalise the militia to a separate committee. Roosevelt, 
always willing to promote military reform, suggested that 
"General" Daniel Butterfield of the New York National 
Guard to chair the contentious committee on militia 
reform. A nine-man committee was established including six 
National Guard officers. Army Colonel A.L. Mills and legal
104
adviser, deputy Judge-Advocate General Lieutenant-colonel 
George B. Davis joined Butterfield as committee members.
The committee legislation provided for 100,000 
locally trained militia under federal command in time of 
war.48 Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans remained unhappy with 
this compromise. They wanted complete central government 
control over the militia. Root's proposals received 
support from governor Roosevelt, secretary of state Hay, 
and the few professional officers interested in reform. In 
the Senate, Lodge, Proctor, Beveridge, and Military 
Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph B. Hawley congratulated 
Root on a great report.49 Proctor, a former secretary of 
war, and currently the senior senator from Vermont was 
most enthusiastic. Root, aware of Proctor's strong 
business connections in Vermont, qualified his praise 
stating: "The only trouble with Proctor was that he wanted 
everything built out of Vermont marble."50 Hawley, the 
senior senator from Connecticut, was a close friend to 
Root. He supported the creation of a strong central 
government and, like Root, had attended Hamilton 
College.51
Despite powerful support, Root faced considerable 
opposition as well. Many congressmen were annoyed at Neo- 
Hamiltonian support for the British position in the Boer 
War and the failure to end the conflict in the 
Philippines. They attacked ideas of colonial expansion and
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military reform as un-American. With an election due in 
1900, many Republican congressmen remained reluctant to 
support contentious proposals for military reform. 
Nonetheless Root pressed on. He instructed Brigadier 
General Theodore Schwan and Carter to draft legislation 
for an army bill to be presented in 1900. Carter, ever 
enthusiastic, proposed legislation to create a general 
staff structure. Root, aware of congressional opposition, 
remained more cautious. A novice on ideas of military 
organisation, he wished to study Carter's plans in detail. 
Distracted by the need to address the problems of colonial 
administration in Cuba and Puerto Rico and the on-going 
war in the Philippines, he lacked the time and political 
will to endorse fully Carter's ideas.52
In Cuba the military leadership was influenced by the 
evangelical ideas of Josiah Strong and Kipling's concept 
of the "White Man's Burden." A program of social 
improvements was initiated. The overall commander in Cuba, 
Major General John R. Brook, was less enthusiastic in 
implementing social reforms than his two deputies Leonard 
Wood and William Ludlow. Root invited all three to 
Washington D.C. to discuss social and political reform in 
Cuba. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans expected to transform 
their new colonial empire into a set of states which 
endorsed multi-party democracy and free trade. These two 
reforms they believed were essential to provide the
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political stability and expanding markets to benefit U.S. 
business.
Root was impressed with the enthusiasm which Wood and 
Ludlow had for their task. He was less impressed with 
Brooke. The old major general refused to mingle with 
"inferior” natives and displayed no interest in social or 
industrial reform. In contrast, Ludlow as governor of 
Havana had established food centres to. avert famine, which 
fed 20,000 people daily. Streets were cleaned regularly to 
prevent disease, a new sewage plant was planned, street 
lighting was installed and a new bacteriological 
laboratory was created to study tropical disease.53 Wood, 
as governor of Santiago, promoted sanitation projects, 
education, and extensive harbour improvements to improve 
trade. Wood summed up their achievement: "The stagnant 
pools and dirt in streets had disappeared. Houses no 
longer discharged effluent onto the streets and disease 
such as yellow fever declined dramatically."54 The decline 
in yellow fever was used as further evidence to support 
American involvement overseas. The gulf coast of America 
was frequently infected with the disease from Cuba. A 
reduction in the incidence of the disease in Cuba reduced 
the chance of infection in America.
Disappointed by Brooke's attitude, Root recommended 
that he be replaced. McKinley favoured Ludlow, but 
Roosevelt intervened and in early December Wood was
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promoted to major general of volunteers and governor of
Cuba. Root, toasting Wood's promotion, underlined the
importance of civic and economic reform to Neo-
Hamiltonians stating:
I am prouder of Wood in Santiago and Wilson in 
Mantanzas and Ludlow in Havana, cleaning the streets 
and disinfecting the pestholes and teaching the 
elements of civic government; teaching them how to go 
back to work, to earn their living; teaching them to 
become self-governing citizens of a free state, than 
I ever could be of a hero on the ramparts amid the
hail of shot ....55
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans agreed with Josiah Strong 
that America had a moral duty to help those states less 
fortunate than the Republic. Of greater importance, 
however, was the establishment of an American claim to the 
limited natural resources and economic markets provided by 
the world. Military success in the Philippines was 
essential to secure a share in the important Pacific 
market.
In the Philippines Brigadier General Samuel Young and 
Brigadier General Lawton almost captured the guerrilla 
leader Aguinaldo. Otis disliked both Young and Lawton, 
and, before his rivals returned, he claimed all the credit 
for their mission. He announced that Aguinaldo's family 
had been seized and that the war was over. Unfortunately 
for Otis the war continued and his premature announcement, 
which had raised hopes in Washington, became another 
source of irritation between the administration and the
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General. On December 18 Lawton died while helping wounded 
men to escape enemy fire. The hero who had captured 
Geronimo was shot by a Filipino rifleman named Lucerio 
Geronimo. Much to the annoyance of Root, the end of the 
war seemed no closer.56
In South Africa war broke out between the British and 
Boer farmers. The British were confident of success, a 
view shared by pro-British Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. 
Unfortunately the Boer War, which lasted for over three 
years, exposed the same organisational problems in the 
British army as existed in the American army. The 
political support provided by Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans 
to the British in South Africa increased the opposition in 
Congress to military reform and overseas expansion. Root, 
Hay, and others hoped for a swift British victory, but, as 
in the Philippines, they were to be disappointed. The 
inefficient British staff system and poor training caused 
initial disaster and defeat.57 At Magersfontein on 
December 1, 1899 poor staff work was responsible for 968 
casualties in the Highland Brigade, when they were shelled 
by their own artillery.58 The weaknesses exposed in Anglo- 
American armies in the Spanish-American War and Boer War, 
produced closer collaboration between the two states on 
military reform.
Military difficulties in the Philippines and South 
Africa provided opponents of Anglo-American imperialism in
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America with evidence that it was a failure, un-American
and pro British. Irish and German political lobbies
attacked McKinley's tacit support for Britain. Bryan
denounced Anglo-American imperialism and upheld the virtue
of the democratic, Jeffersonian, republic. In a speech to
Congress he explained the dangers of imperialism:
.... After a century and a half of English domination 
in India, less than one twentieth of one per cent of 
the people of India are of English birth, and it 
requires an army of seventy thousand British soldiers 
to take care of the tax collectors.... A colonial 
policy means that we shall send to the Philippine 
Islands a few traders, a few taskmasters and a few 
office-holders and an army large enough to support 
the authority of a small fraction of the people while
they rule the natives....59
Roosevelt, Root, and Hay were furious at criticism of 
what they regarded as the essential expansion of commerce. 
Hay angrily wrote to Whitelaw Reid that Bryan was "a 
halfbacked glib little briefless jack-leg lawyer," 
grasping for power.60 Lodge reminded the Senate that 
Britain supported the American desire for free trade in 
China and the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt vilified Bryan 
and dismissed his ideas claiming that those who opposed 
British imperialism invariably disputed the American right 
to intervene in the Caribbean and Pacific.61 Secretary of 
State Hay attempted to prevent South African President 
Kruger from visiting America. Commenting on the request to 
Lodge he wrote: "The Boer women and children are in the 
concentration camps simply because their husbands and
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brothers want them there, and as to the war ... it will 
stop the instant Botha and deWet wish it to stop."62 
Despite British set-backs in South Africa, Republican 
desires for free trade and overseas expansion encouraged 
the adoption of a pro-British stance. Increasingly many 
Republicans recognised that the two countries had common 
interests.
Root entered the new year determined to get some army 
reforms approved. His main goals, however, were to learn 
more about army organisation and gain greater support for 
the concept of military reform. During the autumn, Carter 
had provided Root with a copy of Upton's book, The Armies 
of Asia and Europe. The text gave Root a survey of foreign 
military organisations and exposed him to the ideas of 
Upton, one of the most influential late nineteenth-century 
army thinkers. When he discovered the book was out of 
print he ordered a new edition. To promote awareness of 
the need for military reform, he had it distributed to all 
army posts and major newspapers. Root found the book 
invaluable stating: "it gave me the detail on which I 
could base my recommendations and overcome my ignorance as 
a civilian."63 The secretary of war gained further insight 
from the eight-volume Dodge Commission Report on the 
Spanish-American War. Root was friends with the chief 
author of the report, and to gather even more information 
on military reform Root authorised the creation of a board
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to study army reform.64 The chairman was Brigadier General 
William Ludlow. Ludlow had impressed Root with his program 
of civil works in Cuba. Unfortunately, the governor of 
Havana had closed two anti-American newspapers in the 
city: La Lucha and El Cubano. This act angered local 
people and involved Ludlow in an unseemly argument over 
press censorship. Root recalled the Governor to Washington 
D.C. and offered him the opportunity to chair the board on 
army reform.65 Ludlow accepted the appointment.
Ludlow graduated from West Point in 1864. A qualified 
engineer, he served with distinction as chief engineer in 
20th corps of the Army of the Cumberland and . later as 
chief engineer for General Sherman. In one twenty-six day 
period, his command built thirty-seven trestle and pontoon 
bridges and mapped over 1,700 miles of road.66 After the 
Civil War he spent the next three decades working on army 
civil engineering projects. He worked on harbour 
improvements in New York and Baltimore, constructed sea- 
coast defences at Staten Island and Charleston S.C., and 
built new water and sewage works in Washington D.C. and 
Philadelphia.67 He fought hard against machine politics 
and was well liked by social reformers. Arriving in 
Philadelphia in February 1883, he confronted scheming 
speculators, hoping to benefit from the new water works 
contract. One contractor entered Ludlow's office and 
quietly laid a $50 bill upon his desk. The general slowly
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picked it up, rolled it like a reefer, held it to a gas 
jet and lit his cigar.68 In 1894 he was posted to Great 
Britain as the U.S. military attache where he served for 
two years. While in London he came into contact with the 
British military reformer Spencer Wilkinson, the first 
Chichele Professor of War, at Oxford University. Ludlow 
forwarded a considerable number of newspaper cuttings, 
articles, and books on military affairs to the Military 
Information Division in Washington. On April 18, 1896 he 
forwarded Wilkinson's work, The Brain of the Army, which 
provided new insight into how to create an efficient, 
German-style army, while maintaining democratic control.69 
The text would become highly influential both among 
British and American military reformers.
The other members of the Ludlow Board were Joseph P. 
Sanger and Henry C. Hasbrouck. Colonel Sanger was well 
acquainted with military reformers and their ideas. He was 
a Civil War veteran, honour graduate of the artillery 
school in 1868 and former professor of military science at 
Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. He had accompanied 
Upton on his world tour, when they inspected the armies of 
the world, and was an aide and military secretary to 
Lieutenant General Schofield for fourteen years.70 The 
other committee member was Colonel Henry C. Hasbrouck. A 
graduate of West Point, he served as assistant professor 
of natural and experimental philosophy at West Point
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between 1863-1865. He spent the 1870s fighting Indians in 
the West. In the 1880s he was appointed commandant of West 
Point and in 1892 became the director of the artillery 
school at Fort Monroe.71 All three officers, like most 
army reformers, enjoyed a military career of education and 
travel, unlike most of their colleagues. The three 
officers were instructed by Root and Corbin to make 
preliminary recommendations on the creation of a war 
college. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, Root's chief military 
adviser, was appointed secretary to the board.72
Congressional debate on the army bill proposed by 
Root began in February 1900. The legislation recommended 
interchangeable staff and field appointments for army 
officers. Permanent staff appointments, except in the 
Medical Bureau, were to be abolished. In an attempt to 
extend executive authority over the army, all bureau 
chiefs would be appointed for fixed terms determined by 
the president. A $2 0,000 appropriation for a new war 
college was proposed. Carter, despite his duties with the 
Ludlow Board, attended all the hearings with Root. Corbin 
testified supporting the suggested reforms. The other 
bureau chiefs mostly opposed reform. Paymaster-General 
Alfred E. Bates supported the removal of permanent staff 
appointments but opposed other reforms.73 Chief of 
Engineers John M. Wilson, Chief of the Records and 
Pensions Department Fred C. Ainsworth, Judge-Advocate
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General G. Norman Lieber, and Inspector General John C. 
Breckinridge opposed all army reform.74 In the Senate, 
Redfield Proctor and Francis Cockrell introduced 
amendments to support Root. They cited the success of the 
American navy in the Spanish-American War, which already 
had staff-line interchange, a war college, and amalgamated 
staff departments.75 The amendments were voted down. 
General Nelson Miles, the commanding general of the army, 
testified in favour of many of the reforms. As he pointed 
out that he had recommended staff-line interchange and an 
expansion in formal army education when he became 
commanding general in 1895. Miles warned Congress that the 
increase in the regular army, from 24,000 to 65,000 men 
approved until July 1901, would have to be extended. 
Garrison forces were required in Hawaii, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. Miles reminded Congress 
that it had increased the demands upon army manpower 
through its coastal defence policy.76 Carter reported that 
only forty-three out of seventy-five new coastal forts 
were even partially manned. The instillations, built due 
to public pressure in the Spanish-American War, had cost 
over $100 million dollars. Without 18,000 new troops to 
maintain these defences, Carter predicted they would 
rapidly deteriorate and be useless in any future 
conflict.77
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The proposed military reforms and congressional 
debate were influenced both by British military thinking 
and American business principles. German military ideas 
played only a minor role; only the proposed war college 
owed its existence to German military thinking. The two 
most contentious issues, the abolition of permanent staff 
appointments and promotion by merit, were inspired by the 
example of the British army. Upton in his influential The 
Armies of Asia and Europe described how British staff 
officers were required to serve in the field after a five- 
year appointment in the staff.78 Root and Carter, familiar 
with Upton's work, recommended a four-year detail to 
coincide with the American electoral process. Brigadier 
General Theodore Schwan, a recognised expert on the German 
army, denied Germany had any meaningful staff- line 
interchange. Once admitted to the army staff, only 
extremely incompetent officers were removed. There was no 
institutionalised length of staff service followed by a 
period of service in the field. Schwan also wrote that 
most regular army appointments were by seniority.79 These 
ideas influenced Root and Carter and their proposed bill. 
Relying on the work of Upton and Schwan, they used the 
British example in planning staff-line interchange.
The language of those who opposed and endorsed 
military reform regularly included references to American 
business. General Greely, chief of army signals, argued 
against the proposed detail system and cited the views of
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the American Institute of Electrical Engineers to support 
his position:
Certainly no man can become an electrical expert by 
the simple detail of four years. The present system 
embodies the principle that has enabled American 
corporations such as the Pennsylvania Railway, New 
York Central Railway, the Westinghouse, the General 
Electric and other companies to train bodies of 
scientific experts who have placed national
interests in the van.80 
Ideas of "professionalism” and "efficiency” dominated the 
debate on military reform. Both concepts were strongly 
associated with corporate success. Unfortunately, 
supporters and opponents of army reform sought to apply 
professionalism in different ways. Bureau chiefs regarded 
professionalism as a vindication of their autonomous 
position within the army, while supporters of reform 
thought professionalism required improved military 
training for the whole army. This debate on how to achieve 
professionalism in the army hindered progress on military 
reform. The drive for professionalism had inspired new 
military associations. In the late nineteenth century the 
cavalry, artillery, and infantry, all established 
associations with their own membership standards and 
journals. The proposal to establish a war college, which 
promised tougher educational standards, appealed to those 
determined to encourage professionalism in the whole army. 
Professionalism created efficiency according to army 
reformers, both by providing a trained army, and supplying 
educated advice to government.
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The professional idea, however, hindered army reform
by encouraging further fragmentation in the army staff.
Bureau chiefs, opposed to reform, stressed that staff
specialisation required knowledge achieved only by
continued staff service. The creation of further staff
bureaus was promoted by veterinarians and pharmacists who
demanded professional recognition.81 Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans rejected these views, which threatened greater
autonomous specialisation, and undermined their desire for
greater central planning and control. In a rare victory
for army reform, Root was able to block the creation of
two new staff bureaus for veterinarians and pharmacists.
Record and Pension Chief Fred C. Ainsworth demonstrated
the manipulation of the professional idea by staff
officers when he spoke before congress:
This is an age of specialities in all professions, 
the military as well as the legal and the medical, 
and that there is no man who can hope to be 
proficient in all branches of any profession; that 
it takes a lifetime of devotion to any one branch 
to make a man master of all its details; and that 
no good would come of half educating a comparatively 
small number of the line officers of the Army by 
detailing them ... for four years and then sending 
them back to the line.
In response to further questioning he bluntly concluded:
"It would mean incomplete education of a small portion of
officers of the line and utter demoralisation of staff
departments."82
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The congressional argument on military reform 
continued unabated. Republican party managers became 
increasingly concerned that the party was promoting 
unpopular military reform. The presidential election was 
only five months away. McKinley, under pressure to act, 
instructed House Speaker David B. Henderson to limit 
debate on military reform. Henderson agreed and promised 
to re-introduce personally an army reform bill in the new 
congress.83 The continued inability of the army to end the 
war in the Philippines and Republican support for the 
British in the Boer War worried Republican Party 
supporters.
The Democrats decided to make the American annexation 
of the Philippines a major election issue. Encouraged by 
Bryan, German-Americans opposed to militarism and Irish- 
Americans opposed to Britain announced their overwhelming 
support for the Democratic Party. In a speech at the New 
York Academy of Music, the "Irish Joan of Arc," Maude 
Conne, denounced Britain as "the robber nation of the 
world. Hence it matters not what nation England is at war 
with, right or wrong, it is Ireland's duty to oppose."84 
Confronted with growing public annoyance over American 
foreign and defence policy, both McKinley and Root were 
desperate for victory in the Philippines. The President 
decided to relieve General Otis and appoint a civilian 
governor-general in the Philippines. In late April 1900,
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it was announced that, after twenty-one months in command, 
Otis had "earned a rest."85 Major General Arthur MacArthur 
replaced Otis, and William Howard Taft became the new 
civilian governor.
Taft, a graduate of Yale and Cincinnati Law School, 
was reluctant to accept the appointment. A former 
solicitor-general of the United States and federal circuit 
court judge, he really wanted an appointment to the 
Supreme Court.86 A stout fellow who had never served in 
the army, he hated killing things and was at best a 
reluctant imperialist. Surprisingly, Root thought him the 
ideal choice.87 Taft hesitated but accepted, when McKinley 
promised him a future appointment to the Supreme Court. 
Root appealed to his sense of honour and duty ideas of 
importance to upper-middle-class gentlemen.88 In May 1900 
Taft accepted and set sail for the Philippines with the 
new civil commission.
Despite the public opposition to military reform and 
imperialism, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans persisted in 
supporting these ideas. Roosevelt, Hay, Root, Croly, Henry 
Adams, and others were convinced that international 
politics and trade were dominated by national self- 
interest. In such a world conflict over limited markets 
and resources made war certain. The most efficient 
response was "military preparedness." Popular among Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republicans, this philosophy gained increasing
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support within the entire party. Events abroad seemed to
provide overwhelming evidence to support this view. In the
Philippines the continued presence of a German fleet
provoked concerns over both a possible German invasion and
possible aid for the Filipino rebels.89 In May 1900, The
New York Times worried over the future of the relatively
unimportant Danish West Indies. The paper caused
considerable alarm among Republicans when it speculated
the islands might be purchased by Germany.90 The
Commercial Bulletin of Boston, summarised the fears of
Root and others in a May editorial:
Now nobody desires or is seeking war with Germany.
At the same time it is silly to close our eyes to 
the fact that we are rivals. If any person doubts 
what German feeling for this country is, he has 
only to look at German caricatures and editorial 
articles, which though not insulting to the United 
States ... are nevertheless hostile .... For a 
quarter of a century Germany has tabooed our 
provisions, made war on our trade, counterfeited our 
goods in foreign markets, and furnished guns and 
cartridges to our enemies. She has not threatened 
war, but she has been a strong and active commercial 
rival.
The performances of the German vessels in 
Manila Bay are one evidence of her attitude. Over 
her great marine exhibit in Paris is the motto,
"Our future lies on the sea." Everywhere in Samoa, 
among the Cameroons, Germany is seeking expansion.
The article concluded with a call to arm: "We certainly do
not want war with Germany or any foreign power. We as
certainly cannot prevent encroachment by stripping
ourselves of defence."91
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Events in China added to Neo-Hamiltonian concern. In 
the summer of 1900 two German missionaries were killed in 
Shandang. The German authorities retaliated by burning two 
Chinese villages, an act that provoked the Boxer Rebellion 
by northern Chinese against foreign intervention in their 
country. The Boxers besieged the American and various 
European legations in Beijing.92 In early July Brigadier 
General Adna Chaffee and a U.S. force dispatched from the 
Philippines joined the Western relief efforts of Russia, 
Japan, France, Britain, and Germany under Count von 
Waldersee, the German commander.93 For the Neo- 
Hamiltonians the international events of 1900 only 
confirmed the need for military reform.
Despite the coming election, Root continued to 
encourage military reform. In late July he instructed 
Corbin to send letters to all general officers and 
regimental colonels for their views.94 The replies arrived 
throughout the autumn of 1900. Of the eight regular army 
general officers only Major General Miles and Brigadier 
General Joseph Wheeler did not reply. Ten of the eighteen 
volunteer general officers replied, but only fourteen of 
forty-two regimental colonels forwarded their opinions.
The views expressed did little to encourage the supporters 
of reform. The only point of consensus was the need for a 
larger army. Bureau chiefs remained implacably opposed to 
all reform and the replies from line officers only 
confirmed the widespread ignorance and apathy.95 The
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secretary of war was thoroughly discouraged, and his 
misery increased when in September he contracted influenza 
and colic.96
A month later the Ludlow Board presented its report. 
Ludlow spent considerable time in Britain and Germany 
studying the military command structures there. Sanger, 
another member of the board, visited Switzerland to 
observe the mobilisation of its reserves.97 In London 
Ludlow contacted the noted military thinker Spencer 
Wilkinson and picked up a copy of Wilkinson's most recent 
work, the Brain of the Army. Ludlow took the book to 
Germany, read it, and on his return to Britain, eagerly 
sought out Wilkinson again, and discussed military reform 
well into the night. Finally, Ludlow asked Wilkinson why 
he did not awaken Britain to its own military realities. 
Wilkinson replied that citizens in a democracy were more 
interested in domestic politics. Ludlow agreed but added, 
"We also have a democracy in America, but you have 
something here we haven't got," "What's that?" Wilkinson 
asked. "Stupidity at the top, all the way around," came 
the reply.98 Wilkinson's work described how an efficient 
German military structure could be established without 
threatening democratic political control. He recognised 
that Germany had the most effective army but, with the 
death of Bismarck, was now operating without civilian 
political control. In a democracy such military freedom 
remained unacceptable.99
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While Ludlow went to Germany, Sanger went to 
Switzerland. Switzerland attracted attention because it 
was a republic with locally organised reserves. The 
reserve forces were better trained and equipped than the 
National Guard. The Swiss government could mobilise 
several hundred thousand militia in twenty-four hours, an 
impossible task for the American army.100
In October 1900 the Ludlow Board reconvened in 
Washington D.C. to present a memorandum to Root that 
suggested executive action. The board proposed an army war 
college headed by a general officer, with the necessary 
assistants, all with four-year, fixed-term appointments. 
The war college would coordinate and provide a unified 
army education system and provide advanced learning for 
selected officers. Fort Leavenworth, the Cavalry and 
Infantry School would provide all practical training with 
large military formations. The board warned Root that a 
war college was no substitute for a general staff. Both 
institutions were required for an efficient military.101 
In a separate meeting Ludlow presented his ideas and a 
copy of Wilkinson's Brain of the Army to the Secretary of 
War. Root read Wilkinson's book and was greatly influenced 
by it, but for now no action was taken on the 
recommendations of the Ludlow Board with the presidential 
election only weeks away.102
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The ongoing war in the Philippines and British
blunders in South Africa continued to give Neo-Hamiltonian
Republicans domestic political problems. In the
Philippines they awaited the arrival of Taft and his
fellow commissioners. Taft was joined by Henry C. Ide, a
New England lawyer and former Chief Justice of Samoa;
Professor Dean C. Worcester, a zoologist from the
University of Michigan; and historian Bernard Moses from
the University of California. This eminent group sailed
first to Japan where it had an audience with the emperor
and left convinced of Japanese friendship towards America.
The party enjoyed several days of sightseeing and visited
the temples at Nikko, high in the mountains. Taft
described the trip to his brother, made more difficult by
his weight, now close to 3 00 pounds:103
.... The road was steep and got steeper. I had one 
pusher in addition to the jinrikisha man,
[jinrikisha a small light weight two wheeled
passenger vehicle], when I began, another joined 
when we were halfway up, and it seemed to me that 
[when] we struck the last hill the whole village was 
engaged in the push. The Japanese seemed to look 
upon me with great amusement; at the various 
places we changed cars there were a great number of 
people clattering along on their wooden platforms 
which they used as shoes, and they gathered about me, 
smiling and enjoying the prospect of so much flesh
and size....104
When the Commission finally arrived in Manila, they 
received a cool reception from the army high command. 
MacArthur, the military commander, resented civilian 
interference in the islands and so failed to greet them at
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the pier and assigned the commission only one room for an 
office. Relations did not improve when Taft criticised 
heavy-handed military operations and suggested cooperation 
with the natives.
In America McKinley and Root were further discouraged 
as the anti-imperialist movement gained support in the 
South. Senator Daniels from Virginia and E.L. Godkin 
attacked imperial expansion which threatened a “witches1 
cauldron of inter racial friction between Blacks, Asians, 
and Anglo-Saxons."105 The increasing political opposition 
to imperialism among previously sympathetic groups 
increased the pressure on MacArthur to achieve victory.
The army was angry at Taft's conversations with "the 
little brown brothers" and pressed Root to approve more 
vigourous measures. MacArthur, without waiting for 
approval from Washington, ordered the execution of 
Filipino prisoners in retaliation for atrocities committed 
against U.S. forces. Taft was furious, and his anger 
reached a new level when MacArthur gave the former judge, 
who prided himself on his legal knowledge, a lecture on 
the constitution. Taft wrote caustically to Root that it 
was not often the constitution was used to maintain the 
absolute power of a subordinate military commander against 
presidential orders.106 The administration angered by this 
civil-military bickering ordered MacArthur to cooperate 
with Taft.
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At home the Republican Party reaffirmed support for 
overseas expansion, despite increased support for Bryan 
among Southern Democrats, Irish-Americans, and German- 
Americans. Secretary of State James Hay sought advice from 
British imperialist James Bryce on how to govern the 
Philippines.107 Hay was convinced that a Franco-German 
plot existed to undermine the Anglo-Saxon desire for free 
trade.108 Root, Lodge, and other Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans continued to endorse a philosophy of 
competitive natural selection, evangelical good works, and 
free trade. In Chicago, Bishop Bowler, summed up the pre­
election mood of these expansionist Republicans:
Expansion is the law of Saxon life. When he accepted 
individual accountability directly to God without 
intervention of any man, then God gave him self- 
reliance and sent him about the job of saving the 
world. Mrs Partington with her broom trying to sweep 
back the tide of the ocean is more certain to win 
than the men who stake their success fighting 
expansion; for they are fighting not merely McKinley, 
and the Rough Rider and the American People, but they 
are also fighting the restless force ... of natural 
selection - and they are also fighting God's external 
purpose to elevate the races.
Expansion is in our blood, in our history, and 
in our destiny .... If McKinley is elected he will 
hold the United States up to the front as a world 
power, secure the open door for trade and the gospel, 
and help perpetuate civilization. Thus hastening the 
end of heathenism and the Christianization of the
world.109
Roosevelt, nominated as McKinley's running mate, 
underlined the belief in American moral rectitude based 
upon Anglo-Saxon superiority. He described expansion by a 
"masterful people" as a source of pride and not regret.110
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Bryan travelled the country attacking militarism and 
imperialism. He proposed public ownership of municipal 
franchises, greater regulation of big business and 
Filipino independence he also and sympathised with the 
Boers in South Africa. The democratic leader warned 
audiences repeatedly that an imperial policy must lead to 
a larger standing army which would threaten American 
liberty.111 Root responded with a widely reported speech 
from Canton, Ohio in which he criticised anti-imperialists 
for encouraging Filipinos to continue the war and praised 
American forces for their successes in the Philippines and 
China. The Secretary of War attacked proposals to regulate 
efficient business organisations and the claim that a 
larger army would be used to suppress labour. In an attack 
on Bryan's use of Jefferson to justify anti-imperialism, 
Root reminded his audience that Jefferson had not 
implemented democracy in the territories acquired in the 
Louisiana Purchase. The speech angered Bryan, but was one 
of the most effective of the campaign.112
Appreciative of the good coverage he had received, 
Root thanked sympathetic journalist William Laffan of the 
New York Sun. In his letter he again lambasted Bryan, 
describing him as "a disgusting, dishonest fakir" and 
concluded: "When I see so many Americans running after 
him, I feel very much as I do when a really lovely woman 
falls in love with a cad."113
On November 7, 1900 the election took place, and the 
Republican Party won in New England, the mid-Atlantic 
States, and upper mid-West. Bryan carried the old
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Confederacy and Colorado, Montana, Idaho, and Nevada. It 
was a convincing Republican victory. McKinley polled over 
7.2 million votes, against 6.3 million for Bryan. In the 
Senate the Republican Party took a fifty-five to thirty- 
one majority with four seats held by minority parties.
Nine of the fourteen senators who opposed Anglo-American 
imperialism were defeated.114 The election vindicated the 
policies of the Republican Party and strengthened the 
position of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in American politics. 
Attention turned once again to military reform and winning 
the war in the Philippines.
CHAPTER THREE - END NOTES
■^Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root. Vol.l (New York: Dodd Mead 
and Co., 1938), p.56.
2Ibid: pp.62-63.
3James G. Wilson ed., Appeltons Cyclopedia of American 
Bioaraohv. 6 Vols. (New York: D.Appleton & Co., 1900), 
p.233, cited in Root's General Correspondence 1900, Elihu 
Root Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
4Jessup, Elihu Root.. Vol.l, pp.195-200
5"Recollections of Mr. Root," by Presidential Secretary, 
George B. Cortelyou, 1904, George B. Cortelyou Papers, 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
6There are various accounts of Root's selection as 
Secretary of War. The most complete are in 
"Autobiography," by Henry C. Corbin, Jan. 29, 1906, Henry
C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 
p.100; and Jessup, Elihu Root. Vol.l, pp.216-217.
7Jessup, Elihu Root. Vol.l, p.215.
129
8Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft. A Conservative's 
Conception of the Presidency (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1968), pp.5-6.
9Governor Theodore Roosevelt to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, 
July 1899, cited by Henry Cabot Lodge ed., Selections from 
the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot 
Lodge. Vol.l (New York: Scribner's & Co., 1925), p.414.
10Henry C. Corbin, "Autobiography," Jan. 29, 1906, Henry
C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.,
p.100.
■^"Editorial," New York World. Feb. 7, 1904, cited in 
Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; 
Henry C. Corbin, "Autobiography," Jan. 29, 1906, Henry C. 
Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.,
p.100-101.
12Jessup, Elihu Root. Vol.l, pp.220-227.
13"The New Secretary of War," Army and Navv Journal. Vol. 
37, Sept. 2, 1899, p.3.
14"The Secretary of War," New York Weekly Tribune. Sept. 
27, 1900, cited by Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
15William Harding Carter, 3545 ACP 1878, Records of the 
Chief of Staff, R.G. 165, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
16William H. Carter, The Creation of the American General 
Staff System. S.Doc.119. 68th Cong. (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1924), p.l.
17Jessup, Elihu Root, pp.225-226.
18Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The 
American Conquest of the Philippines. 1899-1903 (New Haven 
CT: Yale University Press, 1982), Intro, i-ii.
19Ibid; pp.33-34.
20David B. Anderson, William Jennings Bryan (Boston:
Twayne Publications, 1981), p.101.
21Paolo Enrico Coletta, William Jennings Brvan Vol.l, 
(Lincoln NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p.235.
130
22Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p.46.
23William Christner to Mrs. Christner, Jan. 17, 1899, 
cited by Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p.57.
24Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive General Leonard Wood 
(San Rafael CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p.42; Miller, 
Benevolent Assimilation, p.70.
25 List of books ordered by Root from Charles Scribner's 
sons, Sept. 12, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.; Miller, Benevolent 
Assimilation. p.67-68.
26Secretary of War Root to Governor Theodore Roosevelt, 
Dec. 9, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
27Secretary of War Root to Maj. General E.S. Otis, Nov.
13, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
28Governor Theodore Roosevelt to Secretary of War Elihu 
Root, Sept. 12, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.; Secretary of War Elihu Root to 
Governor Theodore Roosevelt, Oct. 12, 1899, Elihu Root 
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
29Elihu Root to Charles Scribner Sons, London, Oct. 13, 
1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.; Elihu Root memo, to Secretary of State John Hay,
Jan. 11, 1901, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
30Kenton J. Clymer, John Hav The Gentleman as Diplomat 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), p.126.
31"The Situation in the Philippine Islands in 1899," memo, 
by Presidential Private Secretary, George B. Cortelyou, 
George B. Cortelyou Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
32R.B. Mowat, The Life of Lord Pauncefote (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), pp.213-214.
33Judge Charles Magoon to Secretary Root, March 30, 1901, 
Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
131
34Address of Mr. F.B. Thurber, President of the U.S.
Export Association, to the 14th Meeting of the Trans- 
Mississippi Congress, Aug. 21, 1903, Elihu Root Papers, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
35Statement of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Cong. 
Record, 56th Cong., 2nd sess. 1901, (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1901), p.637.
36W m .H . Carter, "A General Staff For The Army," North 
American Review. Vol. 175, (October 1902), pp.559-561.
37N.G. General George W. Wingate and C.R. Boardsman, "The 
Reorganization of Our State Troops," Journal of the 
Military Service Institution. Vol.13, (July 1898), pp.552- 
554; Major Walter A. Irvine, Ohio N.G., "Proposed 
Reorganization of the National Guard," Journal of the 
Military Service Institution. Vol.14 (Jan., 1900), pp.502- 
504.
38N.G. Col. J.G. Gilchrist, "The Reorganization of Our 
State Troops," Journal of the Military Service 
Institution. Vol.14 (Jan., 1900), pp.510-514).
39"Posts for the Philippines," Army and Navv Journal. Vol. 
37 (Dec. 29, 1900), p.425.
40Secretary Root to General Francis Greene, Aug. 12, 1899, 
Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
41Jessup, Elihu Root, p.244.
42Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p.88.
43Letter pub. annon., San Francisco Call. April 9, 1900, 
cited in Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p.88.
44Andrew Carnegie to Whitelaw Reid, Dec. 1, 1899, Whitelaw 
Reid Papers, cited by Clymer, John Hav The Gentleman as 
Diplomat, p.19.
45Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p.95.
46United States, War Department, Annual Reports of the War 
Department for Fiscal Year Ended June 7. 1899. Report of 
the Secretary of War (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1899), pp.46- 
51.
132
47George P. Ahern, Chronicle of the Army War College 1899- 
1919 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1919), pp.1-3.
48Colonel Daniel Butterfield U.S.A. to Secretary of War 
Elihu Root, November, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
49Senator Albert Beveridge to Secretary of War Elihu Root, 
Dec. 3, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
50Jessup, Elihu Root, p.252.
51Secretary of War Elihu Root to Sen. Joseph R. Hawley, 
Sept. 13, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
52William H. Carter, "The Creation of the American General 
Staff System," S.Doc. 119. 68th Cong. (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1924), p.2.
53E.V. McAndrews, "William Ludlow: Engineer, Governor, 
Soldier." (Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State University, 
1973), pp.182-189.
54Brigadier General Leonard Wood U.S.V. to Sen. George F. 
Hoar, Aug. 31, 1900, Leonard Wood Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. Leonard Wood Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.; and "A Cleansing 
Civilization," Editorial, Troy Daily Times. March 8, 1899, 
cited by Leonard Wood Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
55Secretary of War Elihu Root addressing the Marquette 
Club, Chicago, May 1, 1900, cited by Robert Bacon and 
James B. Scott, The Military and Colonial Policy of the 
United States: Addresses and Reports (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press, 1916), pp.11-12.
56Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp.96-97.
57Ed. Peter Warwick, The South African War: The Anglo-Boer 
War 1899-1902 (Harlow Essex: Longman Group, 1980), p.66.
58Ibid; p.81.
59William Jennings Bryan Speeches Vol.2, p.27, cited by 
Anderson, William Jennings Brvan. p.114.
133
60Coletta, William Jennings Brvan. p.195.
6-'-Lodge, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American 
Foreign Policy, pp.158-159.
62Tyler Dennett, John Hav From Poetry to Politics (New 
York: Dodd Mead, and Co., 1933), p.243.
63Jessup, Elihu Root, pp.242-243.
64Ibid; p.243.




68 In memorian to William Ludlow, a service by the 
Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, 
New York, Oct. 15, 1901, Circular 19, Series 1901-02. File 
No. L294 CBF67, ACP File, Office of the Chief of Staff, 
R.G. 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
69Lieutenant-Colonel William Ludlow Report No. 380, April 
18, 1896, Reports of the Military Attaches 1889-1913, War 
College Division General Correspondence, Office of the 
Chief of Staff, R.G. 165, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C.
70Colonel Joseph P. Sanger, 5091 ACP 1875, Office of the 
Chief of Staff, R.G. 165, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C.
71Colonel Henry Hasbrouck, 5568 ACP 1882, Office of the 
Chief of Staff, R.G. 165, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C.
72Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin to Brigadier General 
Wm. Ludlow, Feb. 20, 1900, General Correspondence, Office 
of the Adjutant General, R.G. 94, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C.
73U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military Affairs. To 
Reorganize the Army. HR 12224: Hearing before the 
Committee on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., 
statement by Paymaster-General Alfred E. Bates, May 16, 
1900 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1900), p.126.
134
U .S . Cong. House, Committee on Military Affairs. To 
Reorganize the Army. HR 12224: Hearing before the 
Committee on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., 
statements by Brigadier General John M. Wilson; Brigadier 
General Fred C. Ainsworth; and Judge-Advocate General G. 
Norman Lieber, May 16-18, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1900), pp.120-130. U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military 
Affairs. To Reorganize the Army. HR 12224: Hearing before 
the Committee on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., 
statement by Inspector General John C. Breckinridge, May 
18, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1900), p.150.
75U.S. Cong. Senate,-Committee on Military Affairs, To 
Reorganize the Armv S.4300: Hearing before the Committee 
on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., statement by 
Senator Redfield Proctor, March 20, 1900 (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1900), pp.173-174.
78U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military Affairs. To 
Reorganize the Armv HR 12224: Hearing Before the Committee 
on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., statement by 
Major General Nelson Miles, May 10, 1900 (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1900), p.27.
77U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military Affairs, To 
Reorganize the Armv HR 12224; Hearing before the Committee 
on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., statement by 
Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Carter, May 23, 1900 
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1900), p.264.
78Colonel Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, 
originally New York: D. Appleton, 1878. (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1968), pp.250-256.
79Theodore Schwan, Report on the Organization of the 
German Armv. Military Information Division (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1894), p.68; Brigadier General Theodore Schwan 
to Secretary of War Elihu Root, Dec. 22, 1900, File No. 
354151, General Correspondence, Office of the Adjutant 
General, R.G. 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
80U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military Affairs, To 
Reorganize the Armv. HR 12224: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., 
letter from the American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers, cited by Brigadier General A. W. Greely, Chief 
of the Signal Corps, May 14, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1900), p.63.
135
81U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military Affairs, To 
Reorganize the Army. HR 12224: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Military Affairs. 56th Cong. 1st sess., 
statement on recognition for Army Veterinarians by Dr. 
Salmon, Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry, U.S. Dept, 
of Agriculture, May 16, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1900), p.152; U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military 
Affairs, For the Reorganization of the Armv of the United 
States. HR 11022: Hearing before the Committee on Military 
Affairs. 55th Cong. 3rd sess., statement of Dr. Thomas W. 
Jamieson appearing in the interests of Pharmacists, Dec. 
12, 1898 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1899), p.126.
82U.S. Cong. House, Committee on Military Affairs, To 
Reorganize the Armv of the United States. HR 12224:
Hearing Before the Committee on Military Affairs. 56th 
Cong. 1st sess., statement by Brigadier General Fred C. 
Ainsworth, Chief of Records and Pensions, May 17, 1900 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1900), pp.139-141.
83,1 Army Reorganization,” Armv and Navy Journal. Vol. 37, 
May 26, 1900, p.920.
84Speech by Maude Conne at the New York Academy of Music, 
Feb. 22, 1900, cited by Warwick, The South African War, 
p.318.
8®Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p.99.
8®Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservative's 
Conception of the Presidency, pp. 4-6.
8^Henry Fowler Pringle, The Life and Times of William 
Howard Taft. 2 Vols. (New York: Farrar and Rhinehart Inc., 
1939), p.154.
88Ibid; pp.159-160.
89Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee to Adjutant General 
Henry C. Corbin, July 7, 1900, Henry C. Corbin Papers, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
90The New York Times. May 1, 1900, p.l; and The New York 
Times. May 2, 1900, p.8.
91Editorial, "Some Real Algers," The Commercial Buletin. 
Boston, May 19, 1900, cited by Elihu Root Papers, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
136
92Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions China From the 
1800's to the 1900's (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), p.136.
93William H. Carter, The Life of Lieutenant-General 
Chaffee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917), 
pp.178-184.
94Secretary of War Elihu Root to Adjutant General Corbin, 
July 24, 1900, Doc. File No. 354151, General 
Correspondence, Office of the Adjutant General, R.G. 94, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
95Report on all officers receiving a request from the 
A.G.O., July 24, 1900, for their views on military reform. 
Doc. File No. 335333, Office of the Adjutant General, R.G. 
94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
96Secretary of War Elihu Root to Governor Theodore 
Roosevelt, Sept. 17, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Library of 
Congress. Washington, D.C.
97Colonel William Sanger to Secretary of War Elihu Root, 
Sept. 29, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.
98Spencer Wilkinson, Thirty Five Years (London: Constable 
and Co., 1924), pp.31-36; McAndrews, "William Ludlow: 
Engineer, Governor, Soldier." pp.22 0-221; J.D. Hittle,
The Military Staff its History and Development. (Westport 
CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1975), p.197.
"spencer Wilkinson, The Brain of the Navy (London: 
Archibald & Co., 1895), pp.31-36.
100Considerable attention was given to the Swiss militia 
system including; Annual Reports on the Swiss Militia 
System 1887-1894, forwarded by Lieutenant T.B. Mott, 
Military Attache Records, Office of the Chief of Staff, 
R.G. 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; "Notes on 
Organization and Military Progress," by Captain George R. 
Cecil, Jan. 1, 1899, Military Attache Records, Office of 
the Chief of Staff, R.G. 165, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C.; Colonel William Sanger to Secretary of 
War Elihu Root, Sept. 29, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
10-'-Memorandum of the Ludlow Board, Oct. 24, 1900, Adjutant 
General's Office, R.G. 94, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
137
102McAndrews, "William Ludlow," p.221.
l°3pringie, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 
pp.165-166.
104Governor William H. Taft to Charles R. Taft May 18, 
1900, William H. Taft Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.; cited also by Pringle, The Life and 
Times of William Howard Taft, p.166.
105Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp.123-125.
106Ibid; pp.165-166.
107Clymer, The Gentleman as Diplomat, p.140.
108Ibid; p.149.
109"H igh Praise of McKinley," speech by Bishop Bowler, 
Chicago Times Herald. Oct. 24, 1900, William McKinley 
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
110Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of 
America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1956), p.25.
1:L1Coletta, William Jennings Brvan. pp.239-240.
112Speech by Secretary of War Elihu Root at Canton, Ohio, 
Oct. 24, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1924), U.S. Army 
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle 
PA.
113Secretary of War Elihu Root to William Laffan, Sun 
Building N.Y., Oct. 31, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
114Warwick, The South African War. The Anglo-Boer War 
1899-1902. p.329.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Republican victory in the election of 1900 allowed 
Neo-Hamiltonian ideas to flourish. Hay and Root continued 
to control the State and War Departments. Theodore 
Roosevelt, a supporter of strong central government and 
overseas expansion, was the new vice-president. In the 
Senate, Lodge, Proctor, Joseph R. Hawley, Albert J. 
Beveridge, and Joseph B. Foraker ensured staunch support 
for imperialism and military reform. These men were 
determined to expand American trade, promote military 
reform, and strengthen central government and dismissed 
the of idea of the locally controlled agrarian republic as 
irrelevant in the modern world. In his early speeches 
Roosevelt demanded larger armed forces, a subsidised 
merchant navy, increased American exports, and the 
application of business methods to government to ensure 
efficiency. To the new vice-president, Jefferson was 
simply "the most incompetent chief executive we ever 
had.nl
The rapprochement between the Republican Party and 
Great Britain continued. American neutrality in the Boer 
War was at best ambiguous. Secretary of State John Hay 
instructed Stanford Newell, the U.S. ambassador to the 
Netherlands, to discourage Boer President Kruger of the
13 8
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Transvaal Republic from visiting America. McKinley 
recalled the letter, but Kruger decided against coming to 
America anyway.2 Throughout the Boer War American 
businessmen provided the hard-pressed British army with 
thousands of horses, hundreds of tons of animal feed, and 
considerable amounts of foodstuffs. The New York Times 
reminded those who were pro-Boer that thirty-eight percent 
of all American exports went directly to Britain and that 
over half of all American trade was with the British 
Empire.3 Root, like Hay, supported British intervention in 
Africc and praised the new Anglo-Egyptian government of 
Lord Cromer.4
In America, despite the convincing Republican 
election victory, many people remained sceptical about the 
value of imperial expansion or military reform. President 
Charles Eliot of Harvard, Lincoln Steffens, Mark Twain, 
and William Dean Howells all joined Bryan in attacking 
American involvement overseas.5 Bryan defended the ideals 
of Jefferson and was furious with Root, who compared the 
annexation of the Louisiana territories in 1803 to the 
annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines. In a direct 
attack on imperialism, Bryan quoted Jefferson: "conquest
is not in our principles; it is inconsistent with our 
government."6 Mark Twain sent an "updated" version of the 
Battle Hymn of the Republic to his friend Hay:
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I have read his bandit gospel writ in burnished 
rows of steel,
As ye deal with my pretensions, so with you my 
wrath shall deal,
Let the faithless sons of freedom, crush the 
patriot with his heel,
Lo, greed is marching on.7
In the Philippines the American military position 
deteriorated further. Mutual brutality encouraged greater 
violence. The army resented both civilian criticism and 
Taft's attempted policy of local reconciliation. Generals 
MacArthur, Young, and Bell ignored Taft's advice and 
adopted more vigourous tactics to end the war.8 Root 
defended the army from charges of harsh conduct, both in 
America and from the Philippine Civil Commission. Taft 
found his ideas of reconciliation rejected, as the 
government sought to end the war through military means.
In Washington, the administration was under pressure 
to pass a new army bill before February 2, 1901 when the 
temporary approval of a larger standing army ended. If no 
new legislation was approved, the army would return to its 
pre-Spanish-American War level of 24,000 men. This force 
was inadequate to meet the new defence commitments at 
home, in the Pacific, and in the Caribbean. Root 
instructed Carter to present a new army bill for 
consideration by Congress.9 Nolonger inhibited by election 
concerns, Root approved the inclusion of several reform 
ideas in the new bill, including creation of an army war 
college, a new corps structure for the artillery, the 
amalgamation of the three bureaus concerned with army
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supply into one department, fixed four-year appointments 
to most staff bureaus, promotion by merit, and a permanent 
increase in the size of the regular army.10 Root refused 
to approve Carter's request to include general staff 
legislation in the new bill. The Secretary of War remained 
concerned that opposition to centralised army command 
among staff officers, Naticnal Guard officers, and 
congressmen would threaten the possibility of any change 
being approved. This cautious approach by Root was 
vindicated when the measures provoked considerable 
protest.
Middle-ranking officers, who had waited for years for
promotion by seniority, condemned promotion by merit. In
an anonymous letter one major expressed the majority view:
I entered the army from West Point nearly 30 years 
ago. I have never ceased to be a student; have 
been faithful in the school of application, lyceums, 
in the execution of the problems of minor tactics, as 
subaltern, captain, squadron commander, in garrison 
and field, in all which I have won the praise of my 
superiors. The Spanish war, with its fine 
opportunities came .... I never worked so hard before 
... worn out with work I became the victim of malaria 
.... Is there anything in this record of 30 years, or 
in the labours of the past 3 3 months, to be ashamed 
of? Is there anything worthy of punishment? If not, 
why should I be deprived of the long delayed 
advancement given by law? I should be glad to see 
merit suitably rewarded but on behalf of myself and 
hundreds of others do earnestly pray that Congress
may never approve so unjust a measure.11 
Staff officers joined middle-ranking colleagues in 
lobbying Congress to oppose army reform. The objections 
raised by these officers received considerable support
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among those in Congress who feared any extension of 
executive authority through the introduction of promotion 
by merit or fixed-term staff appointments. Representative 
John Hull, the House Military Affairs Committee chairman, 
expressly informed Root that the majority of congressmen 
opposed fixed four-year term staff appointments and 
promotion by merit for these reasons.12 Root introduced a 
compromise suggesting that only one-third of all 
promotions be decided on merit. The president would select 
one officer for promotion from a choice of three 
recommended by an army promotion board.13 Congress 
remained skeptical of this attempt to strengthen executive 
authority over military appointments, because the idea of 
trained professionals advising a strong central authority 
was not recognised by most Americans as an appropriate way 
to achieve effective government.14
General Miles, the commanding general of the army, 
announced his support for fixed-term staff appointments, a 
larger army, and more artillery, but he opposed the other 
suggested reforms.15 Most bureau chiefs resisted reform 
except the proposal to increase the size of the regular 
army; all wanted more men for their particular 
departments. Brigadier General A.R. Buffington the 
Ordnance Chief, Inspector General J.C. Breckinridge, 
Quartermaster General M.I. Luddington, and Judge Advocate 
General G. Norman Lieber rejected all suggested reforms.16
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Paymaster General Alfred Bates, Signals Chief Horace 
Greely, and many artillery officers supported most of the 
recommendations by Root. The inability of the army officer 
corps to present a coherent program of reform aided those 
opposed to any change in the traditional reliance on the 
hastily mobilised volunteer.
Industrial analogies and the twin concepts of 
"efficiency" and "professionalism" once more dominated the 
debates on military reform. The issue of a separate bureau 
for veterinarians was again advanced on the basis of 
emerging professionalism.17 Root forcefully opposed 
further fragmentation of command and lobbied hard against 
such ideas. He wrote to Senate Military Affairs chairman, 
Joseph Hawley, that the creation of any further staff 
bureaus only enhanced the disintegration of army command, 
which in turn promoted inefficiency.18 Carter, the author 
of the proposed reforms, was impressed with the ability of 
modern business organisations to control diverse 
specialisations and markets. For military reformers there 
were clear analogies between the success of American 
business and organisational failure in the army. Carter 
and Root believed that centralised control and clear lines 
of command in any system created efficiency. Alexander 
Hamilton had advocated such ideas in government, and 
American business success seemed to prove him right.
The expansion of the regular array had required the
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selection of 298 new staff officers and 837 new first and 
second lieutenants so that the need for new officers added 
impetus to recommendations for army education reform.19 
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans regarded education as 
essential to creating an efficient military profession and 
Root was aware the current system was wholly inadequate.
In September, 1900 Colonel Joseph P. Sanger issued a 
scathing attack on army education. He -reported a lack of 
standardised training in the National Guard, poor 
educational facilities, and the general ridicule of formal 
education as a means of training in the army. No state had 
classes for National Guard officers or non-commissioned 
officers. In the regular army, most officers received no 
training after leaving West Point, and only three percent 
of enlisted men attended post schools.20 Military training 
at universities was mostly symbolic and was ineffective 
for current defence needs. All of the 104 university and 
college courses were regarded as inadequate: target 
practice, sanitation procedures, and army administration 
were omitted from the syllabus in many cases.21
In his annual report Root attempted to tackle these 
problems. A new system of continuous education for army 
officers v/as recommended. Each army post would educate 
junior military officers who had not attended West Point, 
and a national system of certificates would document the 
courses completed by junior officers. Five service schools
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would provide specialist training for certain officers: 
artillery training at Fort Monroe; engineering at 
Washington Barracks; submarine defence at Fort Tctten; 
army medicine at Washington Barracks; and staff work at 
Fort Leavenworth.22 The last would give officers 
experience with large military forces in order to prevent 
repetition of Spanish-American War command failures. A 
permanent garrison of several thousand men would be 
stationed at Fort Leavenworth to provide officers with 
practical experience in handling brigade-size units.23
The final element of Root's proposed reforms was an 
army war college. The college would supervise and inspect 
all other schools and oversee all aspects of military 
education. The brightest officers would receive advanced 
training in command and organisation at the college. 
Strategic planning would be conducted on the basis of 
military information gathered from abroad. A general 
officer would head a five-man committee in charge of the 
college. The chief of artillery, chief of engineers, 
superintendent of West Point, and the commander of Fort 
Leavenworth would attend committee meetings as ex officio 
members.24 Root hoped these officers would act as an 
informal general staff by acting as the centre of 
education and information gathering. Six months 
previously, Root had expressed the reasons for these 
changes before the Senate:
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Instead of having nothing but a poor, weak, simple- 
minded civilian secretary of war who is the only 
person to bring the strings together of all this 
multitudinous activity you have a board of the 
leading officers of the army, including the heads of 
all the staff departments whose business it is to 
advise on all the great questions of military
preparation.2 5
Despite this testimony, many remained skeptical of Root's 
proposals.
The proposed artillery reform abolished the 
regimental system and created a new corps system, sub­
divided into coastal defence and field sections. The new 
coastal fortifications, built to defend communities from 
naval assault in the Spanish-American War, were 
undermanned so an increase of 7,000 artillerymen was 
unanimously recommended by army officers as the solution 
to the problem.26
These proposed organisational changes caused great 
division of opinion in the army. Nelson Miles, army 
traditionalists, and most bureau chiefs opposed any change 
to the regimental system.27 Typical opposition was 
expressed by Inspector General Breckinridge who 
pronounced: "As a soldier I believe in regiments. This 
section abolishes them. It would disband admirable 
regiments that have a history running back a hundred years 
and an esprit de corps which might be the envy of the 
world."28 Supporters of reform argued that the corps 
system produced a more flexible organisation with a
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general officer providing a unified authoritative voice on 
the needs of the artillery. Army artillery previously 
struggled under the divided authority of regimental 
colonels. The recommendation underlined Neo-Hamiltonian 
desires for centralised army command which enhanced 
political control over the army. The United States did not 
rely exclusively on Germany for ideas on military reform, 
for the suggested change in artillery -organisation was 
borrowed from the corps structure used in the British 
army.
The proposed introduction of fixed term assignments 
for army officers proved controversial. The staff system, 
already outlined, gave permanent tenure to officers 
transferred to staff bureaus, which made them 
unaccountable to the commanding general, (see Appendix 1). 
It created envy between staff and line officers as staff 
officers enjoyed city life and influential political 
friends. The introduction of fixed four-year staff 
appointments, followed by an automatic appointment for at 
least two years to a field command, attempted to solve 
these problems. Only the president could re-appoint any 
officer to the staff without an automatic re-detail to the 
field.29 The recommendation applied to only six of the 
twelve staff bureaus: the Adjutant General's Office, 
Inspector General's Office, Quartermaster's Department, 
Commissary General's Office, Ordnance Department, and
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Signal Corps. Specialist technical or professional 
knowledge, excluded the other bureaus, such as the 
Engineers or Medical Corps. The reform was further limited 
when Root agreed to apply the new measure to only the 155 
new staff positions, created by the expansion in the 
army.30 The 185 current members of the army staff were, 
both excluded from re-detail and guaranteed promotion by 
seniority.31 These concessions underlined the significant 
opposition to this reform by Congress and staff officers.
Throughout the nineteenth century the issue of staff- 
line interchange had provoked endless controversy, 
highlighted by the failed attempts to limit staff 
appointments by the Banning, Coburn, and Garfield 
committees on military reform.32 The bitter fight in 
Congress to pass even a limited rotation of staff and line 
officers confirmed the political acumen of Root, who 
rejected any attempt to move quickly on radical reforms. 
The measure endorsed by Congress limited staff experience 
to only ten percent of all army officers in their first 
twenty years of service. The majority of senior officers 
would continue to have no staff experience. A full detail 
system was only envisaged after twenty, or thirty years, 
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The Senate altered the final reading of the bill by 
promoting Commanding General Miles and Adjutant General 
Corbin. The top rank in the American army after the 
retirement Sherman in 1883 was only major general, two 
full ranks lower than most other armies. After years of 
protest by senior officers, Congress agreed to restore the 
rank of lieutenant general.33 Miles was promoted to 
lieutenant general and Corbin to major general, restoring 
the original rank distinction between the commanding 
general, adjutant general, and the bureau chiefs.
On February 2, 1901 the new army bill was finally 
passed by Congress. Root had achieved only a partial 
victory. The expansion of the army was approved. The 
regular army increased from 24,000 to 60,000 regulars.
This force could be further raised, at the discretion of 
the president, to 88,000 in times of national emergency.34 
Such a flexible system reflected both congressional 
desires to keep the army small, and the Neo-Hamiltonian 
wish for greater control by the executive. The president, 
not Congress, determined the size of the army.
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The focus of army expansion emphasised the view of 
military reformers that "military preparedness" was the 
best response to inevitable future conflict. Since the 
training required for artillery and cavalry service took 
longer than for the infantry, they received a larger 
proportional increase in numbers. The number of infantry 
regiments jumped from twenty five to thirty while the 
number of cavalry regiments increased by fifty percent and 
the new artillery force almost doubled in size.35 The new 
artillery corps and the refusal to create any further 
staff bureaus were victories for the supporters of 
centralised command. Congress, however, refused to approve 
the amalgamation of the three supply bureaus and severely 
curtailed the implementation of staff-line interchange. 
These failures and the decision by Root to tackle National 
Guard reform in a separate bill underlined the political 
strength of Democrats, bureau chiefs, and National Guard 
officers and the Jeffersonian ideology of states rights, 
volunteerism, and local control.
The creation of the war college was the most 
significant change agreed to by Congress. This institution 
was a major step towards the general staff system, the 
ultimate aim of the reformers. Carter, Bliss, and 
Schofield all pressed Root to continue the reform process. 
All three hoped the secretary of war would introduce a
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general staff bill to Congress. Root, backed by a 
politically secure executive, was more sympathetic than 
previously to such requests. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans 
hoped the new general staff would rectify previously 
confused army management, and strengthen executive 
authority over the National Guard.
The idea of a staff for generals was many centuries 
old. Originally they consisted of aides who relayed 
messages throughout the army and clerks who copied and 
kept orders. Larger armies required more efficient 
administration and a new centralised body, the general 
staff, emerged. It administered, maintained, and directed 
the army.36 The first effective general staff system 
appeared in early nineteenth-century Prussia. Prussia had 
three powerful states on its borders: France, Austria- 
Hungary, and Russia. National independence required an 
efficient army. France's defeat of Prussia at Jena in 1806 
underlined the importance of the army in preserving 
national sovereignty. Military defeat forced Prussia to 
reform its army and in 1807 a commission was established 
to recommend a new military organisation. This commission 
included the most significant military thinkers of the 
nineteenth century. Gerhard Scharnhorst, Neithardt von 
Gneisenau, Karl von Stein, Karl von Grolman, and Herman 
von Boyen as commission members and Count Goetzen and Karl 
von Clausewitz, an important military theorist, as 
associate members.37
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These men hoped that military reform would serve as a 
means to transform a monarchical absolutist state, with 
its strict caste system, into a liberal democratic state. 
Prussia required an army for its existence, and, if the 
army recruited from all able-bodied male citizens, it 
should give these citizens access to government.38 
Scharnhorst emphasised military education and promotion 
based upon merit. He laid the foundation for an effective 
military education system open to nobles and commoners, 
with new war schools at Berlin, Konigsberg, and Breslau, 
and a new war academy in Berlin.39
It was this war academy that had impressed successive 
generations of American military reformers. Sheridan, 
Upton, Schofield, Bliss, and Ludlow all reported 
favourably on the institution. In 1821, the general staff 
was established in Prussia as a separate department, which 
reported through the war department to the King. This new 
department had periodic staff-line officer reassignment. 
Gneisenau developed the great general staff which remained 
in Berlin, while other general staff officers, were 
assigned to field commands to ensure the implementation of 
staff planning.40 The Prussian nobility rejected liberal 
reforms and convinced successive Prussian monarchs to 
oppose democratic accountability over the military.
Liberal reformers had succeeded in creating an efficient
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military structure, which in the end became a bulwark 
against liberalism and democracy.41
The Prussian General Staff expanded throughout the 
nineteenth century. In 1866, during the war against 
Austria, the king subordinated all units of the army to 
the Chief of Staff von Moltke. This remarkable order 
allowed Moltke to command the entire army, without 
reference to either the king, or war minister.42 
Militarily successful, this degree of autonomy further 
undermined civilian control over the military. Although 
the order was rescinded between the armistice with Austria 
in 1866 and war with France in 187 0, a dangerous precedent 
was established. The rapid defeat of France in 1870 
further weakened civilian political control over the army. 
Military victories made the army popular. The General 
Staff was rewarded for its success with complete control 
over all military decision-making. The new German system 
rejected the teachings of Clausewitz who warned that 
military planning must always be subordinate to civilian 
political policy. In America, only General U.S. Grant 
enjoyed such freedom of command during the last year of 
the Civil War. Moltke ignored the assertions of 
Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, and Bismarck that military policy 
must always implement civilian political goals. Supported 
by military victories, he easily resisted civilian 
attempts to regain some control over the army.43 Without
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the influence of wider political concerns, the German army 
conducted its strategic planning in a political vacuum, 
the fatal consequences of which were exposed in World War 
One. The system, with its reputation for efficiency, 
impressed Upton, Hazen, Sherman, and Grant. Only 
Schofield, among nineteenth-century American military 
reformers, realised that the autonomy given to the German 
army was politically unacceptable in America.44
The German military system was unattractive to Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republicans who wanted stronger, not weaker, 
political control over the army. Spencer Wilkinson's Brain 
of the Army presented the Secretary of War with a solution 
to this problem.45 Wilkinson argued that the essence of 
government was a single strong authority and that the 
object of representative government was to put authority 
into the hands of a body which had the confidence of the 
majority. The problem with the British and American armies 
was that government could not get professional advice 
because they had failed as professional bodies. Anglo- 
American armies lacked proper educational standards, 
failed to plan for future conflicts, and were unable to 
present government with efficient prepared alternatives in 
time of national emergency.46 The divided U.S. army 
command structure only aggravated these failings, (see 
Appendix 1). The problem was how to reconcile a civilian 
president who was commander-in-chief, with the Commanding
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General of the army, who presumably was an expert.
Wilkinson presented the solution:
What we want for the defence of Great Britain is in 
each of the two services, the navy and the army, a 
department for campaigns and battles, for preparing 
as Moltke prepared, for the next war, for the 
directing it when it comes, and all the time training 
and testing the admirals and generals. As the heads 
of these two departments we want the best naval 
strategist and the best military strategist in the 
service; and we want no one whatever to stand between 
either of these men and the Cabinet. Of course, when 
I say Cabinet, I mean for this purpose the First Lord 
of the Admiralty [Secretary of the Navy] and the 
Secretary of State for War. Each of these 
Ministers is the Cabinet to the service over 
which he presides; when he says "yea" or "nay" it 
is the Cabinet [President] that speaks through
him."47
Wilkinson's solution was close to the original idea of 
Prussian military reformers who advocated a Prussian 
general staff reporting to an elected civilian war 
minister, who represented a politically accountable 
government. Root instructed Carter to prepare a general 
staff bill on the Wilkinson model.
American foreign policy was dominated by policy of 
"benevolent assimilation" in new colonies and the war in 
the Philippines. The ideas of Josiah Strong, who believed 
America had a moral duty to improve the lives of less 
fortunate foreigners, were partially implemented. General 
Young informed Army Headquarters in Manila that 203 
schools teaching 10,714 children had been established and 
he hoped enrollment would rise to 25,000 in a few months. 
The general requested over 30,000 textbooks, 15,000
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slates, 30,000 slate pencils, seventy-five teachers of 
English, and building materials for 150 school 
buildings.48 In Washington, Root received reports from 
High School Superintendent Eduardo Diaz and Morgan T. 
Scudder, principal of New York State Normal School, on 
education in Cuba. The reports emphasised the need to 
teach civics, especially American democratic ideals, and 
business methods to high school students.40 These social 
reforms underlined the determination of Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans to combine Strong's claim of moral 
responsibility with the extension of U.S. trading 
opportunities.
The creation of politically stable, English-speaking 
democracies that endorsed free trade, would benefit 
American exports. In the competitive world market, 
Republicans sought to support actively American business. 
Root, a corporate lawyer, retained many business contacts 
and staunchly supported attempts to increase U.S. exports. 
The Secretary of War endorsed free trade and regarded the 
Pacific as "the Ocean of the future." America could 
dominate this new market through its control of more than 
half the North American Pacific coastline, Hawaii, and the 
Philippines.50 Root sent maps of Asia to prominent 
industrialists to encourage trade with the east, regularly 
requested information on foreign trade from his colonial 
legal adviser Charles Magoon, and defended the industrial
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trusts as elements of progress essential for foreign 
trade,51 He agreed with Hay that Anglo-American friendship 
was bound by many ties and that Japan and Germany were 
America's main commercial rivals.52 Only fishing rights 
off the coast of Canada and right of free passage in any 
proposed Panama Canal remained as difficult issues between 
Britain and the United States.
The large increase in the regular army allowed Root 
to recommend promotion for several officers. Adna Romanza 
Chaffee, who commanded U.S. forces during the Boxer 
rebellion in China, was promoted to major general. Five 
other officers were promoted to brigadier general, 
including Leonard Wood and J. Franklin Bell, men 
sympathetic to army reform and to the ideas of Neo- 
Hamiltonianism.53 The promotion of Wood from surgeon 
captain to brigadier general was the most contentious.
Wood joined the army as a contract surgeon on June 9, 1885 
having graduated from Harvard in 1884. His military 
career, like that of most army reformers, was 
unrepresentative of the standard army career. He was not a 
Civil War veteran but had served extensively in the South­
west in the campaigns against the Apache Indian. After the 
capture of Geronimo, he was appointed surgeon at Fort 
McPherson, Georgia. In the early 1890s he became attending 
surgeon to Presidents Cleveland and McKinley. In May 1898, 
he organised the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, "The Rough
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Riders," with his good friend Theodore Roosevelt. Upon the 
surrender of Spanish forces in Cuba, he was appointed 
governor of Santiago.
His attempts to implement sanitary and educational 
reforms gained favourable recognition from Root. Wood was 
a staunch imperialist who admired the British Empire. He 
supported military reform both to sustain American 
expansion overseas and because he believed international 
conflict was unavoidable. A close friend of Roosevelt, his 
outspoken defence of American imperialism and support for 
army reform made him a staunch supporter of Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republicanism. In December, 1899, he was 
appointed governor of Cuba and promoted to major general 
of volunteers.54 His regular army rank remained captain 
and surgeon. The promotion of "Doctor" Wood over hundreds 
of colleagues caused the first of many controversies which 
occurred throughout Wood's career. Corbin, Shafter, and 
other senior officers resented the promotion, but Wood 
proved an able officer who encouraged army reform and 
American imperialism.55 Wood and Corbin soon became firm 
friends. The Adjutant General quickly recognised his 
abilities and stated: "I have never ceased to say that it 
is utterly wrong in principle, but I also say that ... the 
man is eminently worthy ... Wood is a soldier and a 
scholar.1,56
The promotion of James Franklin Bell created further 
resentment among many regular army officers. Bell had
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graduated from the U.S. Army Military Academy in 1874. 
Wagner, Bliss, and Carter were all his classmates. After 
graduation he served extensively in the West. A captain in 
the 7th Cavalry in 1898, he served in the Philippines and 
was rapidly promoted to volunteer major, lieutenant 
colonel, and brigadier general. On Sept. 9, 1899, he won 
the Congressional Medal of Honour during fighting against 
Filipino forces near Poroa Luzon.57 An advocate of tough 
reprisals against Filipino guerrillas, he attracted 
favourable attention from army superiors, Root, and 
Roosevelt. Governor Taft, attempting a policy of 
reconciliation in the islands, was less impressed. Bell 
was promoted over 1036 more senior colleagues and, with 
Wood, represented a major assault on promotion by 
seniority. Both officers were to have a significant role 
in future army reform.58
The poor performance of the American army in China 
increased pressure on Root to implement further army 
reforms. In the early spring, William Crozier, the 
ordnance chief for American forces in China identified 
the poor training of officers, ignorance about the 
country, lack of forward planning, and supply failures as 
major problems affecting the army.59 The world-wide 
commercial expansion of Germany and uncertainty over the 
intentions of Japan added impetus to demands for army 
reform.
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The improvement in Anglo-American relations continued
with sympathetic reaction to British imperial development,
while Japanese and German expansion was severely
criticised. Secretary of State John Hay wrote to his
friend Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, hoping for a speedy end to
the Boer War and the creation of a "new English- speaking
commonwealth South of the Zambesi" and in Eastern Asia.60
While Hay encouraged British imperialism, Roosevelt railed
at German belligerence:
Some friends of mine who have been at the German 
field manoeuvres last year were greatly impressed 
with the evident intention of the German military 
classes to take a fall out of us when the 
opportunity arises. I find that the Germans regard 
our failure to go forward ... as a sign that our 
spasm of preparation, as they think has come to an 
end; that we shall sink back, so that in a few 
years they will be in a position to take some 
steps in the West Indies or South America which 
will make us put up or shut up on the Monroe 
Doctrine .... I wish to see us act upon the old 
frontier principle, Don't bluster, don't flourish 
your revolver and never draw unless you intend to
shoot.61
The opinions of both the secretary of state and the 
vice-president emphasised a new Anglo-American 
understanding. Throughout the spring of 1901, relations 
between America and both Japan, and Germany, continued to 
deteriorate. In April it was discovered that Mr. Taiyo 
Hojo, a Japanese consular official in Manila, was acting 
as a spy for Filipino guerrillas. He accompanied U.S. 
missions against Filipino forces and passed information on
161
American troop dispositions to the guerrillas. He was 
arrested and deported to Japan.62 Root reported this 
action by the military to secretary of state John Hay. 
Later the same day, Root reported further evidence of 
Japanese treachery to the State Department. The U.S. 
military attache in Beijing reported certain steamers 
smuggling arms from Japan, via Hong Kong, to Manila. The 
secretary of war asked the British government in London to 
tighten customs procedures in the colony.63
Despite these developments, the American army seemed 
close to victory in the Philippines. On March 23, 1901 
Brigadier General Frederick Funston, in a da?:ing 
undercover raid, captured the guerrilla leader Aguinaldo. 
Funston intercepted a courier carrying a message from 
Aguinaldo to his brother requesting reinforcements. The 
general organised 81 Tagalog-speaking Macebe scouts who, 
with Funston and three others disguised as captured 
American officers, entered Aguinaldo's camp and captured 
the elusive guerrilla leader. Funston rushed his prisoner 
to the coast where they boarded the U.S.S. Vicksburg. This 
daring raid made Funston the hero of the hour and 
depressed many of his contemporaries, who regarded him an 
irksome blowhard.64 Aguinaldo ordered a cease-fire and 
much of the fighting on Luzon stopped. In outlying 
islands, however, the war continued with various tribal 
groups.
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In Washington, Assistant Secretary of War George D. 
Meiklejohn was replaced by William C. Sanger. Sanger, from 
New York State, was Roosevelt's friend, attended Root's 
alma mater, Hamilton College, and was an expert on the 
militia. The appointment signalled Root's determination to 
reform the National Guard and demonstrated Roosevelt's 
influence over appointments.66 The vice-president was 
responsible for advancing the careers of Wood, Bell, 
Crozier, Sanger, and others who contributed greatly to 
military reform. The appointment of Sanger, a Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republican, indicated McKinley's willingness 
to endorse further military reform. While Sanger 
familiarised himself with his office, Root was compelled 
to review colonial, not military problems.
In the early summer a constitutional convention 
established a new American-Cuban relationship. The 
agreement featured many of the imperialist goals of Neo- 
Hamiltonians. Cuba was forbidden from concluding treaties 
with any foreign power or allowing the construction of 
military bases by foreign powers. The United States 
reserved the right to intervene in Cuba, to protect life 
or property, and demanded a naval station on the island at 
Guantanamo. Wood, as governor of the island, presented the 
American terms to the islanders. The agreement, ensured a 
virtual American protectorate over the island.66
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In the Philippines the capture of Aguinaldo reduced 
the level of fighting. Root took the opportunity to remove 
MacArthur and replace him with Chaffee, the successful 
commander in the Boxer Rebellion. The Secretary of War 
hoped this change would improve the poor relations between 
Governor Taft and the army in the Philippines. On July 4, 
1901, the formal transfer from MacArthur to Chaffee took 
place. MacArthur headed home to a hero's welcome in 
California, despite allegations of corruption among his 
staff, which included giving favoured status to certain 
companies in return for a percentage of the profits.67
The appointment of Chaffee failed to heal the rift 
between the army and civilian authority. Otis, MacArthur, 
Chaffee, and Young believed the Filipinos to be 
untrustworthy heathens who required enlightened American 
leadership so the duty of the army was to restore order 
and introduce democracy and capitalism to an inferior 
people. Taft rejected this indictment and criticised the 
draconian measures imposed on local people. He infuriated 
the army by inviting Filipino leaders to dinner and 
consulting them on government reform.68
Chaffee, a career soldier who felt more comfortable 
on a horse than behind a desk, soon fell out with Taft. He 
informed the Governor that he distrusted native government 
and that he intended to give the Filipino "bayonet rule" 
for years to come. Later he informed a journalist, "if you 
should hear of a few Filipinos more or less being put
164
away, don't grow too sentimental over it." Chaffee brought 
in his fellow cavalrymen, J. Franklin Bell and Jacob 
Smith, officers who believed in a thorough prosecution of 
the war to deal with rebellions in Batangus and Samar.69 
(see map, p.60 Chpt. 2). The methods employed by these 
officers later caused a major political scandal.
The continued failure of the British to secure 
victory in South Africa annoyed those Neo-Hamiltonians 
attempting to convince the American public of the benefits 
of imperialism. The Army and Navy Journal, impatient with 
British failure, sought to explain what had happened. The 
British lacked business efficiency. Piecemeal organisation 
and divided command created unpreparedness and gross 
inefficiency. The Journal continued: "if a railroad, after 
being reorganised, were placed entirely under the control 
of the engineers and traffic superintendents, it would not 
be long before it came to grief again. It must have 
business managers." The solution for the British was to 
put the army staff "upon a business footing" and have as 
head a man, "thoroughly versed in business methods."70 
Later that month, Root received from Paymaster General 
Alfred Bates a letter advocating the amalgamation of 
staff bureaus on the basis of business efficiency.71 
Despite this enthusiasm for applying business methods to 
the army, opposition to reform remained widespread. The 
New York Evening Post described Root's reforms as "An Act
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to Make the President of the United States a Military 
Dictator" and attacked the extension of federal powers.72 
McKinley's administration ignored these criticisms, 
implemented the reforms already approved, and planned 
further changes.
In the summer of 1901, the War Department selected 
Washington Barracks as the site of the new war college. 
Major General S.B.M. Young was appointed college 
president. Young and the other officers appointed had no 
training in the role of a war college. Root hoped the war 
college could act as a de facto general staff, until 
Congress approved the creation of a new staff system. The 
decision overburdened an inexperienced War College Board 
with administrative, planning, and educational functions. 
The early development and success of the college was 
severely curtailed by this decision.73
Military reform was only one important proposal, 
among several, suggested by Neo-Hamiltonians to strengthen 
federal government. The consular service, local 
government, and federal civil service, also required 
reform. To create a strong centralised government, advised 
by professionals, required that provincial amateurs be 
replaced throughout government.74 Business ideas of 
organisation influenced reform in each of these areas. In 
1900, the first municipality was established in Galveston, 
Texas. The municipality was designed to operate as a
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business corporation, which applied business methods to 
public service. Municipal commissionaries were regarded as 
a board of directors. By 1907 the corporate idea in local 
government was common in Texas, and by 1913 over 3 00 
cities adopted such an organisation. Municipal 
commissionaries planned for the future, adjudicated 
between competing interest groups, and coordinated city 
government, much like the functions of- an army general 
staff.75
In August 1901 Brigadier General William Ludlow died. 
An efficient colonial administrator and enthusiastic 
supporter of military reform, his death was a set-back for 
supporters of military reorganisation. Having completed 
the recommendations of the Ludlow Board, which he 
presented to Root, he was posted to the Philippines. On 
the outward passage he contracted bronchial problems 
diagnosed in Manila as tuberculosis. He returned home 
immediately and died two months later, at Convent, New 
Jersey; he was fifty-seven.76 William H. Carter made 
extensive use of Ludlow's ideas as plans for a general 
staff slowly developed. The ill-health of both the 
Secretary of War and Senator Hawley, chairman of the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee, hindered progress on 
introducing further military reform for much of the year. 
Root was ill throughout most of the early spring and much 
of the autumn of 1901 with influenza, colic and a series
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of painful boils.77 In early September, despite continued 
ill-health, Root announced his intention to introduce a 
general staff bill that year.78
Unfortunately, two disasters halted all progress on 
military reorganisation. On September 6, while attending 
the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, president William 
McKinley was shot. He died six days later. The sudden 
death of McKinley temporarily paralysed government with a 
period of mourning and the arrival of a new president.79
The second tragedy occurred three weeks later.
Company C, 9th U.S. Infantry, camped at Balangiga, Samar, 
was almost all massacred in a native attack, (see map, 
p.60 Chpt. 2). The unit was commanded by Captain Thomas 
Connell, a devout Catholic, who decided that on Sundays 
only camp sentries were to carry arms. Native forces 
surprised the unarmed soldiers at breakfast on Sunday, 
September 27. Armed with only tent poles, hot water, and 
shovels, a few men made it to boats on the coast. The 
following day six survivors, out of a total of eighty- 
eight men and three officers, reported the tragedy to the 
regiment. The relief column discovered terrible savagery 
in the camp; Connell's body was found decapitated and on 
fire, other bodies were burnt or slit open and stuffed 
with camp stores.80
The massacre was reported extensively in America, and 
Roosevelt, the new president, quickly endorsed the army's
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demand for harsh retaliation. Chaffee, the army commander 
in the Philippines, was furious at the death of colleagues 
who had served with him in China. The general attacked 
Taft's policy of friendship and promised tough reprisals. 
Roosevelt and Root supported Chaffee, and Taft was left 
isolated in his role as civilian governor. In vain Taft 
announced his sympathy with civilian, not military, 
methods and insisted that "justice requires that both 
sides should be heard before judgement is given." Neither 
the army nor Roosevelt was prepared to be so reasonable. 
The President wrote to Taft instructing the Governor to 
come to terms with Chaffee.81 To compound a miserable 
October for Taft, he contracted Dengue fever, and was 
forced to return to America for treatment.
The departure of Taft, removed the only voice of 
restraint and compromise on the islands and left Chaffee 
and the army free to deal with the natives. Taft, the 
reluctant imperialist, read Kipling to his staff before he 
departed for San Francisco:
Now it is not good for the Christian
To hustle the Aryan brown.
For the Christian riles and the Aryan smiles,
And he weareth the Christian down;
And the end of the fight is a toombstone white,
And the name of the late deceased,
And the epitaph dear, "A fool lies here,
Who tried to hustle the East.82
Chaffee met his colleagues, J. Franklin Bell and 
Jacob Smith, and instructed both to show no mercy against
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suspected guerrillas. Bell ordered a Filipino prisoner 
shot every time an American soldier died. Both Bell and 
Smith ordered field commanders not to discourage junior 
officers who were "over enthusiastic" in carrying out 
their orders. Bell described the new policy as a short 
aggressive war, where the innocent and guilty suffered to 
produce a quick conclusion. The example of William T. 
Sherman in the Civil War justified the. army's actions.83
In contrast to events in the Philippines, the attempt 
to establish American primacy in the Caribbean proceeded 
smoothly. In Cuba, Wood reported local approval for the 
American conditions for independence, increased trade with 
America, a drop in yellow fever and continued progress in 
educational reform.84 In November 1901, Lord Landsdowne 
signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which established 
conditions for a Panama canal.85 The agreement abrogated 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which stipulated any 
canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans must never 
be fortified or controlled by either Great Britain or the 
United States. The new treaty allowed America to 
construct, control, and fortify any isthmian canal. The 
agreement concluded by Lord Pauncefote, the British 
ambassador who was an expert on international canal 
legislation, and John Hay, the secretary of state, 
emphasised increasing Anglo-American cooperation.86
For many senior British officials the Spanish- 
American War had been a decisive event. The brief war both
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stimulated American naval construction and showed the 
ability of the U.S. navy in battle.
TABLE 4
BATTLESHIP NUMBERS 1896-1906: BUILT AMD UNDER
CONSTRUCTION.
Year/Country 6.B. 6ER. FR. U.S. JAP
1896 57 24 35 12 -
1898 63 22 36 13 6
1901 66 36 33 18 7
1904 68 38 42 25 9
1906 67 39 41 28 17
From the Accounts and Papers in the Parliamentary Records 
cited by Aaron L. Freidberg, The Weary Titan, p.153.
Great Britain, confronted by German, Russian, Japanese,
and American industrial and military growth, could
nolonger expect to dominate world trade. The solution was
a new mutual understanding between the two "Anglo-Saxon1'
powers and in 1902 an alliance with Japan against Russia.
The weakened British position was emphasised by the
deterioration in British naval superiority (see table 4).
Britain regarded Russia and Germany as the greatest
military threats to its world position. To defend the
empire against the challenge, required comprimise with
other powers. In a letter to the prime minister's private
secretary, George Clarke, secretary of the Committee on
Imperial Defence, summed up the British position:
What is best not to say is that we believe that 
the idea of opposing the navy of the United States 
... close to its bases must be abandoned. This 
naturally altered some strategic aspects of this
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part of the world. In years not far distant, we 
shall be quite unable to oppose the navy of Japan 
in its own waters. It is best to recognise facts,
but not always proclaim them from the housetop.87 
In America Neo-Hamiltonians happily endorsed this new 
reapproachment with Great Britain.
On October 23, 1901, Root returned to reforming the 
War Department after a three-month absence due to 
McKinley's death, ill-health, and the distractions of 
events in the Philippines. The new President and Root were 
concerned by the level of army staff opposition to reform. 
They decided to weaken this opposition through the 
promotion of younger officers to senior positions. Judge- 
Advocate General G. Norman Lieber, as the army's senior 
legal officer, advised Congress and the War Department on 
the constitutionality of reform. His opposition to 
military reorganisation seriously hampered the progress of 
reform legislation.88 Root wanted a chief legal officer 
who actively supported change: particularly contentious 
militia reform which involved increasing presidential 
authority. He selected Deputy Judge Advocate Lieutenant 
Colonel George B. Davis. Davis served on General 
Butterfield's Committee on Militia Reform in late 1899. He 
was familiar with the arguments and indicated his support 
for greater federal control over local reserves.89
Root also wanted to replace ordnance chief Brigadier 
General A.R. Buffington. The Ordnance Department performed 
poorly in the Spanish-American War and had been criticised
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by Congress and the army line. The bureau had refused to 
cooperate with the artillery service or Board of Ordnance 
and Fortification.90 Roosevelt and Root wanted to abolish 
the overlapping functions of these organisations, to 
produce a simplified, "business organisation." Captain 
William Crozier, the ordnance chief with American forces 
in China, impressed the President with his enthusiasm for 
army reorganisation.91 Crozier was only forty-seven years 
old. A senior captain, he had served in the army for 
twenty-six years in both the artillery and Ordnance 
Department at home and abroad. He was an expert on small 
ship design and European Ordnance and had travelled widely 
in Europe. At West Point he attended classes with Carter, 
Bliss, Wagner, and Bell, all prominent supporters of 
military change.92 These two nominations, which ignored 
promotion by seniority, provoked immediate opposition in 
the Senate. Roosevelt and Root again confronted the 
opposition in a protracted fight.93
In late November 1901, Root released his annual 
report as secretary of war. It contained an outline of 
proposed military reorganisation. The main recommendations 
included an expansion in military education; the 
integration of the National Guard with the regular army, 
common training, and standardised equipment; amalgamation 
of supply bureaus and the creation of a general staff.94 
Root argued strongly for all the reforms and wrote of the
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general staff proposal:
No one can doubt the general and field officers of 
our army have been too exclusively occupied in the 
details of administration, with inadequate 
opportunity and provision for the study of great 
questions, the consideration and formulation of 
plans, comprehensive forethought against future 
contingencies, and coordination of the various 
branches of the service with a view to harmonious 
action .... I strongly urge the establishment by law 
of a general staff, of which the war college
board shall form a part.95 
The report praised American expansion overseas and the 
social reforms implemented in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines. Root argued for new low tariffs in the 
Pacific and Caribbean to encourage American exports. 
Support for a subsidised merchant navy was encouraged. 
Lastly, the continued guerrilla war in the Philippines was 
dismissed as "minor in character."96
Root's report outlined an agenda of reform which 
stressed the dominant Neo-Hamiltonian, imperial, and 
business influences within the Republican Party. The 
general staff and National Guard reform proposals weakened 
state control and promoted presidential power. Staff 
bureau amalgamation produced simplified, centralised 
command, apparently similar to successful American 
business enterprises. The suggested promotions of Crozier 
and Davis indicated a commitment to merit-based 
professionalism and not amateur volunteerism. Root's 
attempts to belittle continued problems in the Philippines 
and his praise for Wood's colonial reforms emphasised the
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continued importance of imperialism to the Republican 
Party. Local political control and a volunteer army, 
however, remained popular ideas nationally. Many people 
were still unwilling to trust a system of limited 
professional military freedom under a strong federal 
government, far removed from local control. The attempt to 
turn Root's proposals into law emphasised these 
ideological divisions.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ROOT'S ARMY REFORMS
On December 7, 1901 Roosevelt delivered a 
presidential message arguing that America needed a more 
efficient, better educated army. The United States did not 
need a larger army but ought to have professional armed 
forces selected by merit to achieve military efficiency. A 
general staff, with a chief of staff at its head, ought to 
plan and coordinate army actions. The militia law was 
obsolete. Roosevelt recommended a major extension of 
executive authority. The training, equipment, and 
organisation, of the National Guard was to be placed under 
federal control. The President concluded by supporting 
Root's reforms passed in 1901: the substitution of four- 
year details from the line for permanent appointments in 
staff divisions, the creation of a unified command for the 
artillery, and the ability of the executive to determine 
the size of the army. The implementation of general staff 
and militia reform, would complete the successful 
transformation of the army into a professional body 
responsive to central government.1
The suggested reforms were opposed by the established 
alliance of senior staff bureau members, congressional 
Democrats, state governors, many militia officers, and 
Commanding General of the army Nelson Miles. Miles
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resented the creation of an army war college, which placed 
military education under the control of the adjutant 
general not his office. He thought further training of 
army officers unnecessary and was appalled at the prospect 
of joint training with "certain classes of men" 
principally the National Guard. Miles claimed that the 
suggested reforms were more appropriate to a "military 
aristocracy" or "monarchical Germany," than to the 
American Republic.2
Root decided to challenge his opposition. Carter,
Young, Bliss, and Ludlow convinced the Secretary of War
that the war college could not perform as a general 
staff.3 This decision caused great animosity between Miles 
and Root. In early December Miles got into further trouble 
when, as chairman of a board on post closures, he reviewed 
political and military considerations. The General was 
reminded that political considerations were the domain of 
Congress and the executive.4 Miles persisted in commenting 
upon issues unconnected with his office, and in late 
December, he was again disciplined by Root when he 
supported Admiral Dewey in his claim for credit in the 
naval victory over Spain.5 Angry at Miles's disobedience, 
Root announced the new chairman of the War College Board 
would be Major General S.B.M. Young. The Board, approved 
by Roosevelt, was the first step towards a general staff. 
The other members of the Board remained unannounced and
six months passed before its first meeting.6
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Events in the Philippines repeatedly prevented 
Roosevelt and Root from introducing further military 
reform. Major General Chaffee appointed his friend 
Brigadier General Jacob Smith to command the district 
where the Balangiga massacre had occurred. A veteran of 
the Indian wars, he regarded all non-whites as savages and 
was nicknamed "Hell-Raising Jack." Smith informed 
reporters that he intended to burn all of Samar and 
inflict heavy casualties on the natives. This report and 
orders by Bell and Chaffee to shoot civilians and 
prisoners were reported extensively in the American 
press.7
The army supported the new tough measures. Major
General Young summed up army feelings on the Philippines
War, civilian interference, and Japanese involvement in a
highly publicised speech delivered in Washington:
War does not usually come before full scope has 
been given to forensic display, and diplomacy has 
exhausted itself. When war does come, the humanity 
talked of in times of peace has no place. To carry 
on war, disguise it as we may, is to be cruel; it 
is to kill and burn, burn and kill, and again kill 
and burn.... I feel confident our little Jap 
friends would have stopped the pattering of the 
bare feet of our "little brown brothers" through the 
jungle in a very short time, and that the aggressive 
Army of our German friends would not have viewed with 
equanimity the burying alive of their friends as did 
our soldiers in obedience to home sentiment....
Young finished by stressing the views of Sumner, Croly,
and Strong and the importance of Social Darwinism and
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evangelical-inspired reform. He concluded:
God is good and He is forgiving, but He is also 
just, and I believe, when the day of judgement 
comes He will surely award the proper punishment to 
the malicious slanderers of His Army.
That the American Army was His Army in Cuba and
the Philippines, I believe, admits no doubt. No army
that had been neglected for so many years by its
government and was so ill prepared for war could have 
achieved such remarkable success, unless He took it
in His special care.8
Many newspaper editors and congressmen were appalled 
at the flagrant disregard for human rights by the army. 
Senator Lodge was forced to establish a congressional 
committee on the Philippines to review army actions. 
Supporters of imperialism were appointed to fill 
Republican vacancies on the committee. Senators Lodge, 
Beveridge, Proctor, and William Allison sought to reduce 
harmful testimony by the various witnesses. Anti­
imperialist Democrats Thomas Patterson, Charles 
Culbertson, and Joseph L. Rawlins, however, secured 
injurious admissions from Brigadier General R.R. Hughes, 
and Governor William H. Taft. Taft specifically condemned 
the indiscriminate attacks on the native population in 
retaliation for acts of violence.9 The Anti-Imperialist 
League gained more public support. Samuel Gompers, the 
American Federation of Labor President, Edwin Lawrence 
Godkin and Horace White, editors of the New York Post, and 
Professor Henry Van Dyck joined Carl Schurz, Carnegie, 
Howells, and others in denouncing imperialism.10
187
Despite these difficulties, Root continued to develop 
his program of military reform. In early January 1902 
Carter, and William Cary Sanger, the new assistant 
secretary of war, drafted the new militia legislation.11 
Root outlined the proposals to sympathetic newspaper 
editors in late January.12 In the Senate, the bill was 
introduced by Senator Hawley, chairman of the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee, and in the- House by Charles 
Dick, who had access both to the recommendations of the 
unofficial Butterfield Committee and to the views of 
Carter and Sanger. A Republican from Ohio and secretary of 
the Republican National Committee, he supported militia 
reorganisation. As a major general in the Ohio National 
Guard, however, he understood that most of the militia 
opposed any federal interference.13 The bill entitled "To 
Increase the Efficiency of the Militia and for Other 
Purposes" was the first attempt to modernise the militia 
since 1792. The bill re-defined the duties of the National 
Guard: equipment and training would be standardised to 
match that in the regular army and in times of national 
emergency the militia would operate under federal control 
as a national reserve.14
Root hoped to introduce general staff legislation in 
tandem with militia reform. The legislation was delayed, 
however, by Carter, who sought a compromise with bureau 
chiefs. Carter was convinced that the proposed
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amalgamation of supply bureaus threatened the passage of 
general staff legislation. Root rejected this advice as 
Roosevelt pressed for a comprehensive reform bill. On 
February 14, 1902 the army reorganisation measures were 
placed before Congress.15 The bill created a new 
department of supply, commanded by a major general, with 
four sub departments responsible for army pay, all aspects 
of supply, and transportation. The amalgamation of supply 
bureaus was justified on the basis of centralisation in 
business, which apparently had created greater efficiency. 
Colonel Carter reaffirmed this when he informed Congress 
that departmental consolidation was in vogue with the 
great corporations. The second item suggested was a 
general staff. The Office of the Commanding General, 
Adjutant General's Department, and Inspector General's 
Office would be amalgamated to create this new body.
Headed by a lieutenant general, it would include thirty- 
six officers who held the rank of lieutenant or above in 
the regular army. The lowest staff grade was captain, and 
each officer detailed for four years could only be re­
appointed after having served two years in the field.16
Presidential selection of staff officers and control 
over re-appointment underlined the continued attempt to 
increase executive authority at the expense of Congress. 
The reforms were justified on the basis of certain future 
conflict which required an efficient military. The success
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of American industry suggested organisational competence 
was possible by applying the methods of business 
organisation. In the North American Review. Carter 
compared the structure of a general staff to the 
management board of a vast railroad which manipulated 
international markets, carried diverse freight over vast 
distances, and maintained thousands of miles of track.17 
Root outlined the relevance of business principles in 
defending the amalgamation of supply bureaus before the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee.18 Even those opposed to 
reform used business organisation examples to support 
their position.
Progress on the General Staff Bill was disrupted by 
the need for Root and Roosevelt to justify army actions in 
the Philippines. The poor health of Republican J.A.T.
Hull, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, 
also delayed the passage of army reform.19 The harsh 
measures used in the Philippines increased opposition both 
to American expansion overseas and to the military reform 
which proposed a stronger federal army. Roosevelt and Root 
were alarmed by increasing opposition to their policies. 
Root published a document entitled Charges of Cruelty, 
etc.. To the Natives of the Philippines 1902 to answer 
opponents of imperialism. The document claimed cruelty by 
the army against civilians was rare but, unfortunately, 
highlighted light sentences given to offending soldiers.
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Newspaper editors seized on one case, in which an army 
lieutenant killed a prisoner and was sentenced to five 
years hard labour. Roosevelt commuted the sentence to half 
pay for nine months and forfeiture of thirty-five places 
on the promotion lists.20 The story created an uproar in 
the country and provided opponents of military reform and 
imperialism with more support.
The Commanding General sensed an opportunity to 
embarrass Root and supporters of army reform. He asked the 
President for permission to visit the Philippines because 
the large forces committed, the considerable expenditure 
involved, and the severity under which the war was being 
conducted made a visit necessary.21 Roosevelt determined 
to prevent unwanted interference by the ambitious Miles, 
denied the request. Several days later, Miles leaked his 
request to visit the islands to the press. Roosevelt was 
incensed and publicly rebuked Miles, reminding him that he 
was in overall command at Wounded Knee, when the army 
shelled helpless Indian women and children. Undaunted, 
Miles suggested he be appointed military governor of the 
islands an idea the President and Root quickly rejected.22
In Congress opposition to the army reforms increased. 
The new staff legislation was attacked by bureau chiefs 
who saw their autonomy threatened. The Inspector General, 
Quartermaster General, and Paymaster General all opposed 
the new staff structure.23 Commanding General Miles
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produced the most hostile testimony to the bill. Relations 
between Miles and the administration, always difficult, 
degenerated to a new low. Roosevelt detested the 
Commanding General, and even in 1899 he had warned Lodge 
of Miles's obsessive desire to be president and the 
difficulties Root faced in dealing with Miles.24 Miles was 
determined to remain commanding general and rejected the 
post of chief of staff, a position he regarded as inferior 
to his own.
Root and Carter were surprised by Miles's powerful
testimony against all the suggested reforms.25 He
denounced the consolidation of the three supply bureaus
and the recommendation for a general staff, which
disbanded his office of commanding general. Miles argued
that the creation of an army transport division only added
another bureau to the three already responsible for army
supply. In an appeal to past glories, he staunchly
defended the current structure:
More than 100 years ago our Army was organized by 
the genius of Washington, Steuben, Hamilton, and 
others. In all wars in which we have been engaged 
it has in the end been victorious .... In my 
judgement, a system that is the fruit of the best 
thought of the most eminent and ablest military men 
that this country has produced should not be 
destroyed by substituting one that is more adopted 
to the monarchies of the Old World .... Unlike our 
Presidents, the sovereigns of Spain, Italy, Turkey, 
Austria, Germany, and Russia, are trained from their 
earliest boyhood with a view to commanding armies ... 
such as suggested might be better adopted for those 
countries than our Republic.
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Miles warned of the dangers in military 
centralisation which a General Staff created. He appealed 
to the committee, dominated by Civil War veterans, not to 
abolish the office of commanding general held with 
distinction by Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. He concluded 
by declaring: "It seems to me you are throwing the door 
wide open for a future autocrat or a military despot."26 
Miles's position as the top ranking soldier in the country 
and as a noted Civil War veteran increased the effect of 
his testimony with many senators who had themselves served 
in the Civil War. The Grand Army of the Republic the 
powerful congressional lobby group which represented Civil 
War veterans, endorsed Miles's views. At the conclusion of 
his testimony, Carter, who had been present throughout, 
was informed by Senator Hawley that no favourable action 
on the bill was likely. Hawley, impressed by Miles's 
testimony, joined Democrats in opposing the bill.
Root reported the effect of Miles's testimony to the 
President and the cabinet. After a prolonged debate, they 
unanimously decided to continue with the army reform 
proposals.27 Determined to encourage further American 
expansion overseas, Roosevelt, Hay, Root, and others knew 
that future conflict was certain future American greatness 
depended on the ability to hold possessions in the 
Pacific, control Asian trade, and defend American 
interests in the Caribbean and Americas. Root openly
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admitted to Carnegie, a staunch anti-imperialist, the 
desire of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans to control the 
Caribbean from the, "point of Florida to the gateway of 
the proposed Isthmian canal."28 The continued attempts to 
buy the Danish West Indies and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 
on the isthmian canal underlined this statement. In late 
January 1902, the Senate supported Neo-Hamiltonian 
policies and approved the purchase of the Danish West 
Indies, but the Danish Rigsdag rejected the offer. The 
Danish government only agreed to a sale in 1917 and after 
a national plebiscite, the islands of St. Croix, St. 
Thomas, and St. Martin were purchased for $25 million.
Certain of full cabinet support for military reform, 
Root and Carter planned the counter attack against their 
opponents. Root arranged for retired generals Schofield, 
and Merritt to testify before Congress. Both men were 
famous Civil War veterans with distinguished military 
careers. Root hoped their testimony would negate that of 
Miles, who claimed to represent the army past and 
present.29 Carter was assigned to advise both Schofield 
and Merritt, while Root approached Senator Francis M. 
Cockrell for his support in putting helpful questions to 
both witnesses during their testimony before Congress.30 
The Secretary of War attempted to enlist supportive 
testimony from other retired and serving officers. Apathy, 
and a reluctance to testify against colleagues and
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superiors, led to a poor response. Among senior officers, 
only Brigadier General George W. Davis in the Philippines 
and retired General Grenville Dodge agreed to testify.31
Throughout the spring the Senate Military Affairs 
Committee remained hostile to all of Root's reforms. In 
early April 1902, the committee rejected the proposed 
nomination of Captain William Crozier to replace Brigadier 
General Buffington as ordnance chief.32 Root continued to 
stress the need for a general staff and circulated 
favourable information including his report as secretary 
of war for 1902 to twelve leading newspapers.33 General 
Corbin coordinated the publicity campaign and used his 
knowledge of the press, army, and government to maximise 
the impact of documents supporting military 
reorganisation. Roosevelt gave Root his full support, 
despite opposition from Congress, staff bureaus, and 
General Miles. The President regarded the general staff as 
an important policy to strengthen federal government and 
to equip America for further expansion overseas.34
Miles and his supporters threatened the 
implementation of reform. Roosevelt was bitter at the 
Commanding General's failure to serve the administration 
and its policies. The President was further angered when 
Miles cast doubt on whether Roosevelt participated in the 
famous charge up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American 
War.35 Roosevelt responded to these attacks in a letter to
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Root, bitterly denouncing the Commanding General:
During the six months that I have been President, 
General Miles has made it abundantly evident by his 
actions that he has not the slightest desire to 
improve or benefit the Army, and to my mind his 
actions can bear only the construction that his 
desire is purely to gratify his selfish ambition, 
his vanity, or his spite. His conduct is certainly 
incompatible, not merely with the intelligent 
devotion to the interests of the country, but even 
with intelligent devotion to the interests of the
service.36
The poor relations between the Senate Military 
Affairs Committee and the administration, caused by 
Miles's testimony, made future reform seem doubtful. The 
Commanding General sought to embarrass the government 
further when in early April 1902, he again raised the 
issue of atrocities in the Philippines. Miles passed 
confidential information on several incidents to members 
of the Senate.37 The General again requested permission to 
visit the army fighting in the Philippines. Root agreed 
and encouraged Miles to also tour Europe and Russia. This 
apparent defeat for the Secretary of War was actually a 
clever ploy to isolate the most persistent critic of 
military reform by sending him abroad. Miles sailed from 
San Fransisco in the late spring on a trip that would take 
several months.
On April 9 Schofield and Merritt appeared before the 
Senate. Schofield, a long-time supporter of military 
reorganisation, proceeded to counter effectively the 
testimony of General Miles. He recalled the chaos in the
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army created by a divided command structure. The past 
highlighted only the frustration produced by divided 
command. General Winfield Scott left Washington in disgust 
for New York; General Sherman moved to St. Louis 
frustrated and angry; and General Sheridan, who remained 
in Washington, became ill. Schofield argued that all the 
great generals of the past, including Washington, 
advocated centralised command. He admitted German 
influence in the general staff idea but denied the system 
proposed would lead to military autocracy. The general 
praised the benefits of army education, the suggested 
amalgamation of bureaus, and emphasised the benefits of 
"efficiency," "professionalism," and stronger federal 
control over the army.38 Merritt seconded Schofield's 
arguments and stressed how consolidation of staff bureaus 
would reduce friction and increase efficiency.39
The testimony of these two senior army officers and 
respected Civil War veterans rallied Republican support 
for military reform. The testimony of Brigadier General 
Davis, a commander in the Philippines, added further 
support to military reform, when he claimed a general 
staff would have prevented the organisational disasters of 
the Spanish-American War.40 In late May the Senate 
reconsidered military reform and signaled a change of 
heart by confirming the appointment of two reforming 
officers, Crozier and Davis, as ordnance chief and judge
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advocate general respectively.41 Root had succeeded in 
reopening the debate on army reorganisation.
Abroad, Cuba was granted independence on May 20,
1902. America retained military bases in the island and 
kept control of Cuban foreign policy. The intentions of 
Germany and Japan continued to concern Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans. In Cuba, Wood reported "official coolness" 
between American officials and German seamen during the 
independence celebrations.42 In the Philippines, suspicion 
over Japanese expansion in the Pacific increased. Chaffee 
and Davis warned Root of substantial Japanese forces 
moving into Formosa and Java. The army command in the 
Philippines recommended a permanent garrison of 35,000 men 
both as evidence of American commitment to the islands and 
as a warning to Japan.43 The future defence of the 
Philippines and guerrilla war on outlying islands 
continued to distract Root from military reform.
Throughout the summer, the "Waller trial," covered 
extensively by the press, added to political scandal over 
army actions in the Philippines. Major Littleton Waller, a 
marine, was under the command of Jacob Smith in Samar. 
"Hell-Roaring Jack" ordered Waller and his command to kill 
all natives over ten years of age. Waller ignored the 
order and attempted to traverse the unknown mountainous 
jungle of Samar to find the main rebel camp. The 
expedition failed and over half the company was taken
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sick. Waller, ill with a fever, ordered twelve local 
guides shot when it was discovered that they planned to 
lead the weakened force into a trap. The incident was 
reported to Root.44 The Secretary of War, aware of 
criticism over light sentences for officers who killed 
indiscriminately, had Waller brought to trial. Root hoped 
the trial of a marine officer would redirect criticism 
from his department to the navy. Unfortunately, Waller 
still had a copy of Smith's orders, which he read to the 
court. Waller was acquitted and Jacob Smith arrested. Root 
and the army command in rhe Philippines were shocked by 
these events. The Secretary of War sought to have Smith 
pronounced insane, but not enough doctors would confirm 
the diagnosis.45 Smith was found guilty and was retired 
from active service. Roosevelt was appalled at Smith's 
"loose talk" during the trial and his defence of various 
arbitrary killings.46 The army supported Smith throughout 
the trial, and Chaffee, Young, and Bell all pressed 
unsuccessfully for an acquittal.
The slow progress of general staff reform, militia 
reorganisation, and the Waller trial, all depressed Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republicans. As the spring session of Congress 
came to an end, however, two important Neo-Hamiltonian 
measures were approved by Congress. On June 28 the Senate 
passed the Isthmian Canal Act, authorising the financing 
and building of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. In
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the event the President could not obtain a concession from 
the Panama Canal Company of France - which he eventually 
did for forty million dollars - he was to negotiate a 
treaty with Columbia. A few days later, the Philippine 
Government Act was approved declaring the Philippine 
Islands an unorganised territory and all inhabitants 
territorial citizens of the United States. A presidential 
commission was authorised to govern the new territory. On 
July 4 Roosevelt granted amnesty to all political 
prisoners in the Philippines in an attempt to end the war. 
No agreement was reached on militia reform or general 
staff legislation, and they remained to be re-introduced 
in the autumn session of Congress.
On July 14, 1902 Root promoted his military adviser 
William H. Carter to brigadier general. Three days later 
Tasker Bliss, another strong supporter of military reform 
and Wood's deputy in Cuba, also received his promotion to 
brigadier general.47 Major General Arthur MacArthur 
retired, and Brigadier General John C. Bates gained his 
second star in the reorganisation of army command. Wood 
and Bliss returned to America immediately after the 
implementation of Cuban independence. Wood stayed in the 
White House with his friend the President while he waited 
for re-assignment.48 Bliss was appointed to the War 
College Board which, with the failure to pass general 
staff legislation, continued to operate as a de facto
200
general staff.49 Major General Young chaired the Board, 
and the other members were: Brigadier General Carter,
Chief of the Artillery Wallace Randolph, Chief of 
Engineers George Gillespie, Major W.B. Beach, and Major 
H.A. Greene.50 Root encouraged these men to discuss 
planning and preparation for future conflicts. The 
Secretary of War also directed the Board to recommend a 
system of continuing officer education for the 1,500 new 
lieutenants commissioned due to army expansion. To deal 
with the training of these officers, J. Franklin Bell was 
reassigned from the Philippines to command the Army Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth. Colonel A.L. Mills was 
appointed superintendent of the Military Academy. Both 
were appointed ex officio members of the War College Board 
and were instructed to follow its directives.51
In June Germany invited three senior American army 
officers to attend their summer military manoeuvres. Root 
and Roosevelt decided to send Corbin, Young, and Wood.52 
Young and Corbin left early in July, while Wood left later 
with Root, who was a member of the commission to decide 
the U.S.-Canadian border in London. Root's associates on 
the commission were Senator Lodge and former Senator 
George Turner. The President instructed Root to secure as 
much of the Pacific coastline as possible, advice 
unpopular with Secretary of State Hay, who sought better 
Anglo-American relations.53 Roosevelt, however, was
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determined to control the North American Pacific coast and 
to ensure American domination of Asian trade. On July 24 
Root and Wood set sail from New York on the S.S. Savoie, 
to London and Le Havre respectively. Corbin, Young, and 
Wood were not to return to America until early October. 
While Root was away, Sanger was appointed acting secretary 
of war, and Carter was adjutant general, deputising for 
Corbin.54
Wood arrived in Le Havre on July 24 and was greeted 
by prominent French officials. After a night in France he 
left for a holiday in Spain. A week later Wood joined his 
colleagues in Berlin. The three officers spent two weeks 
in Germany, as guests of the Kaiser, visiting military 
schools and observing the army manoeuvres.55 The visit was 
covered extensively by the press in America. Corbin's 
comment that the German army was the best in the world was 
widely quoted. In the New York Sun, a paper supportive of 
military reform, Miles's contention before Congress that a 
system good enough for Grant and Sherman was good enough 
for today was dismissed by Corbin as "oratorical rot." The 
three officers enjoyed the publicity, national attention, 
and their frequent dinner engagements with the Kaiser. The 
officers described the German leader as similar to an 
enterprising president of an American railroad. Such 
business analogies revealed the high reputation American 
business organisation enjoyed among senior officers.56
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Not all the press comment on the trip was favourable. 
Democrats and anti-imperialist opponents of a large 
professional army criticised the visit. One paper 
characterised it as "The Terrible Spectacle in Berlin" 
while others variously reported the visit as "repugnant to 
Quaker blood" and "whetting the American appetite for 
bloodshed."57 These emotive headlines underlined the deep 
divisions in America over policies advocating imperialism, 
a stronger executive, and a professional military. After 
two weeks in Germany, Corbin, Young, and Wood left for 
Paris having been invited to the French manoeuvres.
France had attempted to reform its army after the 
disastrous defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. To 
solve its problems, the army attempted to use German 
military ideas. The decision to introduce German military 
institutions also presented France with the problem of 
maintaining democratic control over its army.58 Unable to 
resolve this dilemma the army produced an ineffective 
command structure. The chief of staff, a junior brigadier 
general, acted as secretary to the war minister. This 
general had no control over staff bureaus, and often more 
than twenty officers outranked him.59 Military reform 
suffered in a political process which produced thirty-two 
governments, and twenty-six ministers of war between 1870 
and 1900. Political instability was compounded by the 
Dreyfus affair in which a Jewish army captain was wrongly
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convicted for treason. The Dreyfus controversy divided the 
army and created public suspicion of the military.60 
France had little to offer America on the subject of 
military reorganisation. Young and Wood spent their time 
at dinner parties, visited Switzerland, and toured Monaco. 
Wood was irritated at the lack of time spent observing the 
French army. He dismissed Monaco as thoroughly rotten with 
its dependence upon gambling and high suicide rate.61
In early October Corbin, Young, and Wood left France 
for Great Britain. Root, having completed his work on the 
U.S.-Canadian Boundary Commission, had already left for 
New York. The Secretary of War contacted military theorist 
Spencer Wilkinson during his visit, and the two men 
discussed in London how to create an effective military 
system in a democracy.62 These discussions between 
Wilkinson and the Secretary of War were to prove 
invaluable in helping Root formulate ideas for American 
military reform.
The reception given to Root, Corbin, Young, and Wood 
in Britain emphasised the developing relationship between 
the two powers. All four men were deluged with requests to 
attend dinner parties and various social functions. The 
date of Wood, Corbin, and Young's departure was postponed 
from October 18 until November 1, 1902 to accommodate new 
engagements. All three dined with King Edward, Lord 
Roberts, Kitchener, Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain,
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James Bryce, and Roosevelt's mess mate in the Spanish- 
American War, First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee. The 
cordial welcome and willingness of the American party to 
enjoy British hospitality to the full contrasted sharply 
with the formal two-week stay in Berlin. Root, Wood, 
Corbin, and Young all visited British military 
establishments and discussed military reform and colonial 
government in detail with their hosts. On October 30 Wood, 
Young, and Corbin left London and the following day 
boarded the St. Louis, bound for New York.63
The informal Anglo-American alliance grew stronger 
while suspicion of Germany increased. Corbin, Young, and 
Wood were sent to Germany not only to view the German 
general staff and war college but also to assess the 
abilities of a potential enemy. In America, the war 
college emphasised increasing suspicion of Germany, with 
its first special study of future conflict. The college 
produced a planned response to a German attempt to prevent 
America from seizing Santo Domingo and Haiti.64 On his 
return to America, Wood produced a detailed analysis of 
the German army for Root and Roosevelt. He discussed 
potential weakness in the use of cavalry, ineffective 
company level command, and the strength of their 
artillery.65
Root returned home and decided to resign as secretary 
of war. Happiest in New York with his lucrative corporate
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law practice, he disliked public speaking and faced 
pressure from his shy wife to leave public office. In late 
September he informed Roosevelt of his decision. He agreed 
to remain in the cabinet until March 1903, allowing one 
last attempt to get militia reform and general staff 
legislation through Congress.66 On October 4, 1902, Root 
wrote to the Army and Navy Journal reaffirming the 
influence of business organisation on military reform 
proposals:
The trust is an evolution rather than a survival, 
and it represents the furthest advance of the 
process of concentration in the business world. Its 
development has been harmonious and logical .... 
Improved machinery, better methods of distribution 
and stricter attention to small details of management 
have resulted in enormous reductions in operating 
expenses .... The trust ... has placed the United 
States foremost among the industrial nations. We take 
it therefore, that if the trust per se is a menace to 
American industry then the Army per se is a menace to 
American liberty. The trust is a highly organized 
kind of energy of one kind and the Army a 
highly organised kind of energy of another kind. In 
both power is supplemented by responsibility. The 
preciseness, simplicity, economy, and thoroughness of 
the methods of military establishment are clearly 
reflected in the conduct of the successful trust. The
analogy between the two is unmistakable.67 
No legislative reform could be implemented until 
after the mid-term congressional elections in early 
November, 1902. Supporters of army reform remained 
confident that the militia bill would pass and pressed 
Root to continue with all his proposed reforms.68 The 
Secretary of War avoided most requests to speak before the 
election and spent his time gathering information on
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military matters. He instructed the War College Board to 
prepare a detailed analysis of the supplies needed to 
equip a force of 50,000 men to fight either in the 
Atlantic or Pacific.69 These requirements were presented 
to Congress. On November 4. the results of the election 
were announced. Both major parties gained seats from minor 
parties or vacant seats. The Republicans however, 
maintained a fifty-seven to thirty-three majority in the 
Senate. In the House of Representatives the total number 
of seats rose from 357 to 386, and the Republicans kept 
their majority over the Democrats, 208 to 178. On November 
9 Young, Corbin, and Wood arrived in New York. /0 The end 
of the election and return of important senior officers 
were quickly followed by the re-introduction to Congress 
of militia reform and general staff legislation.
Root implemented a propaganda campaign endorsing 
military reorganisation. In late November, copies of 
Root's annual report as secretary of war for 1902 were 
distributed to sympathetic newspapers and businessmen, 
including Paul Danna of the New York Sun. R.L. Fern of the 
New York Tribune. J.P. Morgan, and Richard McCurdy, 
President of Mutual Life Insurance.71 The normally 
reticent chairman of the War College Board, Major General 
Young, joined in enlisting commercial support for army 
reform. In a speech to businessmen in Cleveland, he argued 
that any increase in American exports depended upon the
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creation of an efficient army. The General defended 
American policy in the new territories as humane and 
civilised and warned of the dangers posed by European 
competition. Young continued: "If we wish to gain the 
supremacy in commerce in the East, we must maintain a 
military force in the Philippine Islands that can act 
instantly ... at any point in the East and that fact must 
... be understood by all Oriental people." He finished by 
promoting military preparedness as the best guarantee of 
peace stating: "The larger and more efficient the force, 
the more widely its strength of arms be delayed."72 The 
speech was well received and emphasised the alliance 
between many business leaders and Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans.
In early December congressional hearings on the 
various military reforms resumed. Root was confident of 
success with General Miles, a main opponent of reform, 
still abroad. Many military reformers thought future 
conflict would involve mass armies under central control. 
The professional army was only the basic structure for 
this larger military force.73 Trained reserves were vital 
to provide the manpower for armies in excess of 100,000 
men. To achieve this goal, militia reform was of great 
importance. Military reformers proposed a voluntary 
national reserve force to consist of 100,000 veterans 
under federal control. In an attempt to weaken state and
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local power, the National Guard would be relegated to a 
position as second volunteer reserve.
The National Guard Association was appalled at these 
proposals, and proud of its role in national defence it 
quickly mobilised opposition to the proposal. Congressmen 
were lobbied by state politicians and National Guard 
officers to change the bill. Confronted with such 
opposition, the War Department was forced to compromise.74 
National Guard officers recognised the need for reform and 
suggested mandatory summer training camps, inspections by 
the regular army, and an end to political appointment or 
election of officers. The Guard rejected plans to replace 
them with a national reserve and upheld the importance of 
local identity and organisation.75 In a compromise, the 
War Department reluctantly agreed to accept the National 
Guard as the first reserve.
On December 4 Root introduced the compromise militia 
reform bill. In his speech announcing the legislation, he 
attacked the obsolete basis on which the National Guard 
operated. Organised without standardised education, 
equipment, and training, the Guard failed in the Spanish-
• » • 7 f \American War to provide an effective reserve. ° The new 
militia bill recognised the National Guard as the first 
volunteer force, while the remainder of the male 
population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five was 
termed the unorganised reserve.77 The bill extended
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federal power. The Guard accepted federal funding; joint 
army-National Guard exercises were introduced; militia 
officers were to attend war college courses; and all 
equipment was standardised regular army issue. This 
compromise legislation made rapid progress through 
Congress and was passed as the Dick Act on January 21,
1903. The new act preserved the state organisation of the 
National Guard but established greater federal control 
over the reserve. The issue of deploying the Guard abroad 
remained politically contentious. The Attorney General, 
encouraged by Roosevelt and Root, announced that the 
legislation clearly permitted the president to deploy the 
Guard abroad.78 Opposition to the deployment of the 
militia in foreign wars, however, refused to disappear. 
Over ten years later, in 1917, Congress challenged the 
right of president Woodrow Wilson to send the National 
Guard to Europe during World War One.
One week after the militia bill was introduced to 
Congress, the equally contentious army reform bill was 
tabled before the relevant committees. The bill proposed a 
general staff and chief of staff to replace the divided 
army command structure (see Appendix 1). The office of 
commanding general was replaced by a chief of staff. The 
Inspector General's Department and Adjutant General's 
Office were abolished to create the general staff. The Pay 
Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Commissary Department 
were amalgamated into one division of supply.
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The general staff could consist of three general
officers, detailed for four years by the president from
serving general officers. Four colonels, six lieutenant
colonels, and twelve majors were detailed from the army,
under rules of selection determined by the president. All
officers appointed to the general staff served four-year
appointments and, upon completion of their tour of duty,
returned for at least two years to a field command. Root
and other army reformers hoped fixed-term appointments
would end animosity and jealousy between staff and line
officers. All operational planning would be controlled by
the general staff. Unlike the old system, there would be
no division of responsibility between the top general of
the army and secretary of war. (see Appendix 2).
Root used business analogies to explain the reforms
to Congress. In response to a question from Senator
Foraker, he explained the need for improvement:
You are in the position of a railroad company 
without a railroad manager as if the president of 
a railroad company who is not a railroad man were 
to undertake to run the railroad by dealing directly 
with the general passenger agent and the chief of 
motive power and the heads of the different 
departments of the railroad. It is impossible for any
civilian secretary to perform this duty.79 
Despite support from powerful men in Congress, the 
proposed legislation was soon in trouble. The supply 
bureau chiefs and Inspector General Breckinridge opposed
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the amalgamation of their departments. Congress attacked 
the presidential appointment of general staff officers as 
an unnecessary extension of executive authority. Promotion 
by merit was criticised both by middle-ranking officers as 
a threat to their rightful promotion and by Congress as a 
dangerous expansion of presidential authority.80 In 
response to this opposition, Carter and Root introduced a 
modified general staff bill. The proposed merger of the 
supply bureaus was dropped, and the Inspector General's 
Office was retained. Vacancies created by general staff 
detail would not be filled until the general staff proved 
its use.81 This compromise removed opposition from 
powerful bureau chiefs to reform. Opposition in Congress, 
however remained high, despite favourable testimony from 
Root, Schofield, Young, Carter, and others.82 Root 
enlisted Roosevelt's help to convince Congress to pass the 
bill. In early January, Roosevelt met Richardson, the 
House minority leader, in an attempt to prevent further 
Democratic opposition.83
In the Philippines, General Miles still attempted 
from far away to discredit the administration during the 
delicate negotiations on military reform. He forwarded a 
report to the War Department and president which supported 
claims of army brutality in the islands. The report 
charged the army with torture, unnecessary death, 
corruption, and abuses of civil rights. Roosevelt and Root
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prevented publication of the information gathered by 
Miles, because the President was determined to give 
Congress no further excuse for postponing military 
reform.84
Corbin continued the public relations offensive. In a 
speech before businessmen, he stressed the Neo-Hamiltonian 
belief that international conflict was certain and that 
the prudent response was military preparedness.85 The Neo- 
Hamiltonian view of the world was given credence by the 
widespread reporting of international commercial 
competition. Many leading articles warned of German 
expansion in Latin America, European encroachment in 
Central America, and the danger of losing the "vital1"
Asian market to Europe or Japan. Newspapers compared 
American and European industrial performance and 
criticised neglect of the merchant navy, as Britain and 
Germany expanded their fleets. These press stories were 
taken seriously by business leaders and Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans who were convinced American greatness depended 
on overseas markets.85 The battle to implement the general 
staff reforms continued.
Root was determined to provide the army with the same 
centralised departmental system that existed in large 
business concerns.87 The scale of War Department 
operations made reliance on talented individuals for 
effective command inefficient and dangerous. American
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business and the German general staff system provided the 
answer. Industrial vice presidents, like a general staff, 
concentrated on long-term planning. General managers, in 
charge of daily operations, were similar to staff officers 
with field commands. Root, who had worked extensively as a 
corporate lawyer, frequently made this analogy in 
explaining how a general staff would work.88
Throughout January, 1903 hearings on military 
reorganisation continued in Congress, Generals Young, 
Carter, and Corbin all testified for a second time.89 
Brigadier General Crozier, the new ordnance chief, and 
Davis the judge advocate general, broke ranks with other 
bureau chiefs and endorsed change.90 On January 7, 1903 
the general staff bill achieved unexpected success in the 
House of Representatives. Root's compromise, which kept 
the supply bureaus and Inspector General's Office, passed 
by 154 votes to fifty-two.91 General Miles, who was on the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad, heard the news weeks later when 
he reached Paris.92 In early February the bill was 
approved by the Senate. Brigadier General Fred C. 
Ainsworth, head of the Army Records and Pensions 
Department, succeeded in getting one last amendment 
accepted. In a subtle, but significant change to the 
wording of the bill, the chief of staff would supervise 
but not command the staff bureaus.93 Carter hoped bureau 
chiefs would accept the chief of staff's authority, and
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would ignore any ambiguity in the legislation.
Unfortunately bureau chiefs frequently challenged general
staff authority in later years.94 Roosevelt and Root
agreed to introduce the staff system, which abolished the
rank of commanding general, one week after General Miles
retired on August 8, 1903.95 These final concessions
ensured the passage of the general staff bill. On February
14, 1903 Roosevelt signed the bill into law.96
The General Staff Act was a triumph for Root and his
adviser Carter. Carter wrote the legislation which Root
requested and provided important testimony before
Congress. Other officers knowledgeable on military reform,
particularly Brigadier Generals Theodore Schwan and Tasker
Bliss, did little to help Carter or Root.97 Schwan wrote
the most influential pamphlet published on the German
army. Bliss taught at the Naval War College and was an
aide to Schofield for many years. Neither ofiicer
testified before Congress, despite their long interest in
military reorganisation. The Secretary of War acknowledged
Carter's central role in both drafting and fighting for
military reform legislation:
Special credit is due to Brigadier General William 
H. Carter for the exceptional ability, and military 
industry which he has contributed to the work of 
devising, bringing about, and putting into operation 
the General Staff Law. He brought thorough patient 
historical research and wide experience, both in the 
line and staff, to the aid of long-continued, anxious 
and concentrated thought upon the problem of 
improving military administration, and if the new
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system shall prove to be an improvement the gain in
the country will be largely due to him.98
The act was a major success for Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans, despite the failure to amalgamate the supply 
bureaus, the Ainsworth amendment, and the delay in 
implementation until Miles retired. The Dick Act and 
General Staff Act strengthened executive control over the 
army and promoted greater professionalism. Individualism 
and localism no longer dominated army command or training.
On January 22, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans achieved 
another important legislative victory. The Hay-Herran 
Treaty, which guarantied a ninety-nine year lease and U.S. 
sovereignty over a Panama canal zone, was signed with 
Columbia. The treaty was ratified by the Senate on March 
17, 1903. The Senate also approved nine new ocean-going 
warships for the navy.99 Roosevelt and his Neo-Hamiltonian 
supporters were delighted. On April 3, in a speech in 
Chicago, Roosevelt praised the new legislation that 
strengthened the military and approved a canal to link the 
American Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The speech, 
influenced by the Social Darwinism of Croly, Sumner, and 
Spencer, and the evangelicalism of Strong, praised 
American achievements in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines. Roosevelt warned, however, of the dangers of 
international competition and expansion and reminded his 
audience of recent attempts by Britain, Germany, and Italy 
to blockade Venezuela to collect over-due debts. America
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needed to be prepared to protect and advance its position
in the world. The President concluded:
I believe in the Monroe Doctrine with all my heart 
and soul; I am convinced that the immense majority 
of our fellow countrymen so believe in it; but, I 
would infinitely prefer to see us abandon it than 
to see us put forward and bluster about it, and yet 
fail to build up the efficient strength which in the 
last resort can alone make it respected by any strong 
foreign power whose interest it may ever happen to be 
to violate it .... There is a homely old adage which 
runs, "Speak softly and carry a big stick: you will 
go far." If the American Nation will speak softly and 
yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training
... the Monroe Doctrine will go far.100 
Notwithstanding these legislative victories, Roosevelt and 
his Neo-Hamiltonian allies realised that continued 
American success required further policies to support the 
navy, foreign investment, and exports.
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CHAPTER SIX;
AMERICA AND THE CONTINUED EXTENSION 
OF THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN
In America, the years 1903 and 1904 were a triumph 
for the aspirations of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. In 
international relations Anglo-American friendship 
continued to develop, while suspicion of Japan and Germany 
intensified. The implementation of Root's military reforms 
suffered from over-confident reformers, continued staff 
bureau and congressional hostility, and ignorance of how 
to use a war college and general staff. General Miles 
persisted in criticising administration policies in the 
Philippines and even his retirment proved controversial.
In 1904 Brigadier General Fred C. Ainsworth emerged as the 
new arch critic of Root's army reforms. Root retired as 
secretary of war. Roosevelt won a full term as president, 
despite Democratic charges of imperialism and militarism.
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were confident of their 
ability and right to govern at home and abroad. The 
success of democratic capitalism in the Anglo-Saxon state 
epitomised progress and justified American imperialism. 
Speeches and articles reaffirmed these values.1 Military 
preparedness remained the key policy to defend American 
progressive, democratic, and commercial ideas.2 The 
passage of the Dick Act on militia reform and the General 
Staff Act were only part of the Neo-Hamiltonian
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legislative program. Roosevelt and his allies remained 
determined to further American trade by investment abroad, 
civil reform in U.S. colonies and protectorates, 
government subsidies to the merchant marine, and support 
for free trade and democracy abroad.
In January 1903 Secretary of State Hay concluded the 
details of the Hay-Herran Treaty with the Columbian 
Ambassador. The agreement ceded a ten mile canal zone 
across the Panamanian Isthmus to the United States.
America agreed to pay Columbia $10 million dollars and an 
annual rent of $250,000 for the proposed canal. When 
built, the canal would encourage American trade in the 
Pacific and give the U.S. navy greater flexibility in any 
future conflict, especially in any war with Japan. On 
February 14, 1903 Congress passed both the general staff 
bill and the bill creating the Department of Commerce and 
Labour. These two pieces of legislation underlined the 
Republican commitment to overseas exports and a strong 
federal government. The new Commerce and Labour Department 
was designed both to promote business exports and inform 
government of industrial competition at home and abroad.3 
Root, like many of his colleagues, promoted American 
overseas trade and was concerned by foreign competition, 
particularly from Germany, in Central and Latin America.4 
These measures, implemented by successive Republican 
administrations, greatly encouraged overseas trade. In
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1900 investment abroad was less than $1 billion dollars: 
by 1908, it reached $2.5 billion dollars.5
The military reforms, passed in 1903, attempted to 
prepare America for conflict. The regular army was much 
larger, the general staff promised efficient management, 
and the militia was under greater federal control. A new 
scheme of military education would establish better 
professional standards in the army. On February 21, 1903, 
in an elaborate ceremony, the Secretary of War laid the 
cornerstone of the new Army War College.6 This act , 
emphasised the lack of general staff training in the army. 
Despite this problem, Root remained confident the army's 
problems had been resolved. In his final report as 
secretary of war, he ignored the inexperience of those 
posted to the general staff and congressional opposition 
to change. He confidently asserted: "I do not think that 
any important legislation regarding the army will be 
advisable for some time to come."7 The Secretary of War 
underestimated the confusion which existed in the army, 
even among supporters of change, over the function of the 
war college and the general staff. Ignorance hindered the 
effectiveness of army reform. Root remained convinced the 
worst problems in the army were settled. General Carter, 
increasingly apprehensive about the ambiguous wording of 
the General Staff Act, was less certain. The General 
encouraged Root to promote public support for military 
reform, by publishing the works of Emory Upton.8
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The improvement in Anglo-American relations 
continued. In late 1902 the British government responded 
to the military inadequacies revealed in the Boer War. Two 
royal commissions studied the militia and regular army.
The flaws uncovered were similar to those reported in the 
American army at the end of the Spanish-American War. The 
Esher Commission reported on regular army failures in 
planning, logistics, training and even marksmanship. It 
was revealed to the King that the best twelve shots in the 
army, fired over 1,200 rounds, at targets from as close as 
210 yards, and only scored ten hits. Lord Esher commented 
drily to the King, "It was not thought desirable that this 
record should appear in the printed evidence."9 As in 
America, British military reformers concluded that 
individual gallantry was no substitute for training and 
staff planning. Supporters of reform in both countries 
advocated a modern army with a staff to coordinate its 
actions, a reserve linked closely to the regular army, and 
the ability to increase greatly reserve and regular forces 
through volunteers.10 The debate on British military 
reform emphasised the new Anglo-American relationship with 
information on military reform freely passed between 
prominent American and British officials. Root was in 
frequent contact with his British counterpart H.O. Arnold 
Forster and First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee.11 Root
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underlined the links between American and British military 
reformers when he wrote some years later to Spencer 
Wilkinson:
I do not forget, although I dare say many people do, 
what a great part your little book, The Brain of the 
Armv. played in bringing to pass that both countries 
had some sort of an institution of that kind [general
staff] in existence when the sudden emergency came.12 
In February 19 03 war broke out between Japan and 
Russia over control of Korea and its strategic ports of 
Dairen and Port Arthur. Initially one assumed Russia, a 
European power with superior forces, would easily defeat 
the oriental Japanese. The war was ignored by most Anglo- 
American officials. Early Japanese success due to inept 
Russian military leadership, however, attracted the 
attention of many foreign observers.13
In the Philippines American army commanders were 
increasingly uneasy after Japan easily defeated the 
Russian pacific fleet. In Washington, the attention of 
Roosevelt and Root again turned to the islands, provoked 
not by the emergence of Japan, but by General Miles. The 
Commanding General, demanded publication of his report on 
the Philippines, suppressed during the legislative battle 
over the General Staff Act. Miles accused Brigadier 
General Funston of ordering prisoners shot; Generals 
Chaffee, Hughes, and Smith, of authorising unnecessary 
torture; and various junior officers of abusing 
prisoners.14 The charges of maltreatment included the
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water cure inflicted upon three priests who subsequently 
died. This torture involved shoving a hose down an 
individual's throat and repeatedly filling their bodies 
with water. Roosevelt and Root attempted to delay the 
publication by ordering Miles to provide copies for the 
War Department and army headquarters in Manila. The 
General had to comply and publication of the report was 
further delayed.15
On March 17, 1903 the Senate had ratified the Hay- 
Herran Treaty, but the Columbian government in the 
meantime had begun to procrastinate over the agreement. 
This delay to the Panama Canal irritated Roosevelt and his 
Neo-Hamiltonian allies. Congress alleviated this 
disappointment with continued support for Neo-Hamiltonian 
legislation. The army and the navy both secured large 
budget appropriations.16 In the War Department, Root 
continued the preparations for implementation of the 
General Staff Act. A review board was established to 
select candidates for the forty-two staff positions 
available, chaired by Major General Young with Chaffee, 
Bates, Randolph, Carter, and Bliss committee members and 
Major H .A . Greene as committee recorder. Any officer who 
was a service school graduate, who displayed 
administrative ability, or who held the Medal of Honor was 
considered for General Staff duty.17 The quality of 
officers selected among the lower grades was remarkably
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high: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Barry, Major George 
Goethals, Captain John J. Pershing, Captain Peyton C. 
March, and Captain Joseph T. Dickman - all appointed to 
the staff - later became successful general officers.18
Major General Young was selected as the first chief 
of staff with Corbin as his deputy. Carter and Randolph, 
the chief of the artillery, were selected as assistants. 
The choice of Young was a political compromise. Roosevelt 
and Root were aware that many opposed promotion by merit 
and the general staff. By appointing a career officer, 
Roosevelt and Root hoped to diffuse criticism of reform. 
The reformers were bitterly resented throughout the army. 
None had served in the Civil War, all had powerful 
political friends, and all had served longer in staff or 
army schools than in operational commands. Carter and 
Wagner were derided for having "written books about 
conflict" rather than serving in the field; Wood was 
dismissed as "that doctor," and Bliss was widely regarded 
as a "pussy-footing academic."19
In contrast General Young had been promoted through 
the ranks. Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1840, Young 
had joined the army as a private at the start of the Civil 
War. In September 1861 he transferred to the cavalry. 
During the Civil War he was promoted four times and fought 
in most of the big battles in the East. At Gettysburg he 
was wounded by a musket ball, which left his left elbow
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permanently crooked. He successfully hid the injury from 
the army for thirty years. Appointed captain in the 
cavalry in 1866, he served throughout the West for the 
next thirty years. In 1897 he was appointed colonel of the 
3rd Cavalry. He served as Roosevelt's brigade commander 
during the Spanish-American War. Roosevelt liked Young and 
thereafter took an active interest in his career. Young 
attended the German manoeuvres in 1902, was the first 
president of the war college, and chaired the selection 
panel for the general staff.20 Roosevelt and Root hoped 
these appointments would prepare Young for his new role as 
chief of staff. Young never attended West Point or any of 
the service schools during his army career. A good 
soldier, he was to prove an inadequate chief of staff.
This attempt to make Root's army reforms more palatable to 
many career soldiers weakened the effectiveness of the 
general staff and war college.
Root remained confident the army reforms would ensure 
an effective military system. The decision by Inspector 
General Breckinridge, a strong opponent of reform, to 
retire early, was taken as evidence that the 
reorganisation would work. Officers supportive of the 
changes already commanded the Artillery, Signal Corps, 
Ordnance Department, and Judge Advocate General's Office. 
Breckinridge's retirement gave Root a further opportunity 
to strengthen support for the new system.21 On March 17
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the Secretary of War wrote a long letter to the Washington 
Times outlining the various changes in army organisation. 
He attacked critics of reform claiming the changes were a 
natural extension of those begun by Generals Scott, Grant, 
and Sherman. He again stressed preparedness, as the 
prudent and efficient response to future conflict, and 
concluded the war college and general staff would soon 
prove to be indispensable.22
Confident the army reorganisation would prove 
successful, Root pressed Roosevelt to let him return to 
his law practice in New York. The President was reluctant 
to let the most successful member of his cabinet leave and 
tried to persuade Root to remain in office until the 
presidential election the following year. The Secretary of 
War insisted he be allowed to leave as soon as possible. 
Roosevelt wrote to Taft, governor of the Philippines, 
asking him to return home and replace Root.23 Taft 
consulted his family and then wrote to the President that 
he had "no knowledge of army matters and no taste for or 
experience in politics."24 Roosevelt continued to press 
Taft to take the post. On April 18, 1903 another staunch 
opponent of reform, Quartermaster General M.I. Luddington, 
announced his retirement. Root, regarded this as further 
evidence that army reorganisation was gaining wider 
acceptance.2  ^ Confident of success he pressed Roosevelt to 
announce a new secretary of war.
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The Secretary of War ignored continued confusion 
among officers over the role of the general staff and war 
college. Bliss, a noted supporter of reform, struggled to 
define the purpose of the Army War College and contacted 
his old colleagues at the Naval War College for advice.26 
Carter and Wood, important champions of reform, sought 
field commands in the Philippines to improve future 
promotion chances. Root convinced Carter to remain as 
assistant chief of staff for six months. Carter's 
professional rival, Leonard Wood, was assigned to the 
Philippines. Wood left for Manila via Europe, North 
Africa, and India.27 In May 1903 Wood arrived in Egypt, 
where he spent two weeks with Lord Cromer who headed the 
British protectorate. Wood sought to learn from him and 
from other British colonial officials in Aden and India, 
all he could about colonial government. The General was 
well received by British officials throughout his trip, 
which emphasised the cordial relations between Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republicans and the British establishment.28
In Washington Roosevelt's administration continued to 
defend American expansion abroad by announcing plans to 
fortify Hawaii against attack. The attention of the 
Secretary of War and President remained focused on the 
Pacific as General Miles returned from his world tour and 
published his report on atrocities in the Philippines. 
Published first in the Armv and Navv Journal on May 2, the
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report soon appeared in the national press.29 The General 
accused the army of illegally occupying church property, 
inflicting water torture on prisoners, and having 
indiscriminately killed innocent civilians. He was 
particularly critical of the actions of Generals Chaffee, 
Bell, and Smith after the Balangiga Massacre. Miles 
denounced General Bell for implementing a policy of 
concentration, which placed villagers in crowded camps 
with little food, while those outside the camps were 
killed. Taft supported these claims and estimated 75,000 
people had died of disease and that ninety percent of 
livestock had been slaughtered due to indiscriminate army 
policies.30
Roosevelt, Root, and many army officers were furious 
at these attempts to re-open charges of army atrocities in 
the islands. The President wrote angrily to Root: "I think 
that Miles must be given more credit for more low cunning 
than we thought. What an irredeemable blackguard and 
scoundrel he is, and how the jacks and fools do take to 
him!" He continued attacking Miles's character and 
demanded he be clearly vilified for challenging American 
imperial aspirations. The President concluded: "He has 
played the part of traitor to the army and therefore to 
the nation. His intriguing disloyalty should be manifest 
so that there can be no mistake about it in the future.1,31 
Chaffee refused to comment on the allegations, but, at a
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banquet in his honour he described Moro tribesmen as 
"150,000 Muslim agricultural savages," and taunted Taft's 
policy of local consultation saying: "They do not wish us 
to come into contact with them, but we love them and are 
going to tell them so."32
Even bureau chiefs, who normally supported Miles, 
refused to endorse his criticism of the army in the 
Philippines. Many appointed by Root had no sympathy for 
the Commanding General, but even among long-serving staff 
officers, his comments provoked anger. Commissary General 
Frank Weston was furious at claims his department supplied 
sub-standard rice to concentration camps in the 
Philippines. Judge Advocate General Davis announced there 
was no basis for charges against the army, and other Root 
appointees such as Crozier and Gillespie rebuked Miles in 
the press.33 Neo-Hamiltonian concern that the charges by 
Miles would increase opposition to U.S. imperialism proved 
unfounded. Many papers, aware of Miles's self-centred 
manipulation of information in his quest to become 
president, dropped the story. As early as April 1902, the 
New York Times had dubbed him "Miles Gloriosus" in an 
article attacking his self-centred promotion of his own 
affairs. The legitimacy of many charges he made were 
dismissed by an apathetic public as the desperate attempts 
of a man trying secure a presidential nomination.34
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Progress continued on implementing Root's army 
reforms. In June the first joint army-navy manoeuvres took 
place. Bliss produced a report on the functions of a 
general staff to help Young understand his new role. Root 
was concerned at the inability of army officers to 
understand the application of the new institutions. He 
directed Bliss to send his report on the general staff to 
all bureau chiefs.35 The Secretary of War asked Bliss to 
prepare a further report on the use of the army war 
college. Root hoped these reports would eliminate 
uncertainty surrounding the use of his reforms.36 In mid- 
June Roosevelt approved the assignment of all general 
staff officers. Young was confirmed as chief of staff, 
Corbin as his deputy, Carter as assistant chief of staff, 
and Bliss as head of the army war college. Root realised 
that Corbin was better qualified to be chief of staff, but 
the Adjutant General was not popular in the army, or with 
the president. A strict disciplinarian who believed in 
professional soldiers, he upset Roosevelt with comments 
denigrating the contribution made by volunteer forces 
during the Spanish-American War.37 Root hoped Corbin and 
Carter would be future leaders of the general staff, once 
Young and Chaffee had their chance.38 In late June, Root 
announced he would leave Washington in August to attend 
another session of the U.S.-Canadian Boundary Commission 
in London.
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In the new American colonies, Taft and other 
reformers continued to create American institutions to 
promote democracy and capitalism. In the Philippines, Taft 
encouraged the construction of schools and the teaching of 
English. In Puerto Rico, on June 17, 1903 a university was 
established. The administration encouraged free trade with 
Cuba, while discouraging trade between the new 
protectorate and Europe.39 Columbia continued to hesitate 
in ratifying of the Hay-Herran Treaty, which infuriated 
Roosevelt. He wrote to Hay: "I do not think the Bogota lot 
of obstructionists should be allowed permanently to bar 
one of the future highways of civilisation."40 In July 
1903 at an informal meeting of Panamanian businessmen in 
New York, agents of the Panama Canal Company and army 
officers, agreed on a way out: the secession of Panama 
from the Republic of Columbia. The solution was 
"unofficially" accepted by Roosevelt and Hay, and plans 
were laid to start a revolution in Panama.
The continued extension of U.S. trade in the 
Americas, determination to construct a Panama Canal, and 
development of colonies, underlined the dominance of Neo- 
Hamiltonian ideas in American foreign policy. Almost two 
years earlier, Root had outlined these goals, which 
stressed the continuity in Neo-Hamiltonian foreign policy, 
to Charles Gardiner. The Secretary of War supported 
Gardiner when he asserted:
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The Americas and the Pacific will be the future trade 
battle ground of the world. Our advantages for the 
trade of the Orient are already greater than any 
European power, because of our long Pacific 
coastline, our possession of Hawaii, the Philippines, 
the Aleutian islands and our foothold in Samoa. The 
isthmian canal will still further strengthen our 
natural advantages so that our holding the leading 
place in the trade of the Orient, as we have recently 
attained to that of the Western world is
inevitable.41
In the Philippines, Taft, having sought the advice of his 
family, accepted the appointment as secretary of war. He 
wrote to Root, however, asking him to delay his 
resignation until the spring of 1904 to which the 
Secretary of War reluctantly agreed. Taft explained that 
his determination to implement reform was the reason for 
delay. As governor of the Philippines, Taft was involved 
in implementing a new criminal code, an internal revenue 
act, districting of the islands for legislative seats, and 
creating a land regulation act for settlement and sale of 
lands. Taft hoped to have these measures in place before 
he returned home.42
In the War Department changes in personnel and 
confusion over the exact role of the general staff 
continued to cause problems. Assistant Secretary of War 
William Cary Sanger, who had worked on the Dick Act, 
decided to retire. An expert on militia organisation and 
staunch supporter of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, he was hard to 
replace. Retired General Robert S. Oliver was appointed as 
the new assistant secretary. Oliver, like Sanger, was from 
New York State. He was a Republican with strong Neo-
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Hamiltonian links, which included his brother-in-law 
Joseph Choate, the American ambassador to France and later 
to Britain.43 The inexperienced Oliver was almost 
immediately appointed acting secretary of war, due to 
Root's imminent departure for London. The first 
operational months of the general staff were overseen by 
an inexperienced acting secretary of war. Root did not 
return from the meetings on the Alaskan Boundary 
Commission until late October 1903.44 The confusion over 
the role of the general staff intensified. Bureau chiefs, 
including Paymaster General Bates, the new Inspector 
General Brigadier General G.H. Burton, and the Chief of 
Engineers Brigadier General Gillespie, complained about 
poor representation on the general staff. No constructive 
relationship developed between the staff bureaus and the 
general staff. Bureau chiefs demanded more men, money, and 
resources. Only Chaffee, Corbin, Carter, and Crozier 
openly supported the general staff. Corbin and Chaffee 
advocated promotion for general staff officers to increase 
their authority, while Crozier and Carter suggested 
clearer wording of legislation to stress general staff 
preeminence.45 The President added to confusion over 
general staff functions by failing to give clear direction 
and blandly called for practical efficiency, and not 
theory, to be the goal of the War Department.46 
Inexperienced in staff work, most of the officers assigned 
to the general staff remained uncertain of their new role
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within the army. The War Department attempted to explain 
new duties, by providing each officer with a copy of 
Brigadier General Theodore Schwan's report on the German 
army. Published in 1894 and entitled "The Organisation of 
the German Army," this inadequate guide was all that was 
available to new staff officers.47
Outside the War Department criticism of Root's army 
reforms continued among congressmen, local politicians, 
and some newspapers. The New Orleans Times-Picavune summed 
up the fears a strong federal army still caused among many 
people:
It is already clear that the people behind the 
General Staff idea are preparing to create a 
military oligarchy within the army that will 
override all the various bureaus of the War 
Department and dominate everything within the army 
that is worth dominating. In a word, the Chief of 
Staff will be practically the Commanding General of 
the Army - not nominally as General Miles has 
been, but actually. The Chief of Staff should have 
no such extensive powers as the new regulations 
propose to give him, particularly over troops 
actually on the scene. It is entirely unsafe to 
give a chief of staff resident in Washington the 
power to negate movements of generals commanding in
the field.48
Despite these problems implementation of Root's army 
reforms continued. A joint army-navy board was created to 
promote greater inter-service cooperation which was a 
major problem in the Spanish-American War.49 Root and 
Roosevelt agreed on a program of army promotions over the 
next two years to advance officers supportive of army 
reform including Corbin, Wood, and Carter.50
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On August 8, 1903 Lieutenant General Miles retired
from the War Department. Roosevelt, who loathed Miles for
his opposition to army reform, criticism of imperial
expansion, and personal attacks on his war record refused
to publish the normal glowing retirement tribute of
service. Many Congressmen and Civil War veterans were
angered by the failure to acknowledge Miles's retiral and
demanded a proper tribute. None was forthcoming. Root
wrote to the President in support of his stand:
.... If he had been a good officer in that position 
(Commanding General) faithful, loyal, useful, the 
holding of the position would have entitled him to 
higher consideration, but he has been a bad officer, 
unfaithful, disloyal, injurious to the service, 
worthy of blame rather than praise, it seemed to me 
the mere holding of the office entitled him to no 
more favourable treatment....
These sentiments were endorsed by Roosevelt, and Miles's
last communication was dismissed by Root, when he stated
bluntly:
.... You will see that he proposes to abandon five 
regiments of cavalry and turn them into bicycle, 
motor cycle, and automobile regiments. Colonel 
A.A. Pope, one of the General's closest friends ... 
who has just written a very violent letter 
regarding the retirement order, is one of the 
leading bicycle and automobile manufacturers of the
country . ...51
In retirement, Miles continued to oppose reform and acted 
as an adviser to congressmen resisting army reorganisation 
plans.
On August 15, 1903, the official transition from 
commanding general, to chief of staff took place. Young
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became the first American chief of staff. A few days later 
Root publicly announced his intention to resign from the 
War Department on January 31, 1904.52 On August 21 Root 
left New York with his family, bound for London and his 
work on the Alaskan Boundary Commission.53 Before he left, 
he addressed the new general staff at a dinner held in his 
honour. In a typical Neo-Hamiltonian speech he attacked 
those who wished to rely on individualism, volunteerism, 
and localism. Progress was defined in terms of 
organisation - such as business trusts or the new general 
staff - which allowed professional individuals to advise 
government which ruled the masses. The war college 
provided the means to educate a new professional officer 
corps. The general staff allowed professional officers to 
direct the army under the secretary of war and president 
(see Appendix 2). Root concluded by praising Young and 
Corbin for the sacrifices they had made to help reorganise 
the army.54 Corbin was unhappy at not being promoted to 
chief of staff. As deputy to Young he had lost much of his 
old power. Secretary of State Hay, Lieutenant General 
Schofield, and Root pressed Roosevelt for assurances that 
Corbin would be appointed chief of staff in the future.
The President, despite his own dislike of Corbin, agreed 
to consider his appointment after the retirement of Young 
and Chaffee.55
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Section two of the General Staff Act defined the four 
main goals of the general staff as: planning for national 
defence, issuing reports on military readiness for 
operations, providing expert advice to the secretary of 
war and field commanders while coordinating all action in 
the field, and performing any other military duties 
assigned to it by the president.56 This broad definition 
of general staff activities and ignorance of staff 
officers produced an ineffective general staff. Captain, 
later General, Peyton March, a member of the first general 
staff, later claimed no one knew what to do. Numerous 
committees studied all aspects of the army without any 
guiding principle (see Appendix 3). March only discovered 
how a general staff actually worked when, as military 
attache in Japan, he was able to observe it work in the 
Russo-Japanese War.57 The new General Service and Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth, also had an inauspicious 
start. Bell, the commandant designate, was delayed in the 
Philippine Islands and only arrived in July 1903. He 
discovered officers attending the college had spent the 
year drinking, gambling, and hunting. Half the class had 
failed over half the college exams. Annoyed by this 
failure to take education seriously the war department 
disciplined the worst offenders. Bell a strong supporter 
of a professional officer corps finally forced army 
officers to apply themselves.58
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The general staff continued its struggle to define 
its purpose. Information was collected from the Board of 
Ordnance and Fortifications, and the Artillery, Cavalry, 
and Infantry Boards, in an attempt to define General Staff 
duties. Young left Washington for Newport, Rhode Island to 
visit the Naval War College and discover how it 
operated.59 On his return to Washington he discovered 
Corbin had issued orders without his approval. Young 
rebuked Corbin, the only senior officer with practical 
knowledge of army administration, who then requested a 
transfer.60 In October 1903 Corbin was appointed Commander 
of the Department of the East and Chaffee became Deputy 
Chief of Staff.61 The failure of Corbin to accept his 
demotion further reduced the effectiveness of the general 
staff. Chaffee an aging Civil War veteran was untrained in 
army planning or administration. Roosevelt underlined his 
great influence on army reform by transferring Corbin and 
promoting Chaffee while Root was in London. The President 
was impressed with Chaffee, especially his distinguished 
service in the Civil War, Cuba, the Boxer Rebellion, and 
the Philippines. He hoped this appointment would end 
suspicion and jealousy directed at the general staff by 
many career army officers.62
In late October Root left London to return home. The 
negotiations on the Canadian-Alaskan Boundary had been 
concluded. The American negotiating team got nearly all
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the territory they demanded. The Canadian government was 
furious, but the treaty was further evidence of the 
British desire - even if it annoyed an important Dominion 
- to improve relations with America. Root met H.O Arnold 
Forster and Spencer Wilkinson during his visit as the 
exchange of information on military reform continued.63 
The Secretary of War was disappointed at the performance 
of the general staff during his absence. He remained 
confident, however, that it would, "find itself," and all 
would be well. In a letter to Schofield, he claimed that 
the major defects had been corrected, and that the army 
was no longer, "like a railroad without a general 
manager."64 Root enjoyed the lavish praise he recieved for 
the successful passage of army reform. He was described as 
a "Hamiltonian genius" by supporters and was widely 
regarded as the ablest member of the President's cabinet. 
The Secretary of War remained determined to leave public 
life, however, and refused to continue as head of the War 
Department or to stand as the Republican candidate for 
governor of New York.65
Convinced the army had the necessary institutions to 
perform effectively,- Root focused during his remaining 
weeks in office on the problems of America's merchant 
marine. He supported criticism by businessmen of 
government decisions which failed to develop the merchant 
navy. American shipping was essential to commercial
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supremacy in the Pacific and Caribbean. Root joined 
Senator Marcus Hanna, William Henry Vanderbilt, and others 
in demanding government support for this strategically 
important industry. These men criticised the decline in 
American merchant shipping from 2.5 million tons in 1865 
to under 1 million tons in 1902; the high running costs 
faced by ship owners; and evidence that sixty-five percent 
of all American exports were carried by foreign ships. 
Politicians and businessmen determined to promote American 
expansion overseas found such figures unacceptable.66
Roosevelt's administration received more bad news 
from the Philippines but better news from Panama. In the 
Philippines, Wood reported renewed fighting against 
Islamic Moro tribesmen in response to piracy and theft.
The offensive on the islands of Mindanao and Jolo was 
conducted with advice from Governor Birch, the senior 
British official in North Borneo, which again underlined 
the development of Anglo-American cooperation.67 The 
administration received happier news from Panama. On 
November 4, 1903 General Huertas, leading a force of 
firemen and railroad workers, declared Panamanian 
independent from Colombia. The American navy stood by to 
prevent any Colombian intervention. Two days later, 
Secretary of State Hay announced American diplomatic 
recognition of the new state. A new Panama Canal treaty 
was quickly concluded. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty
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guarantied the United States a hundred year lease of a ten 
mile canal zone, for a lump sum of $10 million and an 
annual rent of $250,000. Colonel, later Major General, 
George Goethals was appointed chief engineer of the new 
canal project, due to be completed in 1914.
In America, Young and Bliss endeavoured to clarify 
the functions of the War college and general staff. Bliss 
published a further report on the war college. The report 
was influenced, both by his own service in the Naval War 
College and his knowledge of American railroad 
organisations which he greatly admired.68 The Chief of 
Staff devoted his time to replacing the old departmental 
army commands with a new divisional structure. This was 
the last attempt by Young to reorganise the army as he 
keenly awaited his retirement.69 In late November, Root 
and Young published their last annual reports. Both men 
remained confident the army reorganisation would prove 
successful. Root, delighted with the passage of the 
General Staff Act and Dick Act, continued to underestimate 
the animosity this legislation provoked among congressmen, 
middle-ranking officers, and many staff officers.70 In 
December, Carter, Root's military adviser and author of 
reform legislation, was posted to the Philippines. The 
General was keen for a field command to ensure future 
promotion, but his untimely departure caused more upheaval 
in a general staff unsure of its purpose.7  ^ Root's
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attention was diverted both by events abroad and by 
domestic politics, and he failed to realise the general 
staff needed further guidance.
The surprise success of Japan in the Russo-Japanese 
War and the American acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone 
forced Root to concentrate on events abroad and not on 
defining clear general staff objectives. In response to 
the expansion of Japanese power in the Pacific, American 
forces established garrison forts at Yavisa and Santa 
Maria in Panama. Congress recieved plans for harbour 
defences in Manila and a new naval station at Subic Bay in 
the Philippines from Secretary of the Navy Moody and 
Secretary of War Root.72 Roosevelt also pressed Congress 
to promote his friend Leonard Wood to major general. The 
attempt to promote Wood was unpopular with many army 
officers and congressmen, due to his rapid promotion from 
captain to brigadier general. Congressmen hostile to Wood 
accused him of corruption in Cuba and attempted to 
misrepresent testimony in his favour. Defending Wood and 
arguing for his promotion involved Root in many time- 
consuming visits to Congress.73 The inability of the 
general staff to perform as expected finally attracted 
Root's attention, as pressure to provide an accurate 
assessment of American defence needs in the Pacific 
increased. In late November 1903, Root authorised the 
creation of a new three-man board to consider army
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administration made up of Brigadier General Fred C. 
Ainsworth, Bliss, and new Adjutant General Colonel Hall.
Fred Crayton Ainsworth was popular with many 
Republican and Democratic politicians. Born in Woodstock, 
Vermont in 1852, Ainsworth joined the army as a contract 
surgeon in 1874. He was appointed to the Surgeon General's 
Office in 1886 after service in Alaska, Oregon, and 
Arizona. In July 1889, he was placed in charge of the 
Record and Pension Division of the Surgeon General's 
Office and Volunteer Enlistment Branch of the Adjutant 
General's Office. In 1892 he was promoted to colonel and 
head of the new Record and Pension Office.74 This bureau 
was responsible for individual Civil War records and 
approved all war pensions. Thousands of pension claims 
were made each week during the 1870s, and 1880s, and the 
bureau failed to keep pace with demand. Ainsworth 
introduced a new system of record keeping which reduced 
the backlog of claims. Congressmen were delighted that 
they could quickly secure pensions for prominent 
constituents and praised the "business methods" of 
Ainsworth.75 In 1898, all military service records for all 
American wars were transferred to Ainsworth's department. 
The Record and Pensions Office took on these extra duties, 
yet under Ainsworth's leadership, reduced its staff from 
300 in 1894, to just forty-two in 1902. In recognition for 
his service he was promoted to brigadier general in March, 
1899.76
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Ainsworth wanted to extend his authority to control 
all army records, many of which were held by the Adjutant 
General's Office. Corbin, while adjutant general, resisted 
any attempt to weaken the power of his department. As a 
member of Root's committee on army administration, 
Ainsworth again suggested all records be placed under his 
control. He argued the general staff reduced the role of 
the adjutant general's office, since many of its command 
functions were now performed by the general staff. Only 
its role as keeper of army records, such as orders issued, 
remained intact. Colonel Hall, unlike Corbin, was not 
disposed to challenge these assertions or Ainsworth's 
proposal that all records be placed under his control. 
Ainsworth cleverly manipulated Roosevelt and Root's 
admiration of business methods by suggesting that his 
ideas matched those occurring in business organisation. 
Root encouraged Hall to accept the offer and promised him 
a promotion to brigadier general if he accepted. The 
merger centralised army records, and rewarded Ainsworth, a 
man who apparently represented professionalism and 
business efficiency. Root hoped this amalgamation would 
provide the general staff with a secretary who would act 
like the secretary to a company board of directors.77 In 
early January 1904, Congress confirmed the abolition of 
the office of adjutant general and the appointment of
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Ainsworth as military secretary. Carter, already on his 
way to the Philippines, wrote to the Secretary of War in 
alarm at this extension of staff bureau power. Root 
dismissed this warning, confident this measure would 
relieve the general staff of administrative detail and 
allow it to function as he envisaged.78
On January 9, 1904 Lieutenant General Young retired 
as chief of staff. A distinguished Civil War and Spanish- 
American War veteran, he struggled for six months both to 
defend the general staff from its detractors and to define 
its function.79 At the end of his career, with no staff 
training, he found it impossible to create an effective 
general staff. Major General Adna Chaffee, another career 
soldier equally ill-equipped to be chief of staff, 
replaced Young. Carter, Wood, Bliss, Wagner, and other 
knowledgeable officers were still too junior in rank to be 
appointed chief of staff. Congress, under pressure from 
those who opposed promotion by merit, continued to reject 
the promotion of Wood and other army reformers.80 Chaffee, 
like Young, was a strong character, able to assert his 
authority and defend the general staff from its critics. 
Untrained in staff work, however, he was unable to provide 
the general staff with the necessary guidance as to its 
role within the army.
The new Chief of Staff enjoyed close links with 
senior British officials, including First Lord of the
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Admiralty Arthur Lee and Field Marshal Earl Roberts of 
Khandahar. Chaffee had first met Lee in Cuba in 1898 and 
met Roberts, Lee, and other senior British officials many 
times during the next few years.81 As commander of 
American forces during the Boxer Rebellion, he enjoyed 
prolonged celebrations with British officers, when his 
promotion to major general was announced during the march 
to Beijing.82 Chaffee replaced MacArthur as commander of 
U.S. forces in the Philippines immediately after the 
liberation of Beijing. A staunch imperialist, he 
ruthlessly crushed opposition in the islands, and 
encouraged American citizens to settle in the archipelago. 
Roosevelt and Root approved of such policies, and Chaffee 
was rewarded with promotion to chief of staff.
Chaffee, while commander in the Philippines, had 
learned to distrust the Japanese. The General was aware of 
Japanese attempts to aid the rebel forces in the 
Philippines and as chief of staff, remained deeply 
suspicious of their future intentions. In one letter he 
wrote:
....The Asiatic will never love the European or 
American. He may be, perhaps, put in a situation 
which will force him to say he does, but you may be 
certain he does not. The Japanese are very friendly, 
but they do not like Europeans or Americans when it 
comes to a matter of like or dislike; they tolerate 
us, so to speak, but the feeling is different from 
the feelings existing between Europeans and other 
Europeans, Americans and Europeans, and vice versa. 
The Japanese smile when we tell them our affairs in 
the Philippines will soon be settled to our
255
satisfaction; they do not believe us for the reason 
that they think they know the islanders better than 
we do. They talk of a time when it may be necessary 
to put a hundred thousand men in Formosa. They do not
adopt a humane policy, but crush resistance....83 
The success of Japan against Russia in Korea and 
Manchuria reinforced fears of Japanese intentions among 
senior American officials. As relations with Japan 
deteriorated, those with Britain continued to improve.
Root continued his exchange of information on army reform 
with British officials.84 In the Philippines, Wood, 
commander of the province of Southern Luzon, reaffirmed 
his friendship with British colonial officials in a letter 
to his friend, J. St. Loe Strachey.85
In early 1904, Lincoln Steffens, a powerful critic of 
those using business as a model of efficiency, published 
The Shame of the Cities. The book advocated civic reform 
to challenge graft, privilege, and corporate corruption. 
Although the book did not directly attack free market big 
business, Steffens and other "muckracking journalists" 
soon specifically identified the deficiencies of business 
management in other works.86 In 1906 William Hard reported 
in Making Steel and Killing Men that forty-six men were 
killed in one year at a Chicago-based U.S. Steel Plant.
The American railroad industry, often the focus of great 
praise among army reformers, was criticised for poor 
safety standards that killed 328 workers each year.87 
This criticism of American business, and by implication
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its management record, attracted the attention of
Roosevelt. Increasingly the President was less willing to
accept the glowing praise which business management
received from Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. Roosevelt
considered federal regulation of business to promote
efficient use of resources, and tighter laws on safety at
work. The willingness of the President to consider greater
government regulation of business, increasingly disrupted
relations with his Neo-Hamiltonian allies. Root, Lodge,
Wood, and others wanted defence and foreign policy
controlled by strong central government but were less
enthusiastic over proposed government regulation of
American business. Over the next few years these differing
views increasingly divided Roosevelt and his followers
from Neo-Hamiltonian and more conservative Republicans.
On February 7 Root gave his last interview as
secretary of war. He recommended the continuation of the
staff-line detail system, more promotion by merit, joint
army-militia manoeuvres, a larger war college, and further
increases in the artillery. He praised the civic reforms
in Cuba and staunchly defended the acquisition of the
Philippines, asserting that:
... our trade will increase as the processes of 
civilization go on in the islands, and particularly 
if the tariff on Philippine goods is reduced. The 
Filipinos are now acquiring wants. You cannot sell 
hats to bareheaded people any more than you can sell 
trousers to people who wear breechclouts. As the 
people become more advanced their wants will become
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even greater and more varied. Civilization and trade 
move together serving them and ourselves.
He continued in words that echoed the views of the social
reformer and evangelist Josiah Strong:
....But there are profits which cannot be cast up 
at once in dollars and cents. Our future relation 
with the Philippines will give us an immense 
advantage in the vast Pacific trade which must 
come into being. That fact is inevitable. But we 
have planted our civilization in the Philippines; 
we are teaching the people to love our institutions, 
and wherever we lift up the weak and ignorant people 
and teach them our ways we are serving ourselves
...88
A few days before he left office, Root received a 
final letter from Carter, still enroute to the 
Philippines. The letter repeated the warning that the 
Military Secretary's Department threatened army reform. 
Military Secretary Ainsworth opposed promotion by merit 
and staff-line interchange, and he sought to limit the 
powers of the general staff. Ainsworth was a close friend 
of the new Commissary General and other staff chiefs, and 
Carter feared a new alliance of bureau chiefs against army 
reorganisation.89 Root ignored these warnings and remained 
confident of success.
In mid-February Taft replaced Root as secretary of 
war. Taft was a civilian ignorant of both army matters and 
the procedures of the War Department. His nomination took 
place in a presidential election year, and, unlike Root, 
he found little time to familiarise himself with the 
problems and responsibilities of his new post. Confronted
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with the demands of the presidential nomination and
electoral process, he was happy to rely on the able
administrative abilities of Ainsworth, who made himself
readily available to the beleaguered secretary of war.90
In Congress, Roosevelt found his authority weakened as the
election approached. The promotion of Wood was further
delayed by jealous middle-ranking officers. In a harsh
attack on promotion by merit, an anonymous letter to
Senator Proctor summed up the feelings of many officers:
Among recent nominations, I will mention those of 
General Wood to be major general; Generals Carter, 
Bliss, Barry and Mills to be brigadier generals.
Each one of them, except Mills, was a staff officer 
and non-combatant when appointed general, and have 
not risked their skins to bullets, nor the health of 
their bodies by work in the field in Cuba or the 
Philippines .... Ninety-nine per cent of the army ... 
know there are far better and more efficient general 
officers than General Wood.
The officer continued his attack on promotion by merit,
claiming combat veterans were ignored. He concluded with a
specific attack on Wood:
But for the extraordinary promotion General Wood has 
already received, he would be a doctor in the 
Medical Department of the army, along with his 
classmates .... If Doctor Wood should receive an 
appointment of major general in ten years, he will 
then have received a greater reward than any
officer of the United States Army ....91 
The frustration felt by middle-ranking officers at their 
own slow promotion hampered the advancement of Wood,
Carter, Bliss, and other able officers for some time to 
come. The close association between reform-minded officers
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and Neo-Hamiltonian politicians made these officers 
unpopular in the army, and politicised their promotions in 
Congress. Despite these problems, Wood was promoted to 
major general on March 14, 1904. Republicans staged a 
surprise vote in Congress, which caught opponents unaware, 
and his promotion was easily confirmed.92
By the spring of 1904, the Russo-Japanese War 
concerned both London and Washington. The comprehensive 
destruction of the Russian Asiatic Fleet at Port Arthur by 
an oriental power was greeted with alarm. In Britain the 
Admiralty announced the Royal Navy would match Franco- 
German naval forces in the Pacific. Significantly, no 
mention was made of any British response to American naval 
forces in the region.93 Britain remained ambivalent over 
the surprising success of Japan against Russia. In 1902 
the British government signed an Anglo-Japanese Treaty to 
undermine any Russian threat to India. Japanese intentions 
to control Manchuria and Korea, however, increasingly 
alarmed the British Foreign Office and the American army 
in the Philippines.94 In London political pressure to 
achieve military preparedness increased. Lord Esher 
proposed his new plan to reform the British army. A 
general staff, chief of staff and increased authority for 
the Committee for Imperial Defence were recommended.95 
Root congratulated his British colleagues in adopting the 
military organisation best suited to Anglo-American
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democracy. He reminded his British friends that neither 
the United States nor Great Britain could adopt 
continental European ideas of military ascendancy over the 
political process.96
In America Ainsworth continued to strengthen his 
position as military secretary. Taft and Roosevelt 
accepted Ainsworth's contention that the military 
secretary should be one rank above other bureau chiefs. 
Despite objections from Root, Congress approved the 
promotion of Ainsworth, who became military secretary and 
major general. Carter, now commander of American forces in 
the Department of Visayas in the Philippines, pressed Root 
to oppose Ainsworth's increasing authority. The former 
Secretary of War, however, was confident Ainsworth would 
relieve the general staff of administrative duties, 
allowing it to concentrate on strategic planning and other 
more worthy goals.97 Chaffee, the new chief of staff, was 
suspicious of Ainsworth and sought to limit his power 
within the army.98 The Military Secretary responded by 
enhancing his reputation through referring all matters 
likely to cause difficulty to the assistant secretary of 
war. In this way he promoted the belief both in the War 
Department and in Congress that he was a man who got 
things done since he was never associated with failure. 
Ainsworth manipulated Army pension awards, which his 
office controlled, to promote himself in Congress.99
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Ainsworth's reputation continued to prosper. Taft, hard-
pressed by Roosevelt's re-election campaign, increasingly
delegated decisions to the Military Secretary. Chaffee,
the chief of staff, and Commandant Bell at Fort
Leavenworth, now paid for undermining Taft's efforts in
the Philippines.
In the Pacific, concern over Japanese expansion
continued to increase. In May 1904 Japan scored a second
convincing victory over the Russian navy. The Russian
Baltic Fleet sailed around the world to avenge the
destruction of their Asiacic fleet. The fleet was
intercepted and destroyed in the strait of Tsushima.100 In
the Philippines, Wood supported Rear Admiral William M.
Folger, who responded to news of the Japanese victory by
recommending a permanent naval base be established at
Subic Bay. It was hoped that this new naval facility would
protect U.S.- Asiatic trade, underline the American
commitment to the islands, and serve as a warning to
Japan.101 Wood warned that America was threatened if Japan
dominated Korea and Manchuria and suggested international
action to limit Japanese expansion. In an oblique
reference to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, he
dismissed the prospect of British support for Japan:
Whatever be the results of the fighting or the 
length of the war, the principal nations of the 
world cannot remain indifferent to the arrangements 
that must finally be concluded. The same reasons that 
would influence the powers in restraining Russian
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aggrandizements at the cost of Chinese dismemberment 
and Korean vassalage in case of unqualified success 
of Russia, would cause them to take action to limit 
Japan's aspirations were her successes unqualified
and her desires excessive.102
In the Caribbean, the Japanese success led Roosevelt 
to press for an early completion date for the Panama 
Canal. On May 9 the Isthmian Canal Commission was placed 
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel George Goethals, 
who was responsible directly to the Secretary of War.103
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In the Caribbean, America continued to strengthen its 
control over the sea lanes between America and Panama, as 
the British decided to withdraw, (see Figure 2). In 
London, Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher replaced Walter Kerr as 
first sea lord at the Admiralty. Fisher, as Britain’s 
senior admiral, recommended that British forces be 
withdrawn from the Caribbean and North America for service 
at home or in the Mediterranean. By the winter of 1904 the 
Royal Navy base at St. Lucia was under orders to close, 
and most of the ground and naval forces in Halifax, Nova 
Scotia and Bermuda had been withdrawn.104 The new 
supremacy of the United States in the region was 
emphasised by American intervention in Santo Domingo and 
the subsequent "Roosevelt Corollary." In the summer of 
1904, Santo Domingo faced demands for debt repayment from 
Germany, Italy, and Spain. The island's president, Carlos 
F. Morales, offered to turn all custom houses and forty- 
five percent of all excise duties over to America, if 
Roosevelt would save the island from its creditors. The 
President agreed in order to obstruct European powers from 
interfering in the island. Roosevelt justified American 
intervention through the "Roosevelt corollary," which he 
attached to the Monroe Doctrine. The amendment authorised 
American intervention in any state in the Western 
Hemisphere, which failed to meet international 
obligations. The President agreed in order to obstruct
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European powers from interfering in the continent.105 This 
arbitrary act emphasised the determination of Roosevelt 
and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies to secure American 
preeminence in the Caribbean, Latin America, and, with the 
opening of the Panama Canal, the Pacific.
In Washington the army continued its struggle to 
define the functions of the general staff and war college. 
In May 1904 Colonel Arthur Wagner and Brigadier General 
Bell planned to reorganise the General Service and Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth. A new syllabus was introduced 
based upon the "applicatory method" favoured by Wagner and 
his teaching colleague Eben Swift. Classroom teaching was 
combined with practical map problems, tactical rides, and 
campaign planning. Swift, head of the Department of 
Military Art, emphasised grand tactics, general staff 
duties, original research in strategy and military 
history, logistics, and military geography.106 In June 
Bliss unsuccessfully attempted to define the relationship 
between the new military secretary, chief of staff, and 
secretary of war. Congress added to the administrative 
confusion by announcing that the military secretary could 
report directly to the secretary of war on questions 
originating in his office, without informing the chief of 
staff.107 Taft, confronted with the demands of 
electioneering, overall responsibility for the army, 
colonial administration and civil reform, and command of
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the Panama Canal project, delegated more work to the 
efficient Ainsworth.108 The general staff found its 
authority slowly eroded both by Ainsworth and Taft's poor 
regard for Chaffee and Bell.
In late June 1904, the Republican National Convention 
selected Roosevelt as its presidential nominee with 
Charles W. Fairbanks as the vice-presidential candidate. 
Two weeks later, the Democratic party met to finalise 
their party manifesto and select a presidential candidate. 
William Jennings Bryan, the party's candidate in 1896 and 
1900, did not seek the nomination and supported the 
candidacy of publisher Randolph Hearst. Instead of Hearst, 
Alton B. Parker from New York was nominated, with Henry G. 
Davis from West Virginia as his running mate. The 
convention did adopt Bryan's policies on anti-imperialism, 
anti-trust measures, and direct election of senators. In 
his speech to the conference Bryan attacked Roosevelt as a 
dangerous militarist and imperialist. He pleaded with the 
conference to nominate "a pilot," who would lead the party 
"away from the Syclla of Militarism without wrecking her 
upon the Charybdis of Commercialism."109
The presidential campaign got off to a slow start. In 
October, however, Miles denounced Roosevelt as a 
militarist. Parker, the Democratic nominee, demanded 
independence for the Philippines and condemned the 
acquisition of the Panama Canal strip. In spite of these
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charges, Roosevelt he was easily re-elected.110 The 
electoral vote gave Roosevelt over 7.5 million votes; 
Parker nearly 6 million votes; and Eugene V. Debs, a 
Socialist candidate, over 4,000,000 votes. It was the 
largest margin of victory since 1872. In Congress the 
Republican Party maintained its fifty-seven to thirty- 
three majority in the Senate and picked up forty-three 
seats in the House for a 250 to 136 majority. The policy 
of American expansion overseas was again vindicated. 
Roosevelt, who had replaced the assassinated McKinley, had 
won a presidential election in his own right. Flushed with 
victory, Roosevelt announced that under no circumstances 
would he be a future candidate for president. The 
President later bitterly regretted this categorical 
statement.111
In the winter of 1904 the Committee for Imperial 
Defence in London approved Admiral Fisher's proposals for 
a complete British withdrawal from the Caribbean and 
Canada. The decision reflected concern over German 
military expansion in Europe and increasing Anglo-American 
cooperation. In America Bliss, the head of the army war 
college, emphasised increasing Anglo-American friendship 
with a report to the Joint Army-Navy Board which 
identified Japan, Germany, and Russia, as likely future 
enemies.112 In December 1904 Admiral Fisher summed up the 
new international order when he wrote in a confidential 
memo:
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A new and definite stage has been reached in that 
evolution of the modern steam navy which has been 
going on for the last thirty years, and that stage 
is marked not only by the changes in the material 
of the British Navy itself, but also by changes in 
the strategic position all over the world arising 
out of the development of foreign navies. To the 
west, the United States are forming a navy the 
power and size of which will be limited only by the 
account of money that the American people choose to 
spend on it. To the east, the smaller but modern navy 
of Japan has been put to the test and has not been 
found wanting ... and a new German navy has come into
existence.113
By the end of 1904 the United States and Great 
Britain had an informal alliance based upon a recognition 
of the limits of British power and a common concern over 
German, Japanese, and Russian territorial and military 
expansion. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans had achieved many 
of their original policy goals. The American people had 
repudiated anti-imperialism in the election; the United 
States had extended its influence in the Caribbean and 
Pacific; and American investment and trade overseas 
continued to increase rapidly. Neo-Hamiltonians were 
confident that their policies would continue to prosper 
for another four years under President Roosevelt.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INTERNATIONAL SUSPICION AND 
FEAR OF JAPAN
American military and foreign policy in the period 
1905 to 1908 was dominated by concern over the intentions 
of Japan in the Pacific. America was determined to assert 
control over that ocean, and the actions of the Republican 
administration in the Caribbean, Central America, and the 
Philippines reaffirmed the importance of this goal. The 
failure of Root's army reforms to deliver promised 
military efficiency made certain that army reorganisation 
remained an important political issue. Conservative and 
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans continued to believe business 
organisation represented efficiency and progress.
Roosevelt and others, however, were less impressed with 
business organisation as reports of industrial 
incompetence, dangerous working practices, and threats to 
public health by the drive for short term profit appeared 
with alarming regularity. In 1905 Charles Evans Hughes 
uncovered serious mismanagement in the three largest 
insurance companies in America. The companies used money 
to purchase political favours and to deal illicitly with 
financial houses on Wall Street. This scandal was followed 
by reports exposing flagrant abuses of public health by 
several food and pharmaceutical companies.1
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The President reacted by supporting greater 
government regulation of business and the economy. The 
willingness of Roosevelt to sanction government regulation 
of business alienated Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, who 
only supported strong government for defence and foreign 
policy. This philosophical division on the role of 
government ultimately divided the Republican Party and 
weakened the influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in 
American politics. Taft, the new secretary of war, 
strugging under a large and diverse workload, was unable 
to resolve the continued organisational problems in the 
army. An influential member of Roosevelt's cabinet, his 
presence weakened the influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, 
which he had always supported only with reluctance.
American foreign policy in the spring of 1905 was 
dominated by worries about Japanese expansion, concern 
over events in Morocco, and the continued attempt to 
strengthen American influence in the Caribbean. In late 
January a protocol was signed with the Dominican Republic 
in the Caribbean. The agreement gave America control over 
Dominican custom houses, foreign affairs, and defence 
policy ensuring that the United States had effectively 
acquired another Caribbean protectorate.
In Washington the German Ambassador Speck von 
Sternberg sought to involve America in the Moroccan 
Crisis. The ambassador claimed Germany wished free trade 
in the region and was being excluded by an Anglo-French
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agreement. He challenged America to support free trade in 
this part of North Africa. The President instructed Taft 
to contact the British ambassador and explain German 
concerns, but he refused to support the German demand for 
free trade. The event underlined both Roosevelt's 
willingness to overburden Taft with affairs unconnected 
with his office and continued Anglo-American friendship. 
The American government happily endorsed the British 
demand for free trade in China yet rejected the German 
request for free trade in Morocco.2
Throughout the late spring and early summer,
Roosevelt and his advisers worried about Japanese 
expansion in the Pacific. This concern was provoked by the 
comprehensive defeat of Russian naval and ground forces by 
Japan. The President and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were 
concerned that Japan would challenge America's attempt to 
secure commercial domination in the region. In Roosevelt's 
cabinet suspicion of Japan was common. On July 1, 1905 
Secretary of State John Hay died. Anti-Japanese feeling in 
the cabinet, however, increased when Elihu Root replaced 
him. Despite opposition from his wife and a reluctance to 
return to public office, Root agreed to become secretary 
of state. As secretary of war, Root knew of Japanese 
attempts to undermine American influence in the 
Philippines, and thereafter he always distrusted Japan. 
Philander C. Knox, the attorney general, and all senior
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generals in the army, shared Root's suspicion of Japanese 
intentions. Only Taft, the Secretary of War, remained 
convinced that Japan posed no threat to American expansion 
in the Far East.3
In the Philippines the policy of benevolent 
assimilation continued. Public education enrolled less 
than 100,000 in 1898 but reached 521,000 in August 1905. 
The teaching of English and civics received priority in 
the new system. Roosevelt ordered the colonial government 
to encourage business as much as possible.4 New taxation 
and fiscal policies were introduced to encourage local 
business and investment from America. Wood left the 
Philippines in June 1905, for minor surgery in Boston and 
a holiday with his friend, the President.5 Bliss, head of 
the war college, asked for a transfer to the Philippines 
to enhance his promotion prospects and was placed in 
charge of the Department of Mindanao.6 He arrived to find 
Corbin, the army commander in the islands, deeply unhappy. 
The former Adjutant General, ordered to the Philippines 
after relinquishing command of the Department of the East 
in New York, disliked the humid and isolated Manila. He 
and his wife missed Washington and New York. The 
announcement that Major General John C. Bates would 
replace Chaffee as chief of staff in January 1906 further 
depressed the isolated Corbin.
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Bates, like Young and Chaffee, was a career soldier 
and Civil War veteran with no staff experience or training 
in military schools.7 The decision to promote Bates 
reflected the attempt by Roosevelt to negate criticism of 
the general staff by appointing a senior combat veteran 
chief of staff. This policy encumbered the general staff 
with a commander who was invariably at the end of his 
career. Young, Chaffee, and Bates were all too old to 
serve a full four-year term as chief of staff, and their 
combined service as head of the general staff covered only 
twenty-seven months (see Appendix 4). On June 24 at 
Asheville, North Carolina, Colonel Arthur Wagner died of 
tuberculosis. The untimely death of Wagner, a staunch 
supporter of military reform, and promotion of Bates, were 
serious set-backs to army reform.8
On June 30, 1905 Taft published his first report as 
secretary of war. He recommended tighter educational 
testing for junior and field grade officers and dismissal 
from the service for lieutenants who failed basic course 
work. Captains and majors who failed to apply themselves 
at service schools should be retired to speed up middle- 
ranking promotions. The Medical Bureau gained one hundred 
and thirty new medical officers to end the army practice 
of relying on civilian contract surgeons. The Artillery 
Corps was to be increased by 6,500 men. Taft noted twenty- 
nine National Guard officers attended regular army service 
schools for the first time. The Secretary praised the work
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of the Army War College, which produced a full study of 
the recent Russo-Japanese War including lectures on the 
Japanese army and its general staff.9 These studies 
emphasised concern in the army over Japanese intentions, 
while the events of both the recent Boer War and Greco- 
Turkish War were largely ignored.
The possibility of Japan gaining complete control of 
Korea and Manchuria worried Roosevelt. The President 
offered to hold the peace conference between the two 
powers. Both states accepted the American offer, and the 
peace conference convened in late August at Portsmouth,
New Hampshire. The Russian negotiator was Foreign Minister 
Sergei Iulevich Witte, while the victors were represented 
by Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro. At the 
conference Japan failed to obtain either an indemnity from 
Russia or any territory apart from Karafuto, a paramount 
position in Korea. Japan was granted the South Manchurian 
Railway concession. Komura returned to Japan to discover 
the premier, Taro Katswa, ready to sell the railroad to 
American millionaire E.H. Harriman. The negotiated sale 
only failed when Komura threatened to resign, and the 
railroad remained under Japanese control. When the 
contents of the treaty became known in Japan, anti-treaty 
demonstrations erupted into rioting, which included an 
assault on Komura's home. The dominant figures in the 
Japanese army, including senior General Yamagata Aritimo
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and his aide Colonel Tanaka Giichi - later war minister 
and prime minister of Japan in the 1920's - were furious 
that Japanese treaty gains had not been greater. Senior 
officers in the Japanese army general staff urged the 
premier to approve a policy of expansion on the Asian 
continent, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.10 These 
plans placed Japan in direct conflict with Neo-Hamiltonian 
wishes that America dominate the commerce of Latin America 
and the Pacific. Roosevelt was delighted with the outcome 
of the peace treaty - that saw him awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize -- for limiting Japanese territorial gains in a 
region where America wished to expand.
In America the leading Democrat, William Jennings 
Bryan, announced his intention to go on a world tour. He 
left San Francisco in early September for his first stop, 
Japan. Unlike most Republican politicians and business 
leaders, Bryan maintained his faith in international 
reasonableness and cooperation. In Japan he received a 
warm welcome and was assured that the Japanese felt 
nothing but good will towards America.11 The perception 
Bryan and many Democrats had of Japan highlighted 
fundamental differences between Republicans and Democrats. 
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, had no faith in international 
agreements and firmly believed that power and wealth 
depended upon securing overseas markets from hostile 
foreign powers. In such a world, military preparedness was
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essential. Democrats, who endorsed international 
cooperation and relative isolation, rejected this view and 
continued to support volunteerism and local control within 
the army.
In the summer of 1905 Roosevelt instructed Taft to 
review American coastal defences. The last comprehensive 
report had been by the Endicott Board commissioned by 
President Grover Cleveland in the 1880s. The Taft Board 
issued its report in the Autumn of 1905. Boston, New York, 
and San Francisco were categorised as of primary 
importance. The committee recommended Guantanamo in Cuba, 
and Subic Bay in the Philippines, be added to this list. 
The second recommendation categorised Panama and Alaska as 
important as continental America for defence purposes. 
Pearl Harbour, Manila Bay, Guam, and the Aleutian Islands 
were important but less so than those in the other two 
categories. Roosevelt used events in the Russo-Japanese 
War to justify this reappraisal of coastal defence. The 
President argued that the Japanese surprise attack on Port 
Arthur underlined the need for secure fleet bases while 
Russian defeat required a greater American presence in the 
Pacific to counter Japan.12
In the Philippines, Corbin's misery was compounded by 
the discovery of a heart condition, which required him to 
take several month's leave in Australia.13 Roosevelt 
offered Wood, now fully recovered from his operation, the
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chance to replace Corbin as head of the Philippine 
Division. Wood accepted and sailed from New York on August 
23, 1905. As with his previous trip to the Philippines, 
Wood elected to go via Europe, the Suez Canal, and India. 
The General again spent considerable time with British 
colonial administrators, including the governors of 
Gibraltar, Egypt, Australia, and Hong Kong.14 Roosevelt 
also decided to recall Brigadier General Carter from the 
Philippines for a new posting in America.15
In Washington concern over German intentions world­
wide abated as attention focussed on Japan. Root, however, 
like his predecessor John Hay, remained suspicious of 
German attempts to expand trade in Latin America. As 
secretary of state, he instructed the American ambassador 
in Berlin to be uncompromising in the negotiations over 
the commercial treaty between the two nations.16 In Europe 
relations between Britain and Germany continued to 
deteriorate. Secretary of State for War R.B. Haldane, who 
replaced H.O. Arnold Forster in the spring of 1905, 
responded by implementing British army reforms. The 
planned general staff was created, the Committee for 
Imperial Defence gained greater authority over colonial 
defence, and a British Expeditionary Force was established 
for rapid deployment in Europe.17 Haldane noted the 
influence of Root on these British reforms:
Really you know I do not need to know anything
about armies and their organization for the five
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reports of Elihu Root, made as Secretary of War in
the United States are the very last word concerning
the organisational place of an Army in a democracy.18
In America the struggle to apply Root's army reforms 
continued within the army. The first extensive joint army- 
navy exercises took place in the Chesapeake Bay in the 
autumn of 1905. These joint manoeuvres were designed to 
encourage inter-service cooperation which had failed so 
badly in the Spanish-American War. Unfortunately this 
first exercise provoked such fierce inter-service argument 
over who won the various engagements that Taft felt 
compelled to ban any further joint manoeuvres.19 
Throughout the winter of 1905 the general staff continued 
its struggle to assert its authority over staff bureaus. 
Taft, swamped with work, was unable to provide the 
necessary political support the general staff required. In 
1905 the secretary of war had been secretary of state for 
one month, was placed in overall command of the Panama 
Canal project, and was pro-tem president of the senate 
whenever Roosevelt was away. Overworked, Taft rarely 
mentioned the War Department in his correspondence.20 Root 
relieved Taft of most foreign policy concerns. In late 
November the Secretary of State wrote to Ambassador Henry 
White in Italy, outlining the American position in the 
continuing Moroccan Crisis. Root instructed White to 
support broadly free trade in North Africa, but under no 
circumstances was he to jeopardize the growing alliance
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between Great Britain and France. The Republican 
administration valued the "Entente Cordial" as a useful 
counter to the emerging industrial and military power of 
Germany.21
On October 24, 1905 Major General Wood arrived in 
Manila and assumed command of all American forces in the 
islands. Corbin, who was still unwell, remained in 
Australia.22 In early December Wood sent his assessment of 
the international situation in the Pacific to Roosevelt. 
The General indicated his great concern over Japanese 
expansion. Wood pressed the President to authorise more 
fortifications for the Philippines and for the Sandwich 
Islands, which he claimed Japan was ready to seize. He 
continued:
The Japanese are very rapidly refitting captured 
Russian battleships, which appear, in many instances, 
to have been only moderately injured, and they will 
soon have a large fleet here .... We should 
concentrate our defensive work at Manila, and put the 
immense fund we intended to spend, not into works 
spread over the islands, but into a fleet of 
battleships, especially designed for duty in this 
part of the Pacific. If we control the sea, no one 
can bother us here, once we lose it, the islands are 
gone with the exception of Manila, which we could 
hold for a while if well prepared. I believe in a 
good army, but we must have a strong Pacific Fleet if 
we are to hold these islands, maintain prestige in 
the Orient, and develop our trade. Very few people 
who have lived in the East ... take any stock in the 
idea that we shall be left free to work our will 
here. Japan is very anxious to be the new England of 
the East. She has unlimited cheap coal and cheap 
labour, and will soon be able to manufacture goods as 
well as we can ....
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Wood concluded by warning Roosevelt of the security 
dangers and racial problems posed by admitting Japanese 
workers to America. He strongly recommended tougher 
immigration controls.23 A month later Wood received the 
President's reply. Roosevelt endorsed the proposals to 
fortify the Sandwich Islands, increase the Pacific Fleet, 
and tighten immigration controls over Japanese and Chinese 
labour. The President, however, thought Japan's attention 
would be directed towards Korea and Manchuria for some 
time to come, and he dismissed claims that the Philippines 
were in imminent danger.24
On January 16, 1906 Lieutenant General Adna Chaffee 
retired as chief of staff. A tough career soldier, he had 
kept control of the staff bureaus through his strong 
character. Chaffee retired a few weeks early to allow his 
friend, Major General John C. Bates, the chance to serve 
briefly as chief of staff before he too retired. Roosevelt 
announced that Corbin would replace Bates and serve the 
first full four-year term as chief of staff.25 
Unfortunately, Corbin was unable to accept the appointment 
due to his deteriorating heart condition. At the end of 
January, Corbin returned to Manila from Australia. In 
Manila he formally handed command of the islands over to 
Wood.26 The former Adjutant General set sail for home. On 
his return home, he suffered partial paralysis of his left 
arm and was offered command of the Northern Division in 
St. Louis, Missouri. A few months later Corbin retired
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from the army and in 1909, he died while undergoing heart 
surgery in Baltimore.27
The inability of Corbin to accept the appointment as 
chief of staff was a set-back to the implementation of 
army reform. Corbin was de facto chief of staff during the 
Spanish-American War, was an able Adjutant General, and 
supported Root's army reforms from the beginning. He was 
the only senior officer with the necessary practical 
experience both to successfully serve as chief of staff 
and to guide the General Staff towards its proper 
function. His ill-health deprived the army of crucial 
experience when it was most needed. Major General Bates, a 
company commander in the Civil War, regimental commander 
in the Indian Wars, and brigade commander in the 
Philippines, readily admitted his lack of professional 
training, business experience, and education.28 The final 
act of a distinguished service career his appointment 
allowed Ainsworth to enhance his authority.
On March 23 Congressman Frederick Gillette wrote to 
Secretary of War Taft with a common complaint about 
Ainsworth's misuse of power. He described how the Military 
Secretary rejected a requested army discharge for the son 
of an influential member of his constituency. Three weeks 
later, the Congressman discovered Ainsworth authorised the 
army discharge at the request of Senator Crane.29 These 
arbitrary decisions, based upon Ainsworth's personal
292
whims, became increasingly common over the next few years. 
Taft, confronted by a large and diverse workload ignored 
others' criticism of the Military Secretary and continued 
to give him greater responsibility. The Secretary of War 
undermined Root's general staff reforms by putting 
Ainsworth in charge of the War Department during his 
frequent absences. This decision made the chief of staff 
responsible to a bureau chief: the exact opposite of what 
Root had intended in the General Staff Act.30
Roosevelt was entrusting Taft with too many diverse 
functions, which prevented the Secretary of War from 
gaining necessary experience to control the War 
Department. Taft found himself constantly harried by a 
president worried over Japanese intentions in the Pacific, 
the construction problems created by the Panama Canal, and 
the problems of colonial administration.31 In early 1906 
Taft's problems increased when rioting broke out during 
mid-term elections in Cuba. President Estrada Palma 
requested American troops to restore order in the island. 
The War Department was considering this request when, on 
April 16, the San Francisco earthquake presented further 
problems.32 Taft was also concerned about his weight; 
which had reached 326 pounds during his time as governor 
of the Philippines. Advised to lose weight, Taft spent 
several hours each day doing physical exercise, which 
further reduced time spent in the War Department. The
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diverse problems confronting the Secretary of War 
prevented his considering why Root's army reforms had 
failed.33
The President was also distracted from the continued 
problems in the army by new domestic concerns. Upton 
Sinclair in The Jungle publicised tainted meat sales by 
Chicago meat-packing companies. The book added to mounting 
evidence which revealed a complete disregard for public 
health by American companies. Army reform was no longer a 
central priority of the administration. Roosevelt focussed 
increasingly on the creation of stronger federal agencies 
to deal with commercial greed. The passage of a Pure Food 
and Drug Act, which tightened government controls over 
American companies, emphasised the new priorities of 
Roosevelt's administration. Increasingly Roosevelt 
regarded the construction of a strong Pacific Fleet and 
completion of the Panama Canal as the only important 
defence priorities of the administration.34 In late spring 
Corbin wrote to his friend Wood of the organisational 
problems still confronting the army. He concluded that 
Secretary of State Root knew more about the continued 
problems in the army than either Roosevelt or the 
overworked Taft.3 5
In April 1906 Roosevelt decided to appoint J.
Franklin Bell to replace Bates as the first four-year 
appointee as chief of staff. Bell had impressed the
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President with his service in the Philippines, which 
included a Congressional Medal of Honour for distinguished 
gallantry in action near Porao, Luzon. In 1902 he returned 
from the Philippines to command the staff college at Fort 
Leavenworth. He successfully introduced Root's educational 
reforms and received great praise from the Inspector 
General's Office for his role in promoting army education. 
Born in 1856, he was the first soldier who had not served 
in the Civil War and the first graduate of West Point to 
be appointed chief of staff.36 Supporters of army reform 
were delighted that a younger, professionally trained 
soldier was to be chief of staff. The decision, however, 
promoted an officer who had been openly critical of Taft's 
policies in the Philippines, which strengthened 
Ainsworth's position within the War Department. Root 
pressed Roosevelt to appoint Carter assistant chief of 
staff, commandant of the war college, or Superintendent of 
West Point. These requests were rejected by the President. 
Carter, the architect of general staff legislation and 
critic of Ainsworth's increasing power, was appointed 
commander of the Department of the Lakes in Chicago.37
Roosevelt and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans continued 
to promote American control over Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific. The President sent Secretary 
of State Root on a prolonged tour of Latin America to 
encourage closer relations with the United States. In
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Cuba, protests against President Palma erupted into open 
warfare in August 1906. Roosevelt, keen to intervene, 
waited until President Palma asked for help. The General 
Staff proved its value when it responded quickly to a 
request from Taft for a plan to send American troops to 
the island. In contrast to the haphazard American invasion 
of Cuba, Bell announced 6,000 troops could be sent to 
Havana in one week, and over 24,000 men could be in Cuba 
in one month.38 The willingness to consider military 
intervention in Cuba, combined with American control of 
Panama and the Dominican Republic, underlined the 
commitment to extend American influence in the Caribbean. 
In the Philippines Wood asserted American authority both 
by attacking rebel natives and preparing for war with 
Japan. Wood and his deputy Bliss organised 8,000 American 
troops to end the piracy and jungle raids conducted by 
Moro tribesmen in Mindanao.39 As commander in the islands 
he expressed concerned at expanding Japanese and German 
influence world-wide. In a letter to Major Higginson, he 
endorsed British concerns over German industrial 
production and the possible threat Japan posed to Anglo- 
American Pacific trade.40
The new Chief of Staff, Bell was determined to 
implement Root's vision of army reform. He initiated 
several new ideas which included a departmental structure 
of army command to replace the divisional structure, the
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abandonment of fixed-term appointments in the Ordnance 
Bureau, and the creation of seven new manoeuvre camps for 
joint army-National Guard exercises.41 Bell's confidence 
quickly evaporated, however, when confronted by the 
intriguing bureau chiefs and the indifference of Taft. 
Increasingly, Bell relied on the devious Ainsworth, who 
became his chief adviser on the political intricacies of 
the War Department.42
In September 1906 Roosevelt approved the deployment 
of American troops in Cuba. The President appointed Taft 
the new governor of the island to replace the beleaguered 
Palma. The Secretary of War snubbed Bell and appointed 
Ainsworth acting head of the War Department during his 
absence. Bell, began to lose confidence in his ability as 
chief of staff as he realised he faced a secretary of war 
and staff bureau chiefs hostile to him and his office.43 
Root was increasingly concerned at the growing power of 
Ainsworth in the War Department. He suggested Carter be 
appointed head of the Army War College to provide help for 
Bell and support for the General Staff. Taft and Roosevelt 
ignored this request and appointed Brigadier General 
William Wotherspoon head of the War College.44 Carter 
remained in Chicago, isolated from the army command in 
Washington.
In the Philippines the arch-imperialist Wood received 
a visit from Bryan and his wife as part of their world
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tour. The couple had visited Korea and China after their 
stop in Japan and were keen to see America's new colony in 
the East.45 In Manila Bryan reaffirmed his opposition to 
imperial expansion and military preparedness. Wood 
recorded the speech in his diary and, with some 
satisfaction, the reaction of Mrs. Bryan: "Mrs Bryan ... 
said that whatever his views were in regard to the 
Philippines it was evident the people of the Moro Province 
were not yet ready for self-government." The General was 
happy to agree with Mrs. Bryan and noted: "Mrs. Bryan is a 
sensible, level-headed appearing woman and I have no doubt 
has a restraining influence on her husband."46 In late 
autumn, Bryan and his party left the Philippines for 
India, the next stop on their world tour. Unimpressed by 
Bryan's arguments, Wood continued to press for new 
defences in the islands, including a new fort to be called 
Fort McKinley in Manila.
In Washington Roosevelt struggled to gain 
Congressional approval for Wood's new fort, and a bigger 
Pacific Fleet. On December 20 he notified Wood that he 
hoped to have the measures approved in the defence 
appropriations for the spring of 1907.47 Root returned 
from his tour of Latin America, and in a speech in mid- 
December, before the Pennsylvania Society of New York, he 
reaffirmed the Neo-Hamiltonian goal of overseas expansion. 
He robustly defended the creation of strong central
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government in defence and foreign policy, achieved through 
professionals who advised the political executive. Only 
this system could guarantee the efficiency required to 
succeed in a highly competitive world. Root defended 
attempts to professionalise the army and the State 
Department. He denounced those who supported political 
power at the local level, endorsed volunteerism over 
professionalism, and opposed American expansion overseas. 
Neo-Hamiltonian ideas must succeed to insure American 
independence, economic growth, and freedom.48 From India 
Bryan rejected Root's ideas. The Democratic leader, 
speaking in Bombay, criticised both the morality of Anglo- 
American imperialism and refuted its claimed economic 
benefits.49
In the spring of 1907, the new congressional session 
approved several policies regarded as vital by Roosevelt 
and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies. It ratified Roosevelt's 
agreement with the Dominican Republic, approved funds for 
new fortifications in the Philippines, and authorised a 
larger navy. Responding to pressure from Wood, Roosevelt's 
proposal to limit Japanese immigration was also accepted. 
War with Japan seemed imminent, and a classified 
memorandum circulating among senior officials, emphasised 
this view:
.... Japan's ambition, to accomplish which she is
doing everything possible, is to be the sole lord
and owner of the Orient, and this is the reason why
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she formerly subjugated Korea and in our days 
dominates China. Russia proposed and tried to 
conquer a dominion in the Orient and we have 
already seen what Japan did to stop her. The 
United States desired to mix up the Philippines, 
and, as the Philippine Islands are on the map of the 
Orient where Japan has harboured resentment against 
the United States - resentment that is constantly 
intensified on account of the question aroused by the 
intervention of the Americans in Manchuria and the 
new restrictive measures adopted against Japan in 
America.
We must therefore confess that war will come 
without fail .... Japan will not wait for the 
opening of the Panama Canal, which would make the 
Americas powerful in the Orient .... Whether we 
desire it or not, we shall see ourselves involved
in the struggle ... we must think what to do.50 
In early April, Wood wrote to Colonel Hugh Scott, a 
future chief of staff, claiming Japan was ready to attack 
the Philippines.51 A few days later, he wrote to Secretary 
Taft, demanding greater preparation for war. The General 
denounced the anti-imperial lobby in America for 
encouraging Japan to believe that the U.S. would 
relinquish the islands without a fight. Wood dismissed the 
idea that Great Britain would aid Japan under the terms of 
the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Treaty. He assured Taft that the 
treaty applied only to Russia and that America would fight 
an internationally isolated Japan.52
Roosevelt and his administration were determined to 
defend American overseas interests in the Pacific, 
Caribbean, and Latin America. On March 17 the President 
underlined this commitment to protect American influence 
abroad when he ordered U.S. Marines to intervene in 
Honduras to restore political stability.
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The prospect of imminent war with Japan forced 
Roosevelt to reconsider the failure of the General Staff 
to perform as expected. Root and other army reformers 
gained the attention of the President for the first time 
in many months. Ainsworth was criticised for wielding too 
much power in the War Department and undermining the role 
of the General Staff. The President agreed to abolish the 
post of military secretary and to re-appoint Ainsworth 
adjutant general. In an attempt to increase the authority 
of the chief of staff, Bell was promoted to Major General, 
the same rank as held by Ainsworth.53 A planned 
reorganisation of the artillery was approved. The 
Artillery Corps, created by Root's Army reforms of 1901, 
was split into a new two-part structure based around coast 
and field artillery. The sudden flurry of military reform, 
however, soon ended as Roosevelt's attention again 
focussed on domestic regulation of big business.54
Roosevelt joined an increasing number of people 
unwilling to accept that business had proven a leader in 
organisation and efficiency. Henry James, who had returned 
to America after a twenty year absence in Europe, 
criticised his homeland in The American Scene. He attacked 
modern America as a nation based upon violence, plunder, 
and commerce. Science and technology had been made 
subservient to a short-term profit motive which destroyed 
human values.55 The attacks on business greed and
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inefficiency by James, Upton Sinclair, and others 
challenged the Neo-Hamiltonian view that business 
organisation represented the pinnacle of progress. 
Nonetheless, Root reaffirmed his support for strong 
central government served by professionals with control 
over defence and foreign policy but limited intervention 
in the economy. Increasing international competition 
required a strong, well-briefed government, while big 
business a symbol of efficiency needed little government 
interference.56 These Neo-Hamiltonian views clashed with 
Roosevelt's wish to introduce government regulation of 
business. The use of business organisational ideas 
continued to flourish, however, and in the summer of 1907, 
Des Moines Iowa introduced corporate, planned city 
government. Based upon an idea first implemented in 
Galveston, Texas in 1900, the development of corporate 
city government was regarded as an efficient response to 
both local corruption and the increasing functions of city 
government.5 7
In late June Roosevelt invited senior army and navy 
officers to Oyster Bay for discussions on the measures to 
be taken if Japan launched a sudden attack. The conference 
decided to fortify Oahu in the Hawaii Islands and 
establish a naval base at Pearl Harbour.^8 In an attempt 
to convince Japan of American military power, it was also 
decided to send an American fleet on a world cruise. The
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President ordered sixteen battleships and cruisers 
accompanied by four destroyers to assemble for the cruise. 
The whole fleet was painted white to attract publicity and 
soon became known as the "Great White Fleet." The ships 
visited Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia to 
emphasise the American commitment to the Pacific.59 Bell, 
the chief of staff, was not invited to these discussions, 
which undermined his authority and that of the General 
Staff. In the War Department Taft continued to appoint 
Ainsworth in charge during his long absences, leaving Bell 
anxious over his inability to establish his command 
authority. Bell, unlike Chaffee, lacked confidence in his 
ability and was unable to break with Ainsworth, who 
continued to increase his authority and reputation at 
Bells expense.60
The Japanese war scare continued throughout the 
autumn of 1907. Brigadier General Pershing, regarded as 
one of the army's finer commanders, was posted to the 
completed Fort McKinley in Manila. Wood criticised the new 
naval base at Subic Bay and wanted American resources 
concentrated in Manila and at Pearl Harbour. In an angry 
comment in his diary, he predicted that scattered American 
forces would easily be defeated and that the Philippines 
would fall within seven days of a Japanese assault.61 On 
October 11, 1907, Captain James H. Reeves, the military 
attache in Beijing, warned of continued Japanese
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commercial and military expansion in the region. He 
reported the arrival of 15,000 Japanese troops in 
Manchuria and claimed it was effectively a Japanese 
province.62 By the Winter of 1907, no Japanese invasion 
had materialised, but concern over Japanese intentions 
remained high.
The prospect of war emphasised the poor performance 
of the general staff. Root, Wood, and Carter were 
concerned at the inability of Bell or Taft to control 
Ainsworth and to assert the primacy of the General 
Staff.63 Captain Frank R. McCoy, the President's military 
aide, claimed Bell was most garrulous, which irritated the 
impatient Roosevelt who stated: "He talks too much and 
would stay all day, I never can get rid of him." The Chief 
of Staff was increasingly unhappy and unwell. He felt 
isolated as the President avoided him by sending 
instructions through either McCoy or Army War College 
President Wotherspoon. Bell never understood this conflict 
of character and was further handicapped by bureau chiefs 
who, inspired by Ainsworth's example, ignored his 
authority.64 The Chief of Staff and Taft did implement one 
major reform, when they established brigade posts, 
regimental - and brigade - sized units, which allowed army 
officers to train with large forces.65
In the spring of 1908, evidence of Japanese treachery 
encouraged the belief that war with Japan was inevitable.
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In early February, a confidential memorandum compiled by 
Lieutenant Colonel Jones, chief of military intelligence 
within the General Staff, was circulated among very senior 
officials. The report detailed Japanese attempts to 
destabilise American influence in the Pacific over a ten- 
year period. Roosevelt, Root, Taft, Bell, Wotherspoon, and 
Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf all received 
copies. The report claimed Japan aided Filipino forces in 
their war against America. In 1896 Filipino nationalist 
Jose Ramos, who fled the Philippines to escape the Spanish 
authorities, was given political asylum in Japan. Ramos 
encouraged Aguinaldo, the main nationalist leader, to 
forge links with Japan. In June 1898 Aguinaldo sent two 
trusted advisers, Nariano Ponce and Faustino Lichauco, to 
Japan for a series of meetings with senior officials. 
Foreign Minister Mr. Askai, Assistant Chief of Staff 
Lieutenant General Fukushima, and several members of the 
Japanese general staff promised to help the nationalists 
against America. Throughout the autumn of 1898, Captain Y. 
Tukizawa, the Japanese military attache in Manila, 
accompanied American forces in the Philippines and passed 
information to Filipino nationalists. Other Japanese 
officers acted as military advisers to Filipino forces.
In October 1900, General Trias, Aguinaldo's deputy, 
approached the Japanese consul in Manila in an attempt to 
secure arms shipments from Japan. The report claimed Japan
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complied with the request. Ships in Shanghai and Hong Kong 
were used to disguise arms shipments from Japan to 
Filipino nationalists. Colonel Jones reported substantial 
Japanese espionage at American bases and alleged that 
Japan had topographical data and other information on the 
new military instillations at Manila Bay, Subic Bay, Pearl 
Harbour, Puget Sound, and Monterey, California. The report 
concluded by warning that American security was threatened 
by Japanese military expansion, its large merchant navy, 
immigration to America, and control of Manchuria, Formosa, 
and the Pescadores Islands.66
This report greatly influenced the President and his 
senior advisers. It highlighted knowledge of Japanese 
activities in the Philippines and explained the hostility 
of the army command towards Japan. All senior officers who 
commanded American forces in the Philippines knew of 
Japan's aid to the enemy. The claims of Japanese espionage 
were supported by an incident in India which occurred only 
weeks after this report had been read in Washington. The 
British authorities in Calcutta intercepted a package 
bound for Japan. The parcel contained complete engineering 
drawings of the fortifications of Corregidor, the island 
fortress which guarded the entrance to Manila Bay. The 
plans revealed the exact height above sea-level of all gun 
emplacements, location of searchlights, position of fire 
control stations, and extent of mine fields guarding the
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harbour entrance. British intelligence delivered the plans
to the American consul, which both underlined Anglo-
American cooperation, and the limited nature of the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty of 19 02.67 Wood summed up to Roosevelt the
anger directed at Japan and the determination to defend
Anglo-American interests in the Pacific:
.... There is a rapidly growing feeling among the 
whites here that a definite issue with Japan is not 
far off. She seems to be without any sense of 
commercial honour, and her recent fortunate outcome 
in her struggle with Russia has served to upset the 
brown people throughout the East and bring a general 
feeling of unrest, and I should not be at all 
surprised to see the British- Japanese Alliance 
broken off for good and sufficient reasons in the 
very near future. Discrimination against British 
merchandise and British merchants in the transport, 
etc., is causing much discontent. It seems to me that 
the best outcome for us would be an understanding 
with England which would result in the maintenance in 
the Pacific of fleets by each which united would 
always be superior to the Japanese fleet. Japan 
must be smashed at sea before long or white 
influence in the East will be ended, and with it, 
to a large extent trade. The Japanese are not 
friendly to any white people and are looking 
forward to the establishment of a policy on the 
coast of Asia that will correspond very closely to
our Monroe Doctrine ....68
The increasing tension between Japan and America 
alarmed the cautious Japanese Premier Taro Katsura. He 
convinced the cabinet, despite army protests, to pursue a 
policy of international cooperation with Europe and 
America. Japan was not ready for war against an America 
supported by Russia and other European powers. In such a 
war, Britain would not support Japan, which reaffirmed the 
limited nature of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. By pursuing a
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policy of expansion as recommended by the army Katusra 
emphasised Japan faced defeat and international isolation. 
Katsura convinced a majority of his government to embark 
on a new policy of international agreement. The army 
opposed this policy. On February 18, 1908 a note was sent 
to the American ambassador in Tokyo acknowledging American 
immigration controls and agreeing to uphold them by not 
issuing any more visas to Japanese labourers. The Japanese 
government also initiated a series of diplomatic treaties 
with the United States, Great Britain, and France. In 
return for recognition of Japanese control of Korea and 
Manchuria, Japan offered to accept American ownership of 
the Philippines, French control of Indo-China, and British 
ownership of India. In the autumn of 1908, a U.S.-Japanese 
treaty was formally concluded in the Root-Takahira 
Agreement.69
The improvement in great power relations in the 
Pacific convinced Roosevelt that Wood could be recalled.
In mid-February he announced that Wood would take command 
of the Department of the East, after a six-month trip 
through Europe including visits to the military manoeuvres 
in Germany and France. Major General Frank C. Weston, the 
former commissary general, became the new commander in the 
Philippines.70 In a final letter to Root from Manila, Wood 
reaffirmed his belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority, the 
benefits of controlling the Philippines, and advantages 
provided by American rule to the islanders.71
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In America, Taft began his campaign to secure the 
Republican presidential nomination. Roosevelt initially 
supported Root and hoped he could be convinced to run for 
president. Root still determined to return to his law 
practice in New York, was reluctant to accept. The 
Secretary of War was viewed with suspicion by Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republicans. As governor of the Philippines, 
and head of the War Department, he had often questioned 
ideas of American racial superiority, the need for 
military expansion, and the long-term benefits of 
colonialism. In an effort to secure Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republican support in the Republican primaries, Taft made 
several "Neo-Hamiltonian speeches." In business clubs in 
Chicago, Cleveland, Tacoma, and Augusta, Georgia, Taft 
gave the strongest endorsements of his career to 
colonialism and military expansion. He attacked ideas of 
"non entanglement" as outdated, enthusiastically endorsed 
the policy of a big navy, reaffirmed the importance of the 
Monroe Doctrine and Panama Canal to America's defence, and 
promised merchant marine ship subsidies and support for 
free trade in the Pacific.72 In domestic politics Taft 
rejected further progressive reforms and pledged to 
"perfect the now adequate machinery" of controls over 
interstate labour and commerce. These views were endorsed 
by Root, Wood, Lodge, and other conservative and Neo-
309
Hamiltonian Republicans.73 As Taft and Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans moved to a closer understanding, Roosevelt 
increasingly alienated such party members with support for 
Bryanite policies on the environment and further business 
regulation.74 Increasingly, Roosevelt identified with 
Republicans unwilling to accept business corruption, poor 
safety standards, and destruction of the environment. This 
group of Republicans included Charles Evans Hughes, Louis 
D. Brandeis, and Albert J. Beveridge, who rejected Taft as 
too conservative.75
The organisational problems of the army continued. 
Secretary of War Taft was distracted by his election 
campaign, while improved relations with Japan removed any 
urgency to solve the army's problems. Root continued to 
press for Carter's appointment to the General Staff. Taft, 
who disliked Carter, rejected the request, and Carter 
remained commander of the Department of the Lakes in 
Chicago. The author of the General Staff Act was deeply 
unhappy, and, despite support from Root and Young, he 
became depressed by the failure of army reform and his own 
career prospects.7 6
Wood, Carter's great professional rival, left the 
Philippines in late February 1908. The former commander of 
the Philippines made use of his return to America to visit 
British colonial officials. These visits emphasised the 
agreement between Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans and the
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British colonial establishment to defend Anglo-Saxon rule 
and free trade. He took tea in the Raffles Hotel Singapore 
with the British high commissioner, stayed with British 
colonial officials in Ceylon, and spent time sightseeing 
in Egypt with his friend Lord Cromer, the de facto ruler 
of Egypt.77 In Gibraltar he was welcomed by the British 
governor, and, after touring Spain for two weeks, he 
arrived in Britain. In London he spent nearly eight weeks 
with senior British military and government officials, 
visited and dined with Lytton Strachey, Lord Curzon, 
Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Howe, and the Colonial Secretary 
the Earl of Crewe.78 With all of these men he discussed 
the future security and trade of the Far East.
Wood sought backing for an unofficial Anglo-American 
alliance against Japan.79 The strong association between 
Wood and British imperialists highlighted Wood's personal 
commitment to Anglo-American friendship, based upon free 
trade and Anglo-American imperialism. It also emphasised 
the support such ideas enjoyed among Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans. The willingness of American envoys to extend 
their visits in Britain, which rarely occurred on trips to 
Germany or France, underlined the mutual advantages many 
felt could be achieved through closer ties.
While Wood promoted Anglo-American friendship, the
presidential election continued in America. Roosevelt
already privately regretted his public pledge that under
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no circumstances would he be a candidate in 1908.80 The 
President continued to hope Root would stand in the 
election, but Root firmly rejected Roosevelt's proposal, 
and the President reluctantly accepted that even "wild 
horses wouldn't drag him into making a public campaign."81 
The other Republican candidates, apart from Taft, were 
Speaker of the House "Uncle Joe" Cannon and Charles Evans 
Hughes. Roosevelt regarded Hughes and Cannon as too 
independent from him and announced his support for Taft.
On June 16 the Republican Party Convention elected Taft as 
its presidential candidate with conservative Jim Sherman 
from New York as his running mate.82 Roosevelt received 
the longest outburst of support at the convention, 
provoked by a speech given by Henry Cabot Lodge praising 
his presidency. Two weeks later the Democratic Party 
selected William Jennings Bryan, giving him a third 
attempt to win the presidency.
In the War Department, the presidential election 
deprived the General Staff of strong political leadership 
and encouraged independent action among staff bureau 
chiefs. In July Taft resigned as secretary of war to 
concentrate on his election campaign.83 On July 23, 1908 
Roosevelt appointed Luke E. Wright, a lawyer from 
Tennessee, to the post. Wright strongly supported Neo- 
Hamiltonian policies of overseas expansion. The new 
Secretary had three sons who volunteered for service in
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the Spanish-American War, was a member of the U.S.-
Philippine Commission between 1900-1904, and replaced Taft
as governor-general of the Islands in 1904, serving until
1906. A committed imperialist, he received an honorary
doctorate in law from Root's alma mater Hamilton College
in 1904. In 1906-1907 he served as American ambassador to
Japan during the "war scare" and advocated a tough line
against Japanese expansion in the Far East. Despite his
staunch support for American Imperialism, which made him
politically acceptable to Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, he
had no knowledge of military affairs.84
Wright discovered a War Department unofficially run
by Ainsworth, while the chief of staff was ignored and
bureau chiefs did as they pleased. Bell had failed utterly
to assert his authority as chief of staff and, to compound
his misery, it was discovered he had diabetes. His medical
condition accounted for much of his depressed state,
tiredness, and wild swings of mood. Unfortunately this
diagnosis did not improve his character, which continued
to make him an ineffective chief of staff. Major Archie
Butt, the President's military aide, summed up the problem
in a letter to his mother:
.... General Bell talks so much that he gets on 
peoples nerves. He always seems to be talking for the 
benefit of someone in the adjoining room. I do not 
see how he is going to last much longer. He has 
crossed swords too, with General Ainsworth, a fatal 
thing for anyone to do, especially one who does not 
handle a rapier. Ainsworth attends to his duties so
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perfectly that it is a relief for anyone to approach 
his office. He is deep and wise and kind, except when 
he is crossed, and then the Assyrian could not come
down more swiftly, or more deadly .,..85 
Supporters of army reform were encouraged, however, when 
orders announced the return of Bliss from the Philippines 
for reassignment in America.86 More good news followed 
when the new Militia Act which had limited the President's 
mobilisation of the National Guard to unit call ups during 
war was offset by an unchallenged ruling by the attorney 
general which reaffirmed the president's right to use the 
Guard abroad. Carter continued to be ignored by the 
administration and, with the sudden death of his son, 
lapsed into a deep depression over the prospects of 
achieving military efficiency, continuing American 
colonial expansion, or advancing his own career.87
In London Wood left his British colleagues and 
travelled to France. Over the next four weeks he observed 
French and German military manoeuvres. He renewed his 
acquaintance with the Kaiser, whom he had met on a 
previous visit in 1902, and dined with both the French 
president and the German emperor. Wood made several 
reports on the French and German armies, which 
concentrated on their abilities in the field and not on 
their general staff structures. The General, like many 
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, was concerned about German 
economic expansion, and the Kaiser's attempts to secure a 
formal overseas empire. Germany was viewed as a commercial
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rival and potential enemy, and Wood welcomed the chance to 
observe any weaknesses in the German army.88 On completion 
of the German manoeuvres, Wood returned to London for 
further meetings with British officials before setting 
sail for New York in early September.
In September the election campaign had begun in 
earnest. Bryan embarked on an extensive national tour 
describing big business as "industrial despotism" and 
attacking American imperialism for undermining individual 
liberty. He denounced army reforms as militarism and, 
citing his hero Jefferson, warned of the dangers to the 
Republic posed by materialism and industrialisation.89 The 
Jeffersonian ideology of local political control, a 
volunteer army, and an internationally isolated agrarian 
republic, continued to have wide public support. In the 
election of November 3, 1908 Taft won 321 electoral votes, 
to Bryan's 162. In the popular vote, Taft won over
7,500,000 votes, while Bryan polled nearly 6,500,000. In 
the Congressional elections the Republicans maintained 
their sixty-one to twenty-three Senate majority and 219- 
172 House majority. The victory, however, was less 
convincing than previous Republican triumphs. Taft's lead 
over Bryan was only 1,200,000 million votes, less than 
half the margin Roosevelt achieved over Parker in 1904. 
Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oklahoma all rejected 
Taft, when they had accepted Roosevelt. The new President
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led an increasingly divided party, emphasised by telegrams 
of congratulations from Progressive Republicans, which 
demanded constructive but not conservative leadership.90
On November 9, less than one week after the election, 
the new Army War College opened. The opening address was 
given by Root to an audience that included Roosevelt,
Taft, Wright, and Bell. In his speech, Root attempted to 
define the functions of the War College, War Department, 
and General Staff. The former Secretary of War, however, 
produced only a vague definition which only emphasised the 
confusion which existed over army administration. The War 
College was "to do the thinking for the army" while the 
General Staff did the "studying of military science" and 
the War Department handled administration.91 The speech 
only emphasised Root's failure to communicate how he had 
intended army organisation to perform. In a major 
omission, he also failed to stress the importance of 
having General Staff officers in the field to ensure the 
implementation of war plans.
Later that same day, Wood arrived in New York. He 
travelled to Washington and spent the next week briefing 
Roosevelt on his travels. The two men discussed Japanese 
expansion and possible American responses, the continued 
superiority of the German army, a closer alliance with 
Britain, and Wood's proposal to popularise the idea of 
military preparedness.92 Wood was appalled by the failure
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of Bell as chief of staff, the power wielded by Ainsworth
in the War Department, and the failure to implement Root's
army reforms as envisaged. To strengthen the General 
Staff, he convinced Roosevelt to appoint Bliss as 
president of the new War College. As the year ended, Wood 
delivered his first public speech on military preparedness 
to the New England Society of New York. The speech warned
of the dangers to American overseas trade if Japan
continued to expand its colonial empire and industrial 
capacity. Wood regarded the world as having limited 
resources and too many competitive empires, making certain 
future world conflict. To protect American liberty and 
economic growth, Wood recommended that the New England 
Society endorse his proposal to train 50,000 volunteer 
officers for service in a national emergency.93
The year closed with both Progressive Republicans and 
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans uncertain what policies the 
new President would adopt. Neo-Hamiltonians remained 
convinced war was inevitable, with Japan the most likely 
enemy. In response Wood, Root, Wright, and others were 
determined to ensure that Taft supported a larger navy and 
greater army efficiency. The new President must defend 
United States territorial and commercial interests in 
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Pacific.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW CITIZEN ARMY 1909-1912
American politics between 1909 and 1912 were 
dominated by increasing division between Progressive and 
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The philosophical and policy 
differences between these two groups temporarily disrupted 
the Republican electoral pre-eminence over the Democratic 
Party. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, many personally 
friendly to Roosevelt, rejected his domestic reform 
program and sided with the conservative Taft. In military 
and foreign affairs, Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, which had 
profoundly changed the agenda on these issues, retained 
their dominant influence. Intervention in China and 
Central America underlined the commitment to asserting 
American influence in the world.
In the army the concept of a broad-based citizen force re- 
emerged. The small professional army of 100,000 regulars 
was regarded as inadequate. European and Japanese forces 
had millions of trained troops and America needed to 
respond to armies of this size. Neo-Hamiltonians suggested 
short-term enlistments to create a trained federal 
reserve, increased money for the armed forces, greater 
standardisation of National Guard and regular army 
equipment, and more joint training exercises. The policy 
proposed a trained professional elite which would command
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a large citizen army with basic military knowledge.
General Wood described the new policy as "military 
preparedness," which encouraged mass mobilisation around a 
professional core.
On January 28, 1909 Cuba once again achieved limited 
self-government when American troops left after three 
years of occupation. Root, writing to the sympathetic 
newspaper The Outlook, reaffirmed his commitment to 
American intervention anywhere in the Caribbean or Latin 
America to defend American interests.1 Taft, the 
president-elect, asked Root to remain secretary of state, 
despite his strong views on asserting American economic 
and military power abroad. The New York lawyer refused, 
although as a favour to his party he agreed to his 
appointment as the junior senator from New York. Root's 
refusal to continue in the cabinet left James Wilson, the 
secretary of agriculture, as the only member of 
Roosevelt's cabinet reappointed by Taft. General Wood 
noted in his diary both the disappointment among the 
"Roosevelt men" and the sudden realisation that Taft was 
determined to assert his independence.2
In the War Department, staunch imperialist and 
supporter of military reform Luke Wright was replaced by 
Jacob McGavock Dickinson. The new secretary was from 
Columbus, Mississippi and was a graduate of universities 
in Leipzig, Paris, and New York. A corporate lawyer with a
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practice in Chicago, his only previous experience of 
government office was two years as an assistant attorney 
general, and two years as a federal solicitor. Unlike 
Wright, he had no commitment to American imperialism. His 
appointment emphasised Taft's reluctance to accept the 
Neo-Hamiltonian view of international relations, that war 
was inevitable and military preparedness essential.3 Taft 
selected six other corporate lawyers for senior cabinet 
positions including: Philander C. Knox as secretary of 
state, Franklin MacVeagh as secretary of the treasury, and 
George Wickersham as attorney general. These appointments 
created a conservative administration, impressed by the 
achievement of American business and unsympathetic to 
further domestic reform.4 On March 4, 1909 Taft was 
inaugurated as president, and his new administration 
formally took power.
In the Philippines, concern about Japanese intentions 
continued among American officials, especially when 
Japanese espionage was again discovered on the islands. A 
soldier, on duty as a photographer with the engineers, was 
offered $25,000 by Japanese army officers for complete 
photographs of the defences on Corregidor. The soldier 
agreed, but then took fright and reported the matter to 
the authorities. A trap was set by the army, and two 
Japanese officers were caught accepting photographs from 
the soldier. The two Japanese officers were arrested, but,
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having diplomatic immunity, they were later released.5 In 
Washington Taft chose to ignore the incident, a decision 
that angered senior army officers and Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans. The incident also revealed the inability of 
the Japanese government, led by Taro Katsura, to control 
the Japanese army and its continued wish to create a 
Japanese empire in the Pacific.
Major General Leonard Wood, now commander of the 
Department of the East, was concerned at Taft's 
willingness to compromise with Japan. He spent the summer 
of 1909 in New York establishing himself as the leading 
spokesman for Neo-Hamiltonian ideas. In June he held 
meetings with Root, Bliss, and Wotherspoon, where he 
outlined his proposals for military preparedness and asked 
for their support. Wood argued that the development of a 
mass army, with a professional core, was essential to 
defend American interests abroad. In letters to army 
colleagues, he denounced the failure to make the chief of 
staff paramount in the army, and reaffirmed his belief in 
the importance of American colonial possessions.6 
Roosevelt announced his support for Wood's ideas, before 
he left for a prolonged hunting trip in Africa.7
In late June Wood led the fight to continue the 
labour exclusion laws affecting Japanese immigration and 
again criticised Taft for his willingness to compromise 
with Japan.8 Wood was utterly convinced his policies were
329
correct, and he personally attacked all those who hindered 
their implementation. He joined the criticism of Bliss, 
his deputy in Cuba and the Philippines, for his failure to 
end the periodic rebellions by Moro tribesmen in the 
Philippines. Wood disliked any action which encouraged 
anti-imperialist sentiment and he lectured Bliss for 
being, "unable to act decisively," and loving too much 
"academic discussion."9 To strengthen the General Staff, 
Wood suggested Bliss head the Army War College and that 
Wotherspoon be appointed assistant chief of staff to help 
Bell.10 The acceptance of both appointments by Taft 
strengthened Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in the War Department 
and underlined the influence Root, Lodge, and Wood, still 
wielded over promotions.
In mid-August Wood implemented joint manoeuvres with 
regular army troops and National Guard forces from 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington D.C. 
The plan was to defend Boston from attack. Over 15,000 
troops were involved with Bliss the main commander and 
Wood chief umpire. The exercise cost $500,000, and 
indicated Taft's willingness to support some Neo- 
Hamiltonian ideas.11
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1909, relations 
between Wood and Adjutant General Ainsworth remained 
cordial. Wood's own command headquarters was Governor's 
Island in New York, but frequent meetings brought him to
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Washington. Ainsworth often met Wood at the station, and 
Wood regularly stayed at Ainsworth's home. The Adjutant 
General suspected Wood would replace Bell as chief of 
staff, and sought to ingratiate himself, to a possible 
superior and rival.12 In early November Wood was appointed 
deputy chairman on the selection board for general staff 
officers, with Major General Bell presiding.13 The 
appointment increased the suspicion that Wood was to 
replace Bell.
On December 7 Taft, in an address to the nation, 
announced stringent fiscal measures to promote government 
economy. The announcement highlighted the views of a 
president and cabinet that believed in the efficiency of 
big business and distrusted big government. All federal 
departments were required to cut expenditure, the War 
Department from $210 million to $165 million.14 Neo- 
Hamiltonian Republicans were appalled at the proposed 
defence cuts. A week later, however, Taft silenced some of 
the criticism from Root and others when he announced Wood 
to be appointed chief of staff. The appointment was a 
major victory for supporters of military reform and 
imperialism.15
Ainsworth was one of the first people to congratulate 
Wood, and he took the opportunity of their first meeting 
in the War Department, to present his ideas on Army 
reorganisation. The Adjutant General, suggested great
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savings could be made in the army budget by placing the 
Inspector General's Office under his control. He reminded 
Wood of his abilities as an administrator, and his 
reputation for providing a better service at a lower 
cost.16 Roosevelt, Taft, and Root all originally impressed 
by the apparent organisational efficiency of big business, 
found many of Ainsworth's ideas attractive. His proposal 
to amalgamate the Adjutant General's Office and Inspector 
General's Office typically mirrored the latest ideas in 
business of amalgamating departments to cut costs. In late 
1909, however, Roosevelt no longer viewed big business 
organisation as an unqualified success, while Root 
concluded Ainsworth's organisational brilliance did not 
outweigh his misuse of power. Both men warned Wood to 
treat any ideas from Ainsworth with caution. Taft, and 
many in his cabinet, however, still held both business 
organisation and Ainsworth's ability to implement business 
measures in high esteem.
Wood refused to accept Ainsworth's ideas, and after 
gaining support from Root and attorney general Wickersham, 
he announced his determination to oppose the planned cuts 
in the defence budget. Senator Root pressed Wood to accept 
Carter as his deputy, but Wood was reluctant to accept 
Carter and indicated his preference for Bliss.17 Carter 
supported the concept of a professional army, but rejected 
the reliance on militia forces, which Wood's proposal for
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military preparedness required.18 In a letter to his
British friend, John St.Loe Strachey, Wood reaffirmed his
belief in volunteer forces:
I want to congratulate you on your new book: "A New 
Way of Life." I have read it with the greatest 
amount of interest .... We, like yourselves, are 
much dependent on volunteers, and anything which 
serves to arouse the interest of the people in the 
necessity for a reasonable amount of preparedness 
for trouble is doing work in the right direction.
I am anxious to see your Territorial Forces and 
hope I shall have time to drop in at some time at
some of your manoeuvres ....19 
Despite Wood's preference for Bliss, Taft announced in 
late December that Carter was promoted to major general 
and assistant chief of staff. Wotherspoon was appointed 
head of the Army War College. Bliss, furious at being 
passed over, was sent to command the Department of 
California.20 Wood was disappointed by these decisions but 
was soon occupied with mobilising opposition to Taft's 
defence cuts. On New Year's Eve Wood dined with Root and 
Admiral Mahan and all three agreed to oppose Taft's 
policies of defence cuts and appeasement towards Japan. A 
strong American military presence must be maintained in 
the Pacific to deter Japan. They remained certain of 
future military conflict and that military preparedness 
was essential.21
In early January, Bell the chief of staff, was 
hospitalised due to complications caused by his 
diabetes.22 Although not due to take office until April,
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Wood became acting chief of staff. In his new office he
continued to warn colleagues of the danger posed by Japan,
criticised Taft's determination to improve relations with
Japan, and claimed the Japanese had sponsored an anti-
American movement in the Philippines. He pressed the
President to give greater priority to the Panama Canal,
which he claimed would provide America with flexibility in
deploying its naval forces. In a typically forthright
interview with George Eriswold Hill, he summed up his
distrust of international agreements:
.... Until international law and justice have 
advanced far beyond their present state of progress, 
a purely neutral [Panama] canal, in the sense of an 
unfortified waterway, must remain a utopian dream.
The body of international law on which even the 
leading powers of the world are agreed is extremely 
limited and as for a means of enforcing it, it does 
not exist. When two nations have exhausted the 
resources of diplomacy ... treaty obligations are as 
ropes of sand and there has never been a time when 
non-belligerents, unless impelled by self-interest, 
have been willing to interfere to enforce the 
provisions of even the most important international 
conventions. . ..
He reminded his readers that, without the Canal,
13,000 miles separated the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of 
the United States. The General outlined the dangers to 
American defence posed by modern technology. Advances in 
shipbuilding techniques, steam power, and electrical 
equipment had ended American immunity to foreign invasion. 
Wood warned of the dangers of surprise attack, noting the 
Japanese assault on Port Arthur, which had destroyed the
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Russian Pacific Fleet in one shock attack. A small 
professional army provided no defence against these 
threats. Only his policy of military preparedness, which 
created a European-style citizen army, provided adequate 
security.23
A few days after this extensive interview, the new 
Chief of Staff, again emphasised his opposition to Taft's 
policies: ". .. . Japan is going ahead in a perfectly 
methodical way to dominate the Far East and as much of the 
Pacific and its trade as we and the rest of the world will 
permit. When she has a good excuse she will absorb the 
Philippines . ,.."24 The President, who placed great faith 
in the rule of law and international cooperation, rejected 
Wood's views. Wood had no more success in his attempt to 
convince Taft not to appoint Carter as his deputy. Senator 
Root and Secretary of War Dickinson were both friendly 
towards Carter and convinced Taft to ignore Wood's 
request.25 Regarded as an author with powerful political 
friends, Carter remained an unpopular figure within the 
army earning the nickname, "fire side willie."
On April 21, 1910 Bell officially retired as chief of 
staff. He had tried his best to implement Root's army 
reforms, but was undermined by Ainsworth and an 
unsympathetic Taft, who remembered Bell's opposition to 
his reform program in the Philippines. Isolated and in 
ill-health, he was delighted to leave Washington D.C. and
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its scheming War Department for a new posting as army 
commander in the Philippines.26 The new Chief of Staff 
left Washington almost immediately for a tour of Latin 
America. Taft appointed Wood and Bliss as presidential 
envoys and instructed them to encourage closer U.S.-Latin 
American relations. At the end of this six-week tour, Wood 
went to London and spent a week discussing Japanese and 
German expansion in the Pacific and Latin America with his 
British colleagues: Lord Cromer, J. St.Loe Strachey,
Arthur Lee, and others.27
While Wood was abroad the philosophy of Taylorism was 
popularised in America. Championed by Frederick W. Taylor, 
who claimed scientific management would increase business 
efficiency, it was popular among people who believed 
business organisation could provide government with the 
example of how to achieve maximum efficiency. Taft's 
administration, dominated by corporate lawyers, responded 
favourably to "Taylorism" and considered implementing its 
ideas in government departments. The new ideas promised to 
save money and challenged those who rejected business 
organisation as inefficient. Taft considered creating an 
efficiency commission to review federal government 
departments.
After an absence of almost two months, Wood returned 
to Washington. He remained opposed to Taft's attempt to 
gain greater government efficiency, which he feared might
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lead to even greater defence cuts. The policies of the 
President were temporarily forgotten, however, when he 
discovered Carter had authorised staff appointments during 
his absence. He informed Carter bluntly that he had not 
wished him to be his deputy, and that he, not Carter, was 
chief of staff. The two men continued to work together but 
Carter, once the leading army reformer, discovered that 
his opposition to any reliance on volunteer forces set him 
against Wood's policy of "military preparedness."28 
Throughout August, Wood, Carter, and Captains Hagood and 
Hanna worked on a new general staff structure.29 They 
presented it to the President in early September, he 
approved it within a few days. The reform eliminated 
general staff sections. Four new organisational divisions 
were created: a Mobile Army Division in charge of rapid 
mobilisation, a Coastal Artillery Division, a Division of 
Militia Affairs responsible for joint reserve-regular army 
actions, and the War College Division responsible for 
strategic planning.3 0
Wood and his colleagues also sought to improve the 
militia system. The Swiss militia system attracted the 
most attention, since Switzerland was a republic with a 
locally organised militia and small professional army 
capable of mobilising 240,000 trained volunteers in less 
than twenty-four hours.31 Wood ordered several reports to 
be commissioned on the Swiss system and its relevance to
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America.32 By late autumn of 1910, these measures had 
become the foundations of Wood's new military system.
The policy of reconciliation with Japan continued to 
be unpopular in the army. Wood, Root, and other senior 
figures remained convinced American economic growth 
depended upon controlling Far Eastern trade. Taft's faith 
in international agreement was ridiculed by Wood, and he 
ordered all military attaches in Latin America and the 
Pacific to report on any Japanese economic or military 
activity.3-3 The President, worried over internal party 
division, was aware of Wood's opposition to his foreign 
and defence policies.
Internal Republican party division between 
progressives and conservatives increased with Roosevelt's 
return from Africa. In May the former President told his 
friend Lodge that his support for Taft had been a 
mistake.34 A few weeks later he delivered his own policy 
speech at Ossawatomie, Kansas. The "Square Deal," speech 
did not criticise Taft by name, but it challenged the 
President to support a graduated income tax, government 
control over big business, stronger labour protection 
laws, and a larger defence budget. The promise of more 
defence expenditure did not impress Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans, because they feared Roosevelt was splitting 
the party. The mid-term congressional results confirmed 
their apprehension. On November 8, 1908 the Democrats had
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gained control of Congress for the first time since 1894. 
The Republican Party theoretically still held a 
comfortable majority in both houses, but Progressive 
Republicans, disillusioned by Taft's policies, voted with 
the Democrats to give them a majority. In the House James 
Hay, Democrat, became chairman of the Military Affairs 
Committee. A staunch supporter of Jeffersonian and 
Jacksonian principles, Hay distrusted strong centralised 
government, opposed Root's army reforms, supported locally 
controlled volunteer forces, and was a close friend of 
General Ainsworth.35 This appointment did not endear 
Roosevelt to Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who blamed the 
former president for the division within their party.
Wood was annoyed by the election results and by 
Taft's decision to create a War Department Board on 
Business Methods. Ainsworth had convinced the President to 
create this board as the military review body for the new 
Efficiency Commission on Government Performance. The 
Adjutant General was appointed chairman. Wood, like his 
predecessors, found his authority undercut by Taft's faith 
in Ainsworth.36 The Chief of Staff's difficulties 
increased with a revolution in Mexico. The dictator 
Porfirio Diaz was challenged by the liberal reformer 
Francisco I. Madero. In Washington, Taft worried over the 
threat to 40,000 U.S. citizens and over $100,000,000 of 
investment in Mexico.37 The President feared Diaz's fall
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might cause political chaos. Wood was ordered to prepare 
contingency plans for military action.38
Relations between the President and the Chief of 
Staff remained difficult, despite their close working 
relationship on the Mexican crisis. In Congress, Democrats 
had passed the McLachlan Resolution, instructing the 
secretary of war to report to Congress on national 
defence. Democrats hoped to use the opportunity to 
discredit ideas of military preparedness and demand 
defence cuts. Ainsworth, advising important congressmen, 
hoped to reduce general staff authority over staff 
bureaus. Dickinson allied with Wood, allowed the chief of 
staff to appear before Congress. In an effective speech, 
Wood claimed the army suffered from badly organised supply 
departments, insufficient artillery, ineffective reserve 
forces and too few personnel for current defence needs.39 
The speech annoyed Taft, since he had not authorised it 
and because it discredited Taft's attempt to reduce 
military expenditure. To avoid causing a scandal, which 
would add to internal party division, Taft decided to 
discipline neither Wood nor Dickinson.
In January 1911 the War Department introduced Wood's 
plan to achieve military preparedness by increasing the 
efficiency of the militia. Wood advocated a new two-year 
enlistment period in the army to replace the current five- 
year term. Under the new scheme, after two years service
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men would be liable for call-up for the next eight years. 
The Chief of Staff hoped this would provide a large 
trained reserve. The bill re-asserted the right of the 
President to use the National Guard abroad.40 A separate 
measure, introduced days later, suggested commissioning 
500 new regular army officers to allow the professional 
army to expand rapidly in time of war.41 Both measures 
were opposed by Democrats and Progressive Republicans. In 
the War Department Wood discovered Ainsworth had passed 
information on to opponents of the new measures, and a 
serious row errupted over the powers of the adjutant 
general.42 Thereafter the two men were bitter enemies. 
Ainsworth continued to provide information to opponents of 
military reform, especially to his friend, House Military 
Affairs Chairman Hay.43
The Mexican crisis distracted Wood from his attempt 
to pass new army legislation. A border incursion from 
Mexico left two U.S. citizens dead and eleven injured in 
Douglas, Arizona. The President was reluctant to act, 
preferring to trust international agreement rather than 
any hasty use of force.44 The demands for action from 
worried businessmen, Roosevelt, and from the army 
increased. In early March public pressure forced Taft to 
order an army mobilisation in Texas, with Major General 
Carter in command. The plan was to rapidly deploy 2 0,000 
troops on the border.45 The troops were not to enter
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Mexico. The mobilisation was a failure. By the end of 
March, the U.S. force numbered less than 20,000 and was 
critically short of supplies. The struggle to assemble
20,000 troops in America gave credance to Wood's comments 
on the continued inadequacies of the army.
The political fight to achieve army reform took on a 
new urgency in the wake of the Mexican trouble. In 
Washington, Wood was frustrated at opposition to his 
reforms and openly described his opponents as "stupid 
fools."46 In the Senate, Root and Lodge announced their 
support for Wood's plans although it did not weaken Taft's 
continued refusal to support Wood. The Chief of Staff's 
reforms, like those of Root, required strong support from 
the executive if they were to succeed. Wood and Taft 
continued to disagree on the benefits of international law 
and better relations with Japan with the Chief of Staff 
persisting in encouraging the army to ignore Taft's 
policies. He ordered Bell, commander in the Philippines, 
to plan U.S. defensive strategies in response to a 
Japanese attack. Bell happily complied. He disliked Taft, 
and, like most senior officers, he scorned any willingness 
to trust in international agreements.47 Aware of 
increasing party division, his declining stature in the 
army, and increasing opposition in Congress the President 
decided to replace Secretary of War Dickinson. He offered 
Henry Lewis Stimson the post. Stimson was regarded as a
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Progressive Republican and one of Roosevelt's closest 
friends, so Taft hoped that this appointment might reunite 
an increasingly divided Republican Party.48
Henry Lewis Stimson was born in New York on September 
21, 1867. A graduate of Yale and Harvard Law School, he 
was admitted to the New York Bar in 1891. In 1893 he 
became a member of Root's law firm in New York where he 
soon became a close friend of Root and full partner in the 
firm in 1897. Over the next few years, Stimson became 
friendly with Roosevelt, Wickersham, Gifford Pinchot and 
other leading Republicans. Between 1906 and 1909 he served 
as U.S. Southern District Attorney for New York.49 
Roosevelt and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were delighted 
by Stimson's appointment as secretary of war. On May 12, 
1911 Dickinson retired as secretary of war and Stimson 
formally took charge. The new Secretary, like most of his 
predecessors, was ignorant of army matters and War 
Department personalities. In a series of meetings, 
dinners, and a week-long fishing trip, Wood, Root, and 
Roosevelt sought to educate Stimson. Their plans for 
military preparedness and the likely opposition in the War 
Department and in Congress were discussed with the new 
Secretary.50 On his return from his fishing trip, Stimson 
immediately faced various demands from opponents of army 
reform.
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In Congress, Hay introduced a bill inspired by 
Ainsworth. The bill revived Ainsworth's suggestion to 
consolidate the Adjutant General's Office and Inspector 
General's Office, proposed to cut the number of General 
Staff officers, and suggested promoting all members of the 
Adjutant General's Office one grade upon retirement.51 The 
last measure ensured Ainsworth would retire as a 
Lieutenant General. Wood opposed all the measures 
suggested. He approached the President and demanded that 
he denounce the bill and reassign Ainsworth to a 
departmental command. Although Taft agreed to consider 
these matters, he decided to leave Ainsworth as adjutant 
general and ignore the implications of the Hay Bill.52 
Ainsworth submitted his views to Stimson, reminding the 
new Secretary that the Record and Pension Office was 
exempt from General Staff control under the original act 
of Feb. 14, 1903. He claimed that Taft, as secretary of 
war, had supported this interpretation of the Act when he 
wrote: "The Chief of Staff is charged ... by law with the 
duty of supervising, under the direction of the Secretary 
of War, all troops of the line and various staff bureaus." 
On the basis of these claims, Ainsworth asserted Wood had 
no legitimate control over his office.53 Stimson rejected 
these assertions. He indicated to Ainsworth his support 
both for the authority of the General Staff over all staff 
bureaus, and for Wood's policy of military preparedness.
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Throughout the autumn of 1911 the War Department
suffered continual bickering among leading officers. Wood,
Carter, and Ainsworth all sought to influence War
Department policy in different ways.54 Wood and Carter
challenged Ainsworth's right to reassign officers to new
posts. The issue caused such acrimony between the Adjutant
General and the Chief of Staff that communication between
the two men could only be conducted through notes passed
by third parties.55 The President tried to avoid becoming
embroiled in these arguments among senior Army officers,
but his decision not to support Wood only encouraged
further adverse comment upon his leadership, abilities and
policies. Colonel John G. Harbord summarised this anti-
Taft feeling in the Army when he wrote:
.... I have heard no good words out here for the 
President's peace-at-any-price policy .... If Mr.
Taft and Carnegie succeed in abolishing war, my 
father-in-law says he supposes all the army we 
need will be Archie Butt [the President's Military 
Aide] and an attending surgeon or two. Bishop 
Brent in his sermon this morning referred to the 
President as an Idealist whose dreams might many of 
them not come true in our day, but might become the 
platforms of practical politicians in another day.
You can never expect any initiative from Congress 
unless pushed from behind. To tell the honest 
American voter that he is worthless as a soldier 
without training does not win him votes like letting 
him know that the citizen soldier of America can win 
over the brutal hirelings of any other land with or 
without training.. . .
Harbord continued, suggesting Wood establish an army
league to promote public interest in military
preparedness.56 The Chief of Staff required no prompting
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on this issue. In Great Britain he had discussed such a 
planned organisation with his British friends.
Senator Root did all he could to get Wood and 
Stimson to become firm friends. The new Secretary of War 
proved eager to learn. He agreed that international 
conflict was inevitable and that Wood's proposal to ensure 
military preparedness was the best guarantee for future 
security. Stimson supported American expansion overseas, 
believing colonial possessions were vital for American 
business and defence. In October he rejected a proposal 
for Puerto Rican statehood and suggested that American 
colonies should aspire to British-style Dominion status 
with the United States.57
Taft's attempt to placate Roosevelt by appointing 
Stimson secretary of war failed. On December 23, 1911 
Roosevelt wrote to William B. Howland announcing his 
intention to challenge Taft for the Republican 
presidential nomination. In late February 1912 Roosevelt 
publicly declared his intention to recapture the White 
House.58 Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were dismayed by 
Roosevelt's action. Root, Wood, Stimson, and others were 
sure he would split the party and thus allow a Democratic 
victory.59 Such a victory would endanger Root's military 
reforms and prevent the implementation of Wood's plans for 
military preparedness. They regarded Roosevelt as 
unelectable and rejected much of his domestic platform as 
too radical. Supporters of Taft and military reform,
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continued to believe in the efficiency of big business and 
free market capitalism. Roosevelt's policies threatened 
judicial freedom, private property, military reform, and 
business interests.60 Stimson, the most progressive member 
of Taft's cabinet, rejected Roosevelt's "progressive 
policies" outright and endorsed Taft. In a letter to Otto 
T. Banard he summarised the faith many Republicans still 
had in business organisation as an example of efficiency:
.... We have reached the stage of big business, but 
not of monopoly, but that which exists for the 
economic purpose of saving the wastes of production 
and lowering its costs have come to stay and should 
not be interfered with. Possibly sometime in the dim 
future we may in some industries as we have already 
in railroads, reach the stage of regulated monopoly, 
but we have not done so yet and it is not a practical 
question.
He further claimed that market competition was an 
effective regulator which guaranteed efficiency and 
confidently concluded: "under normal conditions our big 
corporations will be regulated and controlled as to their 
prices by potential competition. "61
Unlike Roosevelt, Taft's cabinet refused to accept 
that business organisation was inefficient and required 
government regulation. The former President was 
increasingly regarded as a dangerous interloper with a 
shallow commitment to true Republican Progressivism.62 
Roosevelt's plans placed Root, Lodge, Stimson, and Wood in 
an awkward position. They did not wish to speak against 
him, yet his actions threatened the Republican Party,
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military reform, and big business. None of these leading 
Neo-Hamiltonians believed Roosevelt could be elected; his 
actions only seemed to guarantee a Democratic victory in 
November.63
Throughout the spring, Wood continued to promote his 
military reforms. The Chief of Staff confronted growing 
opposition in Congress, both to further army reform and to 
measures already enacted. Congressional Democrats, 
encouraged by a divided Republican Party, introduced their 
own bill to challenge Wood's ideas for military 
preparedness. The legislation recommended longer army 
enlistments, the disbandment of the Militia Division 
responsible for army-militia cooperation, the end of line 
officer appointments in the General Staff, the return of 
coastal artillery to local regiments, and Adjutant General 
Ainsworth's right to control the Inspector General's 
Office.64 These proposals reflected the continued appeal 
of local control, volunteerism, and international 
isolation to many Americans. The fear remained that a 
centralised professional army, and colonial expansion, 
threatened the American republic.
In Congress, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans attacked the 
changes proposed by Democratic legislation, but many of 
Roosevelt's progressive supporters endorsed the attempt to 
weaken American military power. Taft joined those opposing 
the bill. Wood and Stimson confronted further difficulties
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when Major General Carter testified before Congress. 
Wood's deputy defended the General Staff, attacked Wood's 
planned national reserve, and supported the creation of a 
large professional army. A staunch advocate of military 
professionalism, he refused to accept that a large 
volunteer reserve could be reliable in battle.65
Wood and Stimson challenged these assertions. The 
Chief of Staff cited the views of economist Brooks Adams 
to highlight the link between conflict and trade. An 
efficient military was essential to guarantee overseas 
trade and ensure American prosperity. Wood released a 
general staff report on the deficiencies that remained in 
the army and the ease with which America could be invaded. 
He argued that the United States confronted industrial 
competitors with large citizen armies and that American 
security depended upon military preparedness.66 In April 
1912 Wood, supported by Root and Stimson, decided to 
establish an Army League to publicise the reasons for 
military preparedness. The League quickly denounced the 
Democrats and Taft for pursuing policies of "retrenchment 
and economy," which threatened national security and 
prosperity.67
Events abroad provoked alarm from Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans as they considered the Democratic Army Bill. 
Political instability in many places seemed to threaten 
American trade and investment. In Mexico virtual civil war
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continued to threaten American citizens and investment.
The Panama Canal was nearing completion and would require 
a military garrison to defend it. American forces occupied 
Tien tsin in China, as revolution inspired by provincial 
army units threatened American nationals, property, and 
trade. Japan continued to expand its military forces and 
to extend territorial control over Manchuria, Korea, and 
Formosa. Many in the army believed the Philippines 
remained in danger and that American trade in the Pacific 
was under threat from Japan. Nicaragua, Honduras, and the 
Dominican Republic all required American troops and custom 
officials to maintain economic and political stability. In 
Europe, the naval arms race between Germany and Britain 
intensified after the British launched the first modern 
battleship, H.M.S. Dreadnought in 1906. For Neo- 
Hamiltonians the international scene in the spring of 1912 
provided proof of political instability abroad, 
accompanying threats to American investment and exports, 
and thus the necessity for American military preparedness.
In Washington the army remained under pressure from 
Taft to produce defence cuts. Stimson and Wood 
commissioned a report on closing posts as a way to cut 
costs, organise larger army units, and reassign their 
limited forces to more strategically important areas. Many 
of the fifty-two military instillations in America had 
been built in response to the Indian Wars and were no
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longer required in the twentieth century. The report 
recommended closing eighteen forts and provoked outrage in 
Congress from representatives of the states affected. The 
majority of the closures were in Texas, Wyoming, Michigan, 
and New York.68 Congress rejected the post closure plan, 
and relations between supporters of military reform and 
Congress reached a low-point. This failure to close posts 
encouraged Stimson to introduce the ideas of Taylorism and 
scientific management into the army to reduce costs. The 
introduction of Taylor's ideas emphasised the continued 
confidence many Republicans had in business organisation 
to achieve efficiency. Stimson, like Root, believed army 
and business organisations were similar in structure and 
problems faced. The introduction of Taylorism did produce 
considerable savings but was dropped after strikes 
occurred at army arsenals in protest against the 
rigourously enforced time allotment for each task.69
The failure of plans to reduce expenditure 
discouraged the already reluctant Stimson and Wood from 
pursuing Taft's defence cuts. In the early spring, 
however, the General Staff recommended abolishing the 
muster rolls held by the Adjutant General's Office. The 
muster rolls, which listed individual members of a unit, 
could be replaced by a descriptive list which would save 
money. Wood wrote to Ainsworth for his opinion. After 
three weeks Wood still had received no reply from the
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Adjutant General. The Chief of Staff sent a further querie 
to Ainsworth, asking for his comments on the suggestion by 
the General Staff. Four days later the Adjutant General 
sent a reply. He accused Wood of arrogance, questioned the 
objectivity of the proposal, and criticised the Secretary 
of War for bias against his office.70 A further inquiry 
from Wood demanding an opinion elicited a sarcastic reply 
to Stimson:
.... Life is too short to permit of wasting any 
portion of it in discussion with, or for the 
benefit of, any one whose conception of the 
underlying principles of military administration is 
so hazy that he can advocate such a proposition 
seriously.... A proposition of this kind would be 
remarkable if advanced by a state militiaman and it 
is simply amazing when put forward by an officer in 
the regular army, even though his connection with the 
military side of that establishment be so remote as
to be merely nominal . ...71
On February 10, Wood met Judge Advocate General 
Crowder, War College President Crozier, and his assistant 
Carter. These senior officers unanimously recommended 
disciplinary action against Ainsworth for 
insubordination.72 Five days later Stimson relieved the 
Adjutant General of his command. The following day, faced 
with a possible court martial and public disgrace, 
Ainsworth announced his retirement.73 Colonel Hall, the 
deputy adjutant general, replaced Ainsworth. James Hay and 
other prominent Democrats were indignant that their friend 
had been forced to retire. The attempt to close army 
posts, continued assertion of presidential authority over
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the National Guard, and the Ainsworth affair created a new 
determination in Congress to remove the Chief of Staff and 
rescind the General Staff Act of 1903.
Wood and his Neo-Hamiltonian supporters needed 
allies. President Taft, confronted by a strong 
presidential challenge by Roosevelt, also needed support. 
The result was a new alliance between conservative Taft 
Republicans and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The 
President, previously reluctant to support American 
intervention overseas, began to solicit Neo-Hamiltonian 
support. In early June the President authorised the use of 
American Marines in Cuba to maintain the pro-American 
administration. A few weeks later Marines landed at 
Managua, capital of Nicaragua, to help the pro-American 
president remain in power. In August Taft signed the 
Panama Canal Act and indicated his willingness to consider 
fortifying the canal, as Wood, Root, and others wished.
In Congress the Democrats, advised by Ainsworth, 
introduced an amended Army Bill. The Bill proposed a forty 
percent cut in the number of General Staff officers, 
disbanded five regiments of cavalry, limited the role of 
the secretary of war on post closures, and narrowed the 
choice of chief of staff open to the president in an 
attempt to exclude Wood.74 These measures, supported by 
progressive Republicans and Democrats, easily gained a 
majority in the House of Representatives. In the Senate,
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Root and Lodge worried that Taft might not veto the bill. 
Both senators worked with Stimson to prevent its passage. 
In the Senate Francis E. Warren of Wyoming, Chairman of 
the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, led the 
fight to pass the bill.75 Wood and Stimson had recommended 
Wyoming lose four posts in their report on post closure.
On June 11 the bill passed the Senate by one vote.76
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans remained unsure whether 
Taft, a man who opposed military preparedness, would veto 
the bill.77 The President, however, required support at 
the forthcoming Republican National Convention. Roosevelt 
had compiled impressive victories in many Republican 
primaries including the important states of Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Taft's home state of Ohio. The President 
had won only Massachusetts, where the party organisation 
was controlled by Senator Lodge. At the convention 
Roosevelt needed only eighty more votes to defeat Taft.78 
To win the nomination, the President required the support 
of Lodge, Stimson, Root, and other Neo-Hamiltonian 
Republicans. On June 18 Taft vetoed the Army Bill. The 
presidential veto included the annual army budget and, in 
a rare display of support for the army, Taft defied 
Congress to leave the army unfunded.79 That same day the 
Republican National Convention began in Chicago.
The Republican convention lasted four days. Root was 
appointed chairman of the convention, and Neo-Hamiltonian
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support gave Taft majorities on the Republican National 
Committee, the platform committee, and the credentials 
committee. These committees and Root's chairmanship 
ensured Taft controlled who spoke to the convention, what 
policies were adopted, and which Roosevelt delegates were 
accredited to replace Taft delegates. Roosevelt and his 
supporters found the convention determined to nominate 
Taft, who secured the nomination with 561 votes to 107 for 
Roosevelt. Over 300 delegates refused to vote in protest 
at Taft's managing the convention.80 Roosevelt was furious 
and never forgave Taft, Root, and Lodge for denying him 
the Republican nomination. Root, once a close friend, was 
singled out for particular vilification by Roosevelt and 
his supporters.81 In a letter to his uncle, Stimson 
stressed his disappointment at Roosevelt's actions and 
underlined how meaningless the term "Progressive" had 
become:
.... I am much disheartened over the performance in 
Chicago. But I place the original responsibility for 
it upon Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers. You remember 
I prophesied at Chicago that his entrance into the 
contest would disrupt the real progressive party and 
probably throw the election into the hands of the 
reactionary Democratic Party. Events have moved 
exactly along these lines. His efforts have thrown 
Taft who is not a reactionary, apparently into the 
hands of the reactionaries ... at the same time, 
defeating himself T.R. and crippling his efforts 
toward good. He is the last man in America to lead a 
progressive party as a candidate for president, 
because he inevitably brings with in with his
personality the third term issue ,...82 
Roosevelt ignored pleas not to further split the
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Republican Party and in August at an alternative 
convention, the Bull Moose Party nominated Roosevelt and 
Hiram Johnson as its candidates. The split in Republican 
ranks was complete. Confident of victory in November, the 
Democrats nominated Woodrow Wilson the governor of New 
Jersey and Thomas R. Marshall from Indiana as their 
presidential ticket.
In Washington Stimson attended a conference with 
leading Democrats to design a new army bill. The 
conference reported its findings to Taft in August. 
Democrats agreed to remove the provisions from the bill 
which disqualified Wood from office and prevented the 
secretary of war from recommending post closures. A new 
suggestion to amalgamate the three supply bureaus into one 
department was accepted.83 Wood and Stimson reluctantly 
accepted a cut of one third in General Staff officers and 
abandoned Wood's planned shorter enlistment periods. 
Ainsworth advised Democratic congressmen to denounce 
Wood's plans for national preparedness during the 
compromise debate, and many did.84 At the end of August, 
the compromise bill was presented to Taft, who quickly 
signed it into law.
The debate on army reform again emphasised the 
influence and respect which business organisation still 
commanded among army reformers. Throughout the spring and 
summer of 1912, Wood and Stimson held a series of
356
conferences on the future organisation of the American 
army.85 A feature of these meetings were large tables, 
which compared the organisational structure of two 
principal railroads, the Pennsylvania and New York 
Central, with the command system operating in the American 
army. Extensive use was made of these diagrams during 
discussions on how to achieve coordination among staff 
bureaus; army-National Guard cooperation; and supervision 
of strategic planning in the field.86 The use of these 
diagrams demonstrated that the business analogies used 
during debates on military reform amounted to more than 
rhetoric designed to impress Congress or the newspapers.
Wood continued to persevere with his policy of 
national preparedness. In early September he sent copies 
of the War Department's conclusions on how to achieve 
efficiency to Taft, Mahan, Choate, Root, and other 
prominent public figures.87 Increasingly, however, the 
upcoming presidential election distracted attention from 
Wood's proposals.88 Stimson advised the Chief of Staff to 
concentrate his attentions on preserving the General Staff 
and army educational reforms already in place. The 
Secretary of War, warned Wood that Taft's administration 
would not tolerate another Ainsworth controversy before 
the election. In September, despite opposition from Wood, 
Ainsworth's friend James Buchanan Aleshire was appointed 
head of the new consolidated Supply Department. Stimson
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advised Wood to cultivate good relations with this new 
bureau chief.89 The approaching election deeply depressed 
Root, Stimson, and other Republicans as most senior 
Republicans were reluctant to speak for a divided party 
apparently bound for defeat. Root, who hated speech- 
making, confided to a friend that he pleaded illness to 
avoid Taft's requests.90 Taft was bitterly disappointed 
and angry at the lack of support from Root, Wickersham, 
Knox, Stimson, and many other senior party members.
Wood continued to worry about American military 
failings. The international situation seemed highly 
unstable. Japan was exploiting the Chinese civil war to 
improve its Pacific trade and to gain more territorial 
concessions in China. In Mexico political instability 
continued to threaten American lives and investment.
German arms sales and exports to Argentina and Brazil 
challenged the American determination to uphold the Monroe 
Doctrine.91 The Chief of Staff was concerned by the threat 
these problems presented to the American attempt to 
achieve economic supremacy in the Pacific and Latin 
America. Wood kept Roosevelt fully informed, as the former 
president seemed more likely to be elected than Taft.92 On 
November 5, 1912 the election result was announced: The 
electoral vote gave Wilson 435 votes, Roosevelt eighty- 
eight votes and Taft eight votes. Roosevelt and Taft split 
the Republican popular vote. Wilson received over
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6,000,000 votes, against over 4,000,000 for Roosevelt, and
nearly 3,500,000 for Taft. In Congress the Democrats
achieved a fifty-one to forty-four majority in the Senate
and a 291-127 majority in the House.
Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans responded quickly to the
defeat. They were determined both to protect Root's
General Staff Act and to ensure that Wood's ideas on
national preparedness received consideration from the new
administration. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, just six days
after the election, Wood again outlined his ideas:
.... Every man of ordinary common sense knows that 
wars, however much we strive to avoid them, will 
come and only those who have failed to gather 
anything of wisdom from the past can object to 
reasonable preparation for the future. If we wish 
to avoid war against this country, it will be 
necessary to be reasonably prepared to meet them.
A simple declaration that wars are not coming, and 
a failure to make reasonable preparation for 
possible difficulty, is distinctly an ostrich 
policy, and those who preach it are responsible for 
disaster and bloodshed than any other class of men 
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In the War Department Stimson attempted to rush 
through several administrative reforms before the new 
administration took office in March 1913. Suggestions made 
by the Cleveland Commission on Economy and Efficiency were 
rapidly implemented. The new measures reduced army paper 
work by one third and produced annual savings of 
$300,000.94 Stimson also sought to convince Wilson, the 
incoming president, of the value of army reforms already 
in place. He used his friend, New Jersey lawyer William
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Osborn, to present his views to Wilson. Osborn was a 
friend of Wilson's, and the President-elect listened to 
his advice on matters of defence policy.95
Wilson appointed Lindley Miller Garrison secretary of 
war. Garrison, a native of New Jersey, was a lawyer and 
former vice-chancellor of New Jersey and would serve as 
secretary of war from March 7, 1913 until February 10, 
1916.96 In the weeks before he took office, Wood and 
Stimson sought to influence Garrison.97 The new Secretary 
became increasingly sympathetic to Neo-Hamilitonian ideas 
and ultimately left office convinced that Wilson's 
opposition to military preparedness was wrong.
In February 1913, violence in Mexico required the 
mobilisation of American troops and in the process 
vindicated the Stimson-Wood reforms which consolidated 
army command. In one short telegram, Stimson mobilized
20,000 fully equipped soldiers, who were quickly deployed 
along the Texas-Mexico border. Garrison observed the 
success of this operation and realised that the 
mobilisation had succeeded because of forward planning by 
the War College and the organisational skills of the 
General Staff. The new Secretary was suitably impressed.98 
Garrison agreed to continue Wood-Stimson policies of 
closing small western outposts, defending army reform, and 
consolidating scattered army units through creating 
brigade and divisional commands.99 Stimson was delighted
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with Garrison's promised support for the army. Wilson 
provided further good news to supporters of military 
reform when he announced that Wood would serve out his 
term as chief of staff. This decision allowed Wood to 
remain chief of staff until April 20, 1914. The continued 
influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas on defence policy was 
assured.
The struggle to preserve the professional army led by 
a general staff and presidential control over the National 
Guard continued for many years. The passage of National 
Defence Acts in 1916 and 1920 rekindled debate on the army 
best suited to the American republic. The experiences of 
World War One convinced all but a small minority in 
Congress to accept Neo-Hamiltonian ideas. The ideas of 
Root, Stimson, Wood, and others radically altered American 
defence and foreign policy. These men, confronted by the 
depression of the 1890s, large European colonial Empires, 
and expanding industrial capacity, were convinced American 
freedom and security depended upon economic expansion 
abroad. To encourage American exports, the acquisition of 
colonies and a strong military were essential. War with 
Spain provided the opportunity to extend American 
influence in the Caribbean and Pacific.
An agrarian, demilitarized state was transformed into 
an interventionist world power. American relations with 
Japan and Germany increasingly deteriorated. A new
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informal Anglo-American alliance, based on free trade and 
a belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, emerged. Neo- 
Hamiltonian policies ensured all future American 
governments faced large overseas commitments. This Neo- 
Hamiltonian victory over the ideals of Jefferson and 
Jackson had fundamentally altered American foreign and 
defence policy for the rest of the century.
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Chief S ignals 
O fficer
Com m anding 
G eneral of the Army
The President 
Com m ander in Chief
The Various Arm y 
Com mands
Derived from  Otto, L. Nelson National Security and the General Staff W ashington, In fan try  jo u rn a l Press: 1946, p. 21
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APPENDIX TWO






































SOME SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY THE FIRST 
GENERAL STAFF.
Purchase of land for new forts.
Prevention of cruelty to animals in time of war.
Revision of infantry drill regulations.
Supply of travel rations for the militia.
Detail of student officers at the General service and 
Staff College.
Pensions for Macabebe Scouts.
Water system for Fort McKinley, Manila.
Compostion and pay of army bands.
Preparation of various maps.
Inspection of seacoast defences.
Reorganisation of field batteries.
Militia organisation in Alaksa and Puerto Rico.
Appointment of a board to consider fire control and 
searchlights.
Instruction of Cuban artillery corps.
Railroad through the Vancouver military reservation.
Information compiled from the Annual Report of the 
Secretary of War June 30, 1903 H.Doc. 58th Cong., 2nd 
sess. Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1903), p.69.
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APPENDIX FOUR
COMMANDING GENERALS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF 




Grant U.S.,' Gen. . March 9, 1864 March 4, 1869
Sherman W.T., Gen. . March 8, 1869 Nov. 1, 1883
Sheridan, W.T., Gen. . Nov. 1, 1883 Aug. 5, 1888
Schofield, J., Lieu. Gen. . Aug. 14, 1888 Sept. 29, 1895
Miles, N.A., Lieu. Gen . . Oct. 5, 1895 Aug. 5, 1903
Chiefs of Staff
Young, S.B.M., Lieu. Gen. Aug. 15, 1903 Jan. 8, 1904
Chafee, A .R., Lieu. Gen. Jan. 9, 1904 Jan. 14, 1906
Bates, J.C., Maj . Gen. Jan. 15, 1906 April 13, 1906
Bell, J.F., Maj . Gen. April 14, 1906 April 21, 1910
Wood, L, Maj . Gen. April 22 , 1910 April 20, 1914
Wotherspoon, W. , Maj . Gen. April 21, 1914 Nov. 15, 1914
Scott, H.L., Maj . Gen. Nov. 16, 1914 Sept. 21, 1917
Bliss, T.H., Maj . Gen. Sept. 22, 1917 May 19, 1918
March, P.C. Gen. • • • « May 19, 1918 June 30, 1921
Derived from William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the 
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